Cooperative game theory and applications by Curiel, I.J.






The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 





Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.









C O O P E R A T I V E G A M E T H E O R Y A N D A P P L I C A T I O N S 
een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied van de 
wiskunde en natuurwetenschappen 
PROEFSCHRIFT 
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor 
aan de Katholieke Universiteit van Nijmegen, 
volgens besluit van het college van decanen 
in het openbaar te verdedigen op 
donderdag 1 september 1988 
des namiddags te 1.30 precies 
door 
INMACULATA JACINTA CURIEL 
geboren op 6 november 1960 te Curaçao 
krips repro meppel 
PROMOTOR: PROF. DR. S.H. TUS 
Pase loque pase, la vida continúa... 
Doble "R", 1976. 
ν 
LEDEN VAN DE MANUSCRIPTCOMMISSIE: 
PROF. DR. G. PEDERZOLI, CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY 
MONTREAL CANADA 
DR. J.A.M. POTTERS, KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT 
NIJMEGEN 
CIP-DATA KONINKLIJKE ВІВІЛОТНЕРЖ, DEN HAAG 
Curiel, Inmaculata Jacinta 
Cooperative game theory and applications / Inmaculata Jacinta Curiel. 
[S.l. : s.n.]. 
Thesis Nijmegen. With ref. - With summary in Dutch. 
ISBN 90-9002316-X 
SISO 517 UDC 519.83 
Subject heading: game theory. 
1980 Mathematics Subject Classification : 90D12 
vi 
CONTENTS 
Preface and summary xi 
Notation xiv 
Chapter 1. Cooperative games 1 
1.1 Introduction 1 
1.2 Cooperative games in characteristic function form 1 
1.3 The core, the core cover and the Weber set 4 
1.4 The Shapley-value 8 
1.5 The (pre-)kernel and the (pre-)nucleolus 11 
1.6 The r-value 15 
Chapter 2. Simple games 20 
2.1 Introduction 20 
2.2 Simple games 21 
2.3 The power index 7 23 
2.4 Other properties of 7 30 
Chapter 3. Linear programming games 35 
3.1 Introduction 35 
3.2 Linear programming games 35 
3.3 Linear programming games with committee control 42 
3.4 Non-balanced linear programming games 46 
3.5 A linear production game with claims 48 
Chapter 4. Combinatorial games 51 
4.1 Introduction 51 
4.2 Matching and permutation situations 51 
4.3 Assignment games and permutaion games 53 
4.4 Economies with indivisibilities 63 
4.5 Ordinal matching situations 67 
4.6 Sequencing games 75 
4.7 Traveling salesman games 86 
4.8 Minimum cost spanning tree games 99 
4.9 Location games 103 
vii 
Chapter 5. Bankruptcy games 105 
5.1 Introduction 105 
5.2 Bankruptcy problems 106 
5.3 Bankruptcy games 114 
5.4 An axiomatic characterization of the ЛР-rule 124 
References 128 
Subject index 134 
Author index 136 
Samenvatting 139 




P R E F A C E AND S U M M A R Y 
The systematic study of cooperative games started with their treatment in 
the well known book "Theory of games and economic behaviour" by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). Cooperative games are well suited to 
model situations of cooperation among a group of people. In this mono-
graph cooperative games in characteristic function form are studied. Such 
a game is an ordered pair consisting of a finite set, the set of players and 
a function, the characteristic function which assigns to each subset of play-
ers a real number, describing the worth of that subset in the game. In a 
situation modeled by such a game the players can decide to work alone or 
in subgroups called coalitions or all together in the grand coalition. The 
characteristic function describes the gain that they make in all these cases. 
A question to which much attention has been paid in cooperative game the-
ory is the following. Suppose that all the players decide to work together. 
How should the reward obtained by taking this course of action be divided 
among them? A desirable property for such a division to satisfy is that of 
securing stability when this is profitable. What is meant by this? Suppose 
that it is profitable for all the players to work together because the worth 
of the grand coalition is more than the sum of the worths of the coalitions 
in any partition of the group. Yet, for certain divisions of the reward it will 
be more profitable for a subgroup to leave the others and work on its own 
since it will gain more in this way. Such a division makes the formation of 
the grand coalition unstable, even when it is profitable. In such a situation 
a division which secures stability is desirable. However, such a division need 
not always exist while in other cases more than one division with this prop-
erty may exists. This inspired the definition of division rules based on other 
properies than stability. In chapter 1 attention will be paid to the existence 
of stable divisions and the definition of some of these other division rules. 
This monograph consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 is an introductory 
chapter. Cooperative games are defined and various of their properties are 
treated. Some well known division rules are discussed. 
Chapter 2 is dedicated to the study of simple games. These are special co-
operative games in which the characteristic function takes only the values 0 
and 1. These games can be used to model situations of committee control 
and of voting. The characteristic function of a simple game is regarded as 
describing the power of the coalitions rather than the gains they can achieve. 
Instead of a rule describing how to divide the gains, what is important here 
is an index describing the power of each player in the game. In chapter 2 
xi 
various power indices from the literature are mentioned and a new one is 
introduced and characterized in two ways. Other properties of this index 
which are not needed for the characterizations are treated as well. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to the study of cooperative games with the worth of a 
coalition equal to the value of a linear programming problem which depends 
on the coalition. These games are called linear progamming games. They 
turn out to be balanced, i.e. a division securing stability exists for them. 
Two examples of linear programming games, namely, flow games and linear 
production games are discussed. With the aid of these two examples the no-
tion of committee control in linear programming games is introduced. The 
simple games of chapter 2 are used to model this committee control. Linear 
programming games with committee control need not be balanced. If all 
the simple games describing the committee control in a linear programming 
game are balanced, then the game itself is balanced. It is proved that every 
non-negative balanced game is a linear programming game with committee 
control. For non-balanced linear programming games two methods to divide 
the gains are described. A variation on linear production games involving 
claims is studied. For this purpose claim games are introduced which will 
appear again in chapter 5 under the name bankruptcy games and will be 
studied extensively there. 
While in chapter 3 a linear programming problem determined the worth of a 
coalition, in chapter 4 this is done by a combinatorial progamming problem. 
Thus, a combinatorial game arises. In section 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 matching 
and permutation situations are studied In section 4.3 combinatorial games 
arising from these situations are treated. In general these games need not be 
balanced but various subclasses containing only balanced games are given. 
Section 4.4 treats economies with indivisibilities arising from permutation 
situations. In section 4.5 ordinal matching situations are handled. Section 
4.6 is dedicated to another combinatorial game, the sequencing game. This 
game turns out to have nice properties. One of them is balancedness. For 
two division rules from cooperative game theory, the Shapley-value and the 
r-vale, simple expressions can be found in the case of sequencing games. A 
division rule for sequencing situations defined without game-theoretic con-
siderations is shown to have the property that it secures stability of the 
grand coalition. This rule is characterized axiomatically. In section 4.7, 4.8 
and 4.9 combinatorial games which are concerned with costs rather than 
with rewards are treated. Section 4.7 deals with traveling salesman games. 
In general traveling salesman games need not be balanced. However, sub-
classes that contain only balanced games are given. Routing games which 
xii 
are closely related to traveling salesman games are defined. Contrary to 
traveling salesman games they are balanced. Section 4.8 deals with mini-
mum cost spanning tree games. Both these games as well as the location 
games studied in 4.9 are balanced. 
As already mentioned before, chapter 5 deals with bankruptcy games. These 
games arise from bankruptcy problems. Three division rules for bankruptcy 
problems are treated. It is proved that they correspond to three well known 
division rules from cooperative game theory. 
A more detailed summary of the contents of each chapter is given in the 
first section of that chapter. 
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1.1 Introduct ion 
This chapter contains basic notions and fundamental definitions from co­
operative game theory needed throughout this monograph. In section 2 
cooperative games in characteristic function form and various of their prop­
erties are introduced. In section 3 three solution concepts for cooperative 
games, the core, the core cover and the Weber set are discussed. Section 
4 deals with the Shapley-value, a one point solution concept. Section 5 is 
dedicated to the (pre-)kernel and the (pre-)nucleolus and their properties. 
In section 6 the r-value is studied. All the notions in these five sections 
are introduced in terms of the rewards that a group of people can achieve 
by working together. In section 7 it is shown that all these notions can be 
adapted to situations of costs also, where a group of people can decrease 
their costs by cooperating. 
1.2 Cooperat i ve games in characterist ic function forni 
Cooperative games in characteristic function form are well suited to model 
situations of cooperation among a group of people. This cooperation may 
have as a goal to obtain more revenues than in the case that they work 
separately. 
1.2.1 Definition A cooperative game in characteristic function form is an 
ordered pair < Ν, υ > where N is a finite set, the set of players and the 
characteristic function ν is a function from 2N to Ж with u(0) = 0. 
A subset 5" of N is called a coalition. The number v{S) can be regarded 
as the worth of coalition S in the game v. In the remainder of this work 
cooperative games in characteristic function form will be called shortly co­
operative games. The cooperative game < Ν, ν > will be identified with 
its characteristic function υ whenever there can be no confusion about the 
player set TV. The set of all cooperative games with player set ./V is denoted 
by GN. In general the set N is taken to be equal to {1,2, ...,n}. For a 
coalition 5 = {і'і,І2»"чг'к}» ^{S) will be denoted by (г'і,І2, .••1г&) instead 
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OÍ v({ÌlyÌ2,...,Ìk}). 
1.2.2 Definition A cooperative game is said to be superadditive if 
v(S) + v(T) < v(S U Τ) + v(S Π Τ) for all S,Te2N with S (Ί Τ = 0 . 
The game ν is called subadditive if the reverse inequality holds and additive 
if equality holds. 
In the context of revenues superadditivity of a game is important while 
in the context of costs subadditivity of a game is important. 
1.2.3 Definition A cooperative game is said to be convex if 
v(S) + v(T) < v(SUT) + v(SΠ Τ) for all S,T E2N . 
The game ν is called concave if the reverse inequality holds. 
Shapley (1971) proved that a game υ is convex iff 
t ;(SU{i})-t;(S)< v(TU{i})-v(T) ΐοτ Ά\\ г £ N and aU S С Τ С N \ {г}. 
It follows that ν is concave if the reverse inequality holds. 
1.2.4 Definition A cooperative game υ is called O-normalized ifv(i) = 0 for 
all i G Ν, ν is called (O^j-normalized ifv(i) = 0 for all г G N and v(N) = 1. 
1.2.5 Definition Two cooperative games и and ν are said to be strate­
gically equivalent if there exist а к > 0 and αι ,α2, . . . , α
η
 such that 
v(S) = ku(S) + Σ сц for all S E2N . 
Every cooperative game υ with v(N) > J2ieNv(i) '1S strategic equivalent 
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to exactly one (O,l)-normalized game. 
1.2.6 Definition A cooperative game ν is monotonie ifv(S) > v(T) when­
ever SDT. 
1.2.7 Definition A cooperative game ν is called 0-monotonic if υ is strate­
gically equivalent to a O-normalized monotonie game. 
A game υ is O-monotonic if and only if 
v(T) < v(S) - Σ υ ( ι ) whenever 5 D Τ . 
ies\T 
1.2.8 Definition The duai game v* of a cooperative game ν is defined 
by v*(S) := v(N) - v(N \ S) for all S € 2N. 
Note that the dual game of a convex game is concave and vice versa and 
that υ** = ν for every game v. 
The set ΟΝ oí all cooperative games with player set JV is a (2n — 1)-
dimensional linear space. 
1.2.9 Definition For each Τ € 21* the T-unanimity game UT is defined 
by 
u (s) f 1 i f 5 c T 
1 0 otherwise. 
The set {UT \ Τ G 2N\ {0}} is a basis of the linear space G1*. Any game υ G 
GN can be written as J^^TcN ст( )ит where ст( ) = 5Глсг( — l) ' r ' - 'Ä 'w(-ß) . 
1.2.10 Definition A collection В of non-empty subsets of N is called a 
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balanced collection if there exist positive numbers Χ$ for all S £ В such 
that J2seB^s^s = Ілг· 
The numbers Х$ are called weights of the elements of B. A balanced collec­
tion containing no proper balanced subcollection is called a minimal balanced 
collection. 
1.2.11 Definition A cooperative game υ is called a balanced game if for 
every balanced collection В with weights {\s}seB the following holds 
ν(Ν)>Σ\5υ(5). (1) 
seB 
Let υ be a cooperative game. For each S G 2N the subgame < S, vs > 
is defined by vs(T) = v(T) for all Τ С 5. 
1.2.12 Definition A cooperative game ν is called totally balanced if for 
each coalition S the subgame vs is balanced. 
1.3 T h e core, the core cover and the W e b e r set 
If in a game ν all the players decide to work together then the question arises 
how v(N) should be divided among them. A distribution of v(N) can be 
represented by a payoff vector χ G IR" where i¿ denotes the amount assigned 
to player i £ N. An χ GR" with x(N) = v(N) is called efficient. 
1.3.1 Definition A function ƒ which assigns to every cooperative game 
ν a, possibly empty, subset f(v) oflR™ is caiied a solution concept. 
1.3.2 Definition A solution concept f is called invariant under strategic 
equivalence if for every game v, every к > 0 and every additive game a, 
f(kv + a) = kf(v) + a. 
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A solution concept ƒ is a one-point solution concept if |/(t>)| = 1 for ev­
ery cooperative game v. If ƒ is a one-point solution concept then f(v) is 
denoted as an element of ]Rn rather than as a subset of IRn, i.e. f(v) = χ 
instead of f(v) = {x}. 
1.3.3 Definition Let ν be a cooperative game. Then the set of pre-
imputations PI(v) of the game ν is the subset oflR" containing all efficient 
vectors for the game v. 
A vector χ G Ж," is said to be individual rational for a game υ if i j > і?(г) 
for all г € TV. 
1.3.4 Definition The imputation set I(v) of a game ν is defined by 
I{v) := {x 6 DT I x(N) = v(N) and Xi > v(i) for all г e N} . 
An imputation of a game ι; represents a distribution of v(N) in such a way 
that no player can do better by working alone. However, it may still be 
possible for a group of players to improve its situation by leaving the grand 
coalition and working on its own. This is not the case when χ belongs to 
the core of v. 
1.3.5 Definition Let ν be a cooperative game. The core C(v) of ν is 
defined by 
C(v) := {x GUT | x(N) = v(N), x(S) > v(S) for all S G 2*} . 
The core of a game υ consists of those vectors in I t " representing distri­
butions which can not be improved upon by any coalition. The core of a 
game υ is a convex, compact subset of ]Rn and can be empty. The following 
well-known theorem, stated here without a proof, gives a characterization 
of games with a non-empty core. 
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1.3.6 Theorem (Bondareva (1961)-Shapley (1967)) A cooperative game 
ν has a non-empty core if and only if ν is balanced. 
From theorem 1.3.6 and definition 1.2.12 it follows that a game ν is to­
tally balanced if and only if each subgame of υ has a non-empty core. 
In fact it can be proved that a game υ has a non-empty core if and only if 
( 1) holds for all minimal balanced collections B. Cf. Shapley (1967). For 
superadditive games with three players this leads to the following proposi­
tion. 
1.3.7 Proposition Let ν be a superadditive game with set of players 
{1,2,3}. Ti]enC(t;)/0ifan(ioniyift;(l,2)- |-v( 1 »3) + i;(2,3)<2t;(l,2,3). 
Proof. Apart from the partitions of {1,2,3} there is only one minimal 
balanced collection, namely, В = {{1,2}, {1,3}, {2,3}} with weight | for 
all elements of B. Because of the superadditivty of ν ( 1 ) holds for all 
partitions of {1,2,3}. Therefore C(v) φ 0 if and only if ( 1) holds for 
В = {{1,2}, {1,3}, {2,3}} and this is the case if and only if w(l,2) + w(l,3)-|-
(2.3)<2г;(1,2,3). • 
1.3.8 Definition Let ν be a cooperative game. Then the upper vector 
Mv ofv is defined by 
M? := v(N) - v{N \ {г}) for ail г 6 N . 
The lower vector μν ofv is defined by 
/,V:=maxK5)- £ MJ). 
M¡ is the marginal contribution of player г to the grand coalition. If player 
г asks for more than M? it is better for the other players to work without 
him. Therefore, M" can be seen as the highest payoff that player i can 
expect to obtain if N forms. The following argument shows that μ" can be 
regarded as the minimum payoff that player г will consent to receive. Player 
г will argue that he can obtain μ" by forming a coalition for which the max­
imum in definition 1.3.8 is achieved and giving to the other members of the 
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coaUtion their highest payoíf. Thus, μ" can be seen as the minimal right of 
player t in the game v. 
1.3.9 Definition The core cover CC(v) of a cooperative game ν is defined 
by 
CC(v) := {x G I(v) | μυ < χ < M"} . 
1.3.10 T h e o r e m (Tijs and Lipperts (1982)) Let υ be a cooperative game. 
Then C(v) С CC(v). 
Proof. Let χ G C{v), then Xi = x{N)-x(N\{i}) < v(N)-v(N\{i}) = M? 
for each г G N. Further, for each 5 with г G S 




and it follows that χ G CC(v). D 
Tijs and Lipperts (1982) gave some classes of games with C(v) = CC(v). In 
chapter 5 a new class of games for which the core and the core cover coincide 
is given. 
1.3.11 Definition Let ν be a cooperative game and iet ж be a permu­
tation of v. Then the marginal vector τη'π(ν) of ν corresponding to π is 
defined by 
mUv) := ν(Ρ(π, i) U {»}) - ν(Ρ(τ, i)) 
where Ρ(π,ΐ) := {j G Ν \ K(J) < т(г)} , s *Ле set of predecessors of i with 
respect to π. 
1.3.12 Definition The Weber set W(v) of a cooperative game ν is the 
convex hu]] of the л.' marginal vectors. 
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The following theorems are stated without proofs. 
1.3.13 Theorem (Weber (1978)) Let υ be a cooperative game. Then 
C(v) С W(v). 
1.3.14 Theorem (Shapley (1971)) Let ν be a convex game. Then C(v) = 
W(v). 
1.3.15 Theorem (Ichiishi (1981)) Let υ be a cooperative game such that 
C(v) = W(v). Then ν is convex. 
Since the Weber set of a game is never empty it follows that convex games 
are balanced. Because any subgame of a convex game is again convex it 
follows that convex games are totally balanced. 
1.4 T h e Shapley-value 
Shapley (1953) used an axiomatic approach to introduce a one-point solu­
tion concept. In the following a one-point solution concept will also be called 
a solution function. Shapley posted a set of properties a solution concept 
should fulfil and proved that there exists a unique solution concept which 
satisfies these properties. 
1.4.1 Definition A player in a cooperative game ν is called a dummy 
player if v{S U {г}) - v(S) = v(i) for all S С N \ {i}. 
1.4.2 Definition A solution function f is said to satisfy the dummy player 
property if fi(v) = v(i) whenever i is a dummy player in the game v. 
1.4.3 Definition A solution function f is said to be efficient if f(v) is 
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efficient for every game υ. 
1.4.4 Definition A solution function f satisfies the symmetry property 
if /^(πυ) = fi(v) for every game v, each player i Ε N and each permu­
tation π G П^. Яеге the game πν is defined by πν(π(5)) := v(S) for all 
se2N. 
1.4.5 Definition A solution function is said to be additive if f(u + v) = 
ƒ(«) + f(v) for all cooperative games u, v. 
The following theorem is stated without a proof. 
1.4.6 Theorem (Shapley (1953)) There exists a unique solution concept 
φ which satisfies the dummy player property, the efficiency property, the 
symmetry property and the additivity property. Moreover, φ is given by 
φί{ν)= Σ mn-\s\)i{v{Sö{i})_v{s)h 
ScN\{i} 
The solution function φ from theorem 1.4.6 is called the Shapley-value. 
Another way to describe the Shapley-value is with the aid of the marginal 
vectors. The Shapley-value of a game ν is the average of the marginal vectors 
of the game, i.e. 
φ{υ) = _L £ m > ) . (2) 
From (2) and theorem 1.3.13 it follows that the Shapley-value of a convex 
game lies in th barycenter of the core of the game. If υ is a superadditive 
game then ψ(υ) is individual rational. For a general game ν this need not be 
the case. The Shapley-value of a non-convex game need not be an element 
of the core of the game. 
Young (1985a) gave a different characterization of the Shapley-value by re­
placing the dummy player property and the additivity property with a strong 
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monotonicity property. Driessen (1985a) characterized the Shapley-value by 
replacing the symmetry property and the dummy player property with a 
weak dummy player property and a restricted equality property. Hart and 
Mas-Colell (1985) provided an interpretation of the Shapley-value in terms 
of the potential function of a game. They characterized the Shapley-value 
with the aid of a consistency property. Here this consistency property and 
the reduced game needed for its definition will be called the HM-consistency 
property and the HM-reduced game in order to distinguish them from the 
consistency property and the reduced game which will be treated in section 
1.5. 
1.4.7 Definition Let ν be a game and let f be a solution function. For any 




f(T) = ν(Τϋ8)-Σ fi(T U S, ν) for allTcN\S 
where /¿(TU S, v) is the payoff to player г according to the solution function 
f in the game < Τ U 5, ν >. 
1.4.8 Definition A solution concept f is HM-consistent if for every game 
ν and each balanced collection S С N, one has 
/¿(Ν \ S, vf ) = fjiv) for alljeN\S 
where fj(N \ S,v^) is the payoff to player j according to the solution func­
tion f in the game < N \ S, vf >. 
The interpretation of HM-consistency is as follows. Consider a game ν and 
a coalition S С N. The members of a coalition Τ С N \ S look at the 
remainder after the members of 5 have received a payoff according to the 
solution function ƒ. Considering this, the worth of Τ in the new situation 
is taken to be equal to the original worth of S U Γ minus the payoffs of the 
members of 5 in the subgame < SU Τ, ν > according to ƒ. For the solution 
function ƒ to be HM-consistent ƒ has to appoint to each member of Τ in the 
HM-reduced game the same payoif as in the original game v. The following 
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result of Hart and Mas-Colell is stated without a proof. 
1.4.9 Theorem There is a unique HM-consistent solution function f with 
fiiv) = v(i)+\(v{i,j)-v{i)-v(j)) andfjiv) = v(j) + \(v(i,j)-v(i)-v(j)) 
for all cooperative games ν with two players i and j . Moreover, f is equal 
to the Shapley-value φ. 
Owen (1972) defined the multilinear extension of a game and described a 
way to calculate the Shapley-value of a game by means of the multilinear 
extension of the game. 
1.5 T h e (pre-)kernel and the (pre-)nucleolus 
The kernel of a cooperative game was introduced by Davis and Maschler 
(1965). Two concepts which are important in the definition of the kernel 
are those of excess and surplus. 
1.5.1 Defintion Let ν be a cooperative game and let χ G JR™ be a pay­
off vector. For any S С N the excess e(5, a;) of 5 with respect to χ is 
defined by 
e(S,x) := v(S)- Y^Xi-
ies 
1.5.2 Definition Let ν be a cooperative game and let i and j be two 
different players. The maximum surplus Sij(x) of г against j with respect 
to a payoff vector χ is defined by 
suil) := max e(S, x) 3
 seMi, 
where MÍJ := {S G 2N \ i G 5, j $ S}. 
The maximum surplus of player i against j with respect to χ can be re­
garded as the highest payoff that player t can gain (or the minimal amount 
that г can lose if Sij(x) is negative) without the cooperation of player j . 
Player г can do this by forming a coalition without j but with other players 
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who are satisfied with their payoff according to x. Thus, Sij can be regarded 
as the weight of a possible threat of t against j . If χ is an imputation then 
player j can not be threatened by i or any other player when Xj = v(j) 
because j can obtain v(j) by working alone. It is said that ι outweights j if 
XJ > v(j) and Sij(x) > Sji(x). 
The kernel is the set of imputations with the property that no player out­
weights another player with respect to such an imputation. 
1.5.3 Definition The /cernei Κ.(ν) of a cooperative game υ is defined by 
JC(v) := {x e I(v) | Sij(x) < sji(x) or x,· = v(j) for aü i,j€N,i¿ j) . 
Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1972) defined the pre-kernel of a cooperative 
game. 
1.5.4 Definition The pre-kernel VIC(v) of a cooperative game υ is defined 
by 
VIC(v) := {x G PI(v) | e¿,-(x) = Sji for all i,j £ N, i φ j) . 
Davis and Maschler (1965) proved that the kernel of a cooperative game 
is always non-empty. Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1972) proved that the 
pre-kernel of any cooperative game is non-empty and that for 0-monotonic 
games the kernel and the pre-kernel coincide. From the definition it follows 
that convex games are 0-monotonic and hence the kernel and the pre-kernel 
coincide for convex games. 
For the definition of the nucleolus introduced by Schmeidler (1969) the fol­
lowing notions are required. Let ν £ GN. For any χ £ ]Rn let θ{χ) be 
the vector in E.n whose coordinates are the excesses of the 2 n subset of jV 
arranged in decreasing order. That is, 
9%(х) > 0j(x) whenever 1 < i < j < 2 n . 
Consider the lexicographic order on the vectors θ(χ). The lexicographic 
order is defined as follows. Given two vectors y = (yi,...,yq) and ζ = 
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(zi,..., 2q), y is said to be lexicographically smaller than ζ if there exists an 
integer к with 1 < к < q such that 
yi — z¡ for 1 < / < к 
Ук < Zk . 
This relation will be denoted by у <L Ζ while у <£ ζ is used to indicate 
that either y < ¿ ζ or у = ζ. 
1.5.5 Definition The nucleolus ¡/(ν) of a cooperative game ν is defined 
by 
v(v) := {x e I(v) | θ(χ) <L (у) for all y G 1{ )} . 
Thus, the nucleolus consists of those imputations which minimize the max­
imum excess. Schmeidler(1969) proved that the nucleolus of any game con­
sists of exactly one point which is always an element of the kernel of the 
game and which lies in the core of the game whenever the core is not empty. 
Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1972) proved that for a convex game the ker­
nel consists of a single point and therefore this point is the nucleolus. Thus, 
for a convex game r, V)C(v) — IC(v) = i'(v). 
1.5.6 Definition The pre-nucleolus pu(v) of a game ν is defined by 
pi>(v) := {x e PI(v) | θ(χ) <L (у) for all y G PT(v)} . 
The pre-nucleolus of any game consists of a unique point. For the charac­
terization of the pre-nucleolus as given by Sobolev (1975) the reduced дате 
property is needed. 
1.5.7 Definition Let ν be a cooperative game and let $ φ S С N. Let 
x G IR". The reduced game < 5, vf > of ν with respect to S and χ is defined 
by 
νξ(Τ) 
0 if T = 0 
v(N) - x{S) if T = S 
max{v(TUQ)-x(Q)\QcN\S} if Τ С S,Τ φ 0,5. 
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Reduced games were defined and investigated in Davis and Maschler (1965). 
The reduced game < 5, r f > describes a situation where all the members of 
N agree that each member j of N \ S will receive Xj. Then the members of 
S can get v(N) — x(N \ S). A coalition Τ С S, Τ ψ S can cooperate with a 
coalition Q С N\S to obtain v(TuQ). However, Q still has to receive x(Q), 
thus by cooperating with Q, Τ will obtain v(T\J Q) — x(Q). The worth of 
Τ in the reduced game is equal to the maximum of all these expressions. 
1.5.8 Definition A solution concept f has the reduced game property if it 
satisfies the following condition. 
ν G GN, 0 # S С N and χ G f (ν) imply x
s
 G f (S, νξ). 
A systemetic investigation of the reduced game property was first carried out 
by Aumann and Drèze (1974). They proved that the core has the reduced 
game property. The following theorem of Sobolev is stated here without a 
proof. 
1.5.9 Theorem The pre-nucleolus is the unique solution concept that satis-
fies the symmetry property, the invariance under strategic equivalence prop-
erty and the reduced game property. 
Peleg (1985) noted that the Shapley-value, the kernel and the nucleolus 
do not satisfy the reduced game property. The pre-kernel does satisfy the 
reduced game property and Peleg gave a characterization of the pre-kernel 
with the aid of the reduced game property and five other axioms. One of 
them is the converse reduced дате property. 
1.5.10 Definition A solution concept f satisfies the converse reduced game 
property if the following holds. If ν E GN and χ G I(v) and for each S Ç. 2N 
with \S\ = 2 the restriction of χ to S belongs to f(S, r f ) then χ belongs to 
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Peleg (1985) also gave a characterization of the core using the reduced game 
property and the converse reduced game property. 
1.6 The r-value 
The T-value is a solution concept which was introduced by Tijs (1981). Orig­
inally it was defined only for the subclass of quasi-balanced games where it 
is a solution function. 
1.6.1 Definition A game ν G GN is called quasi-balanced if 
1. μυ < Mv 
2. μν(Ν) < v(N) < MV{N). 
Note that every game with a non-empty core cover is quasi-balanced. With 
theorem 1.3.10 it follows that every balanced game is quasi-balanced. Let 
QN denote the set of quasi-balanced games in GN. It is straightforward to 
see that QN is a convex cone. For a game ν 6 QN the r-value is the unique 
efficient payoff vector on the closed interval [μ0,Μν]. 
1.6.2 Definition Let ν 6 QN. The τ-value τ(ν) of υ is defined by 
T(V) := Χμυ + (1- X)MV 
where λ G [0,1] is uniquely determined by X^
e
jv r»( r) = r(iV). 
The r-value of a game ν G QN need not be an element of C(v) even when 
C(v) is not empty. In Driessen and Tijs (1985) necessary and sufficient con­
ditions for τ(υ) to be an element of C(v) are given. 
1.6.3 Definition Let ν G GN. The gap function gv : 2N -* R of υ is 
defined by 
gv(S) := MV(S) - v(S) for all S G 2 * . 
The gap function can be used to define a subclass of games for which a 
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simple expression for the r-value exists. 
1.6.4 Definition Let ν G G1*. Then ν is called semiconvex if ν is su­
peradditive and ff"({¿}) < gv(S) for all i Ε N and S £ 2N with г G S. 
Driessen and Tijs (1985) proved that every convex game is semiconvex and 
that every semiconvex game is quasi-balanced. The following result is due 
to Driessen and Tijs (1985). 
1.6.5 Theorem Let ν be a semiconvex game. Then τ(ν) = Xv + (1 — \)MV 
where v — (v(l),v(2),...,v(n)) and where λ is such that т( ) is efficient. 
Proof. Let г G N and suppose that μ" = v(T) — J3jer\{t·} ^j where Τ is such 
that i £ T. Then v(T) - Ejer\{i} Mj > V(S) - Ejes\{i} Щ for aU S £ 2 ^ 
with г £ S. This yields v(T) - MV(T) > v(S) - MV(S) for all 5 with г £ S. 
From the definition of the gap function it follows that gv(T) < gv(S) for all 
5 with i £ 5. Because ν is semiconvex this yields gv(T) = gv({i}) or equiv­
alenti^ v(T) - MV(T) = v(i) - M?. Now μ? = v(T) - MV(T) + M? = v(i) 
completes the proof. • 
1.6.6 Corollary Let ν be a semiconvex zero-normalized game. Then т( ) = 
Mvv(N)/Mv(N). 
Proof. Immediate from theorem 1.6.5 • 
Driessen and Tijs (1985) introduced the subclass of 1-convex games. They 
proved that these games have a non-empty core and that r-value, nucleo­
lus and center of gravity of the core all concide for these games. Driessen 
(1985b) gave an characterization of the 1-convex games by means of the 
structure of their cores. In Driessen and Tijs (1984) an extension of the 
r-value from QN to GN was given. However, this extension does not posses 
the individual rationality and dummy player property which the r-value 
does posses on QN. In Tijs and Driessen(1986a) another extension of the 
r-value from QN to the subclass of games with a non-empty imputation set 
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was given that is individual rational and possesses the dummy player prop­
erty. A thorough treatment of the r-value and 1-convex games and their 
generalization, k-convex games can be found in Driessen (1985c). 
1.6.7 Definition A solution concept f on QN is said to have the mini­
ma] right property if f(v) = μν + f (ν — μ0) for all υ G QN. Неге ν — μν is 
the game defined by (v — μν)(3) :— v(S) — μν(8). 
Note that if υ G QN then ν - μν G QN. The minimal right property says 
that the payoffs assigned by ƒ in ν are the same as in the case where the 
players get their minimal right first and then ƒ is applied to the adapted 
game ν — μυ. Note that any solution concept which is invariant under strate­
gic equivalence satisfies the minimal right property. 
1.6.8 Definition A solution function ƒ on QN has the restricted propor­
tionality property if for every ν G QN with μυ = 0 f (ν) is proportional to 
Mv. 
The following characterization of the r-value is due to Tijs (1987). 
1.6.9 Theorem The r-vaiue is the unique efficient solution function on QN 
with the minimal right property and the restricted proportionality property. 
Proof. From the definition it follows that the r-value is efficient. Tijs (1981) 
proved that the r-value on QN is invariant under strategic equivalence and 
hence the r-value satisfies the minimal right property. Again from the defi­
nition it is obvious that for a game ν G QN with μυ = 0, г(г;) is proportional 
to Mv. Thus, the r-value possesses the restricted proportionality property. 
Let ƒ : QN -* lRn be a solution function with the three mentioned properties. 
Consider the game w = ν — μυ. For this game the following holds. 
M? = v(N) - μν(Ν) - v(N \ {г}) + μ·(Ν \ {i}) = M? - μ? 
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and 
μ? = тах.К5)-^(5)- Σ М " + Σ ^ ) 
¿es\{¿} jes\{»} 
= т а х ( г ( 5 ) - MV(S) + M? - μ?) 
5:5Э» 
= max(v(5) - M"(5) + М Л - μν 
8:8Эі 
= μ1-μ1 = 0. 
From the restricted proportionality property and efficiency it follows that 
f(v) = w(N)MwIMW(N) = T(W). Because of the minimal right property 
/(ν) = μυ + f (ν - μ") = μν + f {ν) = μν + T(W) = τ(ν). Thus, ƒ is equal to 
the r-value and the proof is completed. •. 
1.7 C o o p e r a t i v e cost games 
In the previous sections the definitions and concepts given were interpreted 
in terms of rewards. The purpose of this section is to show that it is possible 
to adjust these definitions and concepts in such a way that they are suitable 
for cost situations as well. The characteristic function of a cost game will 
be denoted in general with с instead of v. For a coalition 5 the amount 
c(S) is the cost of S. A cost game can be used to describe a situation 
where a group of people can decrease their costs by working together. In 
chapter 4 four examples of cost games will be discused. All the definitions 
in section 1.2 except that of balancedness stay the same for cost games. 
To obtain the definition of balancedness for cost games the inequality sign 
in 1.2.11 has to be reversed. If in a cost game the players decide to work 
together then the cost c(./V) has to be allocated among them. Just as in 
the case of reward games such an allocation can be represented by a vector 
a; G IRn where χ i denotes the cost allocated to player i G N. While in a 
situation with rewards it is assumed that each player wants to have as much 
of the rewards as possible, in a cost situation it is logical to assume that 
each player wants to contribute as little as possible to the total cost. With 
this in mind the definitions of the solution concepts given in section 1.3 can 
be adjusted. The definitions which are not mentioned here stay the same. 
By reversing the inequality signs in the definitions of the imputation set 
and the core, the definitions of these two sets for cost games is obtained. 
With the new definitions theorem 1.3.6 stays valid. Proposition 1.3.7 has 
to be adjusted by changing superadditive into subaditive and reversing the 
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inequality sign. For a cost game с the vector Mc is defined in the same 
way as in 1.3.8. The definition of μ' is obtained by changing "max" into 
"min". The interpretation of these vectors changes. M ' can be seen as the 
minimum cost that г can expect to have to pay and μ' as the highest cost 
that г will consent to pay. The core cover CC(c) of с is defined by reversing 
the inequality signs in 1.3.9. With the new definitions theorem 1.3.10 still 
holds. Theorems 1.3.14 and 1.3.15 have to be adjusted by changing convex 
into concave. The definitions in 1.4 need no adjustment. The definition of 
the excess e(S, x) of S with respect to an allocation a; in a cost game с is 
given by e(S,x) := ^ZieS1» — C(S)· With this new definition of excess the 
definitions of the (pre-)kernel and the (pre-)nucleolus can be given in the 
same way as in 1.5.3, 1.5.4, 1.5.5 and 1.5.6. The reduced game < 5, cf > of 
a cost game с with respect to a coalition S and an allocation a; is obtained 
from 1.5.7 by changing "max" into "min" and leaving everything else as 
before. With the new definitions all the results in section 1.5 still hold. For 
cost games the definition of quasi-balancedness can be given by reversing 
the inequality signs in 1.6.1. The r-value of a quasi-balanced cost game is 
defined in the same way as in 1.6.2 with the new definitions of M c and μ'. 
The gap function ge of a cost game с is defined similarly as in 1.6.3. A cost 
game с is called semiconcave if с is subadditive and ge{{i}) > 9C{S) for all 
г G N and S £2N with i G 5. Theorem 1.6.5 and corrollary 1.6.6 have to be 
adjusted by changing semiconvex into semiconcave. The characterization of 
the r-value given in 1.6.9 can be given in the same way for the r-value for 
cost games. Cooperative cost games are discussed e.g. in "Cost Allocation: 
Methods, Principles, Applications", H.P. Young (1985b) (ed.) and in Tijs 




2.1 Introduct ion 
This chapter deals with the, so called, simple games. A cooperative game 
υ is called a simple game if any coalition can either have worth 0 or 1. 
A coalition S is either all powerful, meaning that v(S) = 1 or completely 
powerless, meaning that v(S) = 0. Simple games were already introduced by 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and since then they have been used to 
model situations of committee control and of voting. Especially monotonie 
simple games, i.e. simple games in which the worth of any coalition is not 
less than the worth of any coalition it contains, have been used for these 
purposes. An outline of the descriptive theory of monotonie simple games 
is given in Shapley (1962). Lucas (1983) describes the use of a special type 
of these games, namely weighted majority games, to model weighted voting 
situations. A player in a simple game will want to know something about 
his power in the game. Several power indices have been proposed as a 
measure of the power of the players in monotonie simple games. Banzhaf 
(1953) and Coleman (1971) independently introduced power indices which 
are essentially the same. Shapley and Shubik (1954) restricted the Shapley-
value to monotonie simple games to obtain the Shapley-Shubik power index. 
Deegan and Packel (1978) introduced a power index which depends only on 
the minimal winning coalitions of a monotonie simple game. In Packel and 
Deegan (1980) a generalization of this index is given. Bolger (1980) studies 
a class of power indices which includes the Deegan-Packel index. In this 
chapter which is based on Curici (1987a) a class of non-normalized power 
indices is studied. The power indices in this class may not be efficient, 
i.e. summing up the power of all the players need not yield 1. They are 
regarded rather as functions describing the prospect of playing diiferent roles 
in a simple game than as division rules for gains. Therefore, efficiency is not 
a necessary condition for them. In section 2 simple games and power indices 
are formally introduced. In section 3 situations where not all coalitions 
are equally likely to be formed are studied. With each coalition a weight 
is associated as a measure for the probability that the coalition will form. 
For each system of weights { f s J ^ ^ O } a power index -/
r
 can be defined. 
When there can be no confusion about the system of weights involved, 7P 
will be denoted by 7. Two axiomatic characterizations of 7
r
 are given for 
a general system of weights. The second one will be in terms of utility 
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functions for simple games. In section 4 a necessary and sufficient condition 
for the system of weigths {rs}t£2N\{qi} 1S gi v e i i to guarantee that 7, has the 
symmetry property. It is proved that 7, satisfies the dummy property and 
the behaviour of 7, when two players quarrel is also examined. 
2.2 Simple games 
In this section formal definitions and notations needed throughout this chap­
ter will be introduced. 
2.2.1 Definition A cooperative game ν is CAÜed a simple game ifv(N) = 1 
and v(S) £ {0,1} for all S G 2N. 
2.2.2 Definition A simple game ν is called monotonie if v(S) < v(T) 
for all coalitions S and Τ with S С T. 
Definition A coalition S in a simple game ν is called losing ifv(S) = 0, S 
is called winning if v(S) = 1. 
2.2.4 Definition A coalition S in a monotonie simple game is called max­
imal losing if v(S) = 0 and v(T) = 1 for aii Τ D S, Τ φ S, S is caiied 
minimai winning ifv(S) = 1 and v(T) = 0 for aii Τ С S, Τ φ S. 
The collection of all winning coalitions in a simple game υ is denoted by 
W(v). The collection of all minimal winning coalitions in a monotonie sim­
ple game ν is denoted by Wm(v). For each г £ N the collection of all 
minimal winning coalitions containing t is denoted by W/7*^). 
2.2.5 Definition A player г £ N in a simple game ν is said to be: 
a dummy player if v(S) + v(i) = v(S U {г}) for all S С N \ {i} 
a null player if v(S) = v(S U {i}) for all S С N \ {i} 
a dictator if v(S) = 1 iff г £ S 
a veto player if v(S) = 1 implies i £ S . 
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A dummy player г can be either a null player, in case v(i) = 0, or a dictator, 
in case г;(г) = 1. 
A well known result for simple games is that a simple game is balanced if 
and only if it has at least one veto player. 
2.2.6 Theorem Л simple game ν is balanced if and only if ν has veto 
players. 
Proof. Let г 6 N be a veto player of v. Define χ G lRn by i¿ = 1 and 
Xj = 0 for all j € N \ {i}. Then i (5 ) = 1 > v(S) for all 5 with i G S and 
x(S) = 0 = v(S) for all S D N \ {i}. Thus, χ G С (υ) and the "if" part of 
the proof is completed. Suppose that ν has no veto players. Then for each 
г E N there is a 5¿ С N \ {i} with v(Si) = 1. Hence if χ were an element 
of the core of υ then ц = 0 for all г G Ν, but this contradicts i(iV) = 1 
and thus the core of υ is empty. This yields the "only if" part and thus the 
proof is completed. • 
Spinetto (1971) proved that every non-negative (0,l)-normalized balanced 
game can be written as a convex combination of balanced simple games. 
The following generalization of this result has been given by Derks (1987) 
and is stated here without a proof. 
2.2.7 Theorem (Derks) Every non-negative balanced game can be writ­
ten as a positive linear combination of simple games. 
As already mentioned monotonie simple games can be used for modelling 
situations of commitee control and of voting. A player in such a situaion 
will want to know how much influence he has on the outcome of the game. 
He will need a measure of his power in the game. Such a measure is called 
a power index. 
2.2.8 Definition A power index is a function ƒ which assigns to every 
monotonie simple game ν a vector f(v) G JR™. 
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The number fi(v) is considered to be a measure of the power of player i 
in the game v. Examples of power indices are the Shapley-Shubik index 
and the Banzhaf index. The Shapley-Shubik index is in fact the restriction 
of the Shapley-value to the monotonie simple games. The Banzhaf index 
counts the number of swings of a player г. A swing for a player г is a pair of 
sets of the form (5U {г},5\ {г}) such that 5 U {¿}is winning and S \ {i} is 
losing. The original characterization of the Shapley-value can not be used 
for the Shapley-Shubik index because the set of monotonie simple games is 
not a linear space. Dubey (1975) characterized the Shapley-Shubik index 
by replacing the additivity axiom by a so called transfer axiom. A power 
index ƒ fulfils this axiom if f(v V w) + f(v Л w) = f(v) + f(w) for all mono-
tonic simple games ν and w. The Banzhaf index can be characterized in 
a similar way as the Shapley-Shubik index by changing the efficiency prop­
erty into an appropiate property. Bolger (1982) gives a characterization of 
the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index without explicitly using 
the transfer axiom. Owen (1975a) extended the Banzhaf index to become 
a solution concept for all cooperative games and characterized this solution 
concept in terms of the multilinear extension of a game. Dubey and Shapley 
(1979) study various mathematical properties of the Banzhaf power index. 
In Owen (1977) and Owen (1980) modifications of respectively the Shapley-
Shubik index and the Banzhaf index are given for games with a priori unions. 
Weber (1978) and Straffin (1983) describe several ways of interpreting the 
Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf indices. 
Deegan and Packel (1978) introduced and characterized a power index which 
depends only on the minimal winning coaltions of a monotonie simple game. 
They assume that only minimal coalitions will form and that all minimal 
winning coalitions have the same probability of forming. In Packel and Dee­
gan (1980) they relax this last assumption and give a generalization of their 
index to the case where only minimal winning coalitions with the same size 
are assumed to have equal probability of forming. The power index 7 which 
will be introduced in section 2.3 will also depend only on the minimal win­
ning coalitions of a monotonie simple game. However, in the definition of 7 
it is not assumed that minimal winning coalitions with the same size have 
the same probabiltiy to occur. 
2.3 The power index 7 
Consider a situation of committee control where not all the subsets S of the 
committee І are equally likely to occur. To each 0 / S С N a weight Γ5 > 0 
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is attached which is interpreted as a measure for the probability that S will 
be formed. For all 5, Τ G 2 ^ \ {0}, rs > r j means that the formation of 5 
is more likely to occur then the formation of T. Coalitions with the same 
weight are equally likely to occur and vice versa. For every collection В of 
coalitions J2s€B rS is denoted by r(B). Let a specific structure of winning 
and losing coalitions in the committee TV be described by a monotonie simple 
game v. In considering υ it is assumed that only minimal winning coalitions 
in ν will be formed. This assumption is justified by the fact that a minimal 
winning coalition can achieve as much as any coalition containing it. It 
is reasonable to assume that any profit resulting from the formation of a 
winning coalition has to be divided among its members so that there is no 
incentive to form larger coalitions which can not achieve more than smaller 
ones (cf. Riker (1962)). Let MSGN denote the set of monotonie simple 
games with set of players equal to TV. For each ν G MSGN and each 
S G 2N define 
/ ч _ ƒ 0 if S І Г т ( ) 
VsKV) :
~ \ rslr{Wm{v)) if 5 G Wm(v). 
Then 
ps(v) > for each S £2N and p(Wm(v)) = 1 . (1) 
The number ps(v) is interpreted as the probability that coalition S is formed 
in the game v. The power index 7 assigns to each player t G TV in a simple 
game ν the probability that a minimal winning coalition containing him will 
be formed. 
2.3.1 Definition The power index 7 is defined by 
ъ
( ) = ρ(\ν^(ν)) for eacA г G TV. 
Note that since the summation over the empty set is zero 7J(V) = 0 if 
И^
т(г;) = 0. By looking at 7i(u) player г can find out something about his 
importance in the game v. The larger 7,(u) the more important he is in the 
game. If i is a veto player nothing can be done without him and 7¿(v) is 
equal to 1, the highest value it can take. 
2.3.2 Definition Let v-i and V2 be two monotonie simple games. Then 
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vi and V2 are called mergeable if for all S G Wm(t>i) and Τ G Wm(v2), 
S t Τ and Τ £ S. 
Note that for two mergeable games Vi and V2: 
VFm(v1) Π Wm(v2) = 0 and Wm(t; 1) U Wm(v2) = W"1^ V υ2) . (2) 
2.3.3 Definition A power index ƒ is said to satisfy the merge property if 
nvMWm(Vl)) + f(V2)r(W™(V2)) 
Л і * ν V2) r(W"»(wi)) + г( У'»(г;2)) 
for aii mergeable games νχ and V2. 
2.3.4 Definition A power index ƒ is said to satisfy the null player property 
if /t(v) = 0 whenever г is a nuii player in v. 
2.3.5 Definition A power index ƒ is said to satisfy the veto player property 
if ft(v) — 1 whenever г is a veto player in v. 
The following theorem provides a characterization of the power index 7. 
2.3.6 T h e o r e m The power index 7 is the unique power index which sat­
isfies (i) the merge property, (ii) the null player property and (Hi) the veto 
player property. 
Proof Let г G N be a null player in a monotonie simple game v. Then 
W™(v) = 0 and hence 7t(v) = 0 by definiton and it follows that 7 satis­
fies (ii). Let г G N be a veto player in a monotonie simple game v. Then 
W™(v) = Wm(v) and 7,(«) = p(W™(v)) = p(Wm(v)) = 1 by ( 1). Hence 7 
satisfies (Hi). Let «1, V2 be two mergeable simple games with vi V V2 = v. 
Then it follows from ( 2) that 
7 . И = р ( И 7 » ) = Σ ps(v)+ £ ps(v) 
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f(r(Wm(v1)) + r(Wm(v2))) (3) 
= Р в Ы К И ^ Ы У К И ^ Ы ) + г(И">2))). 
Similarly, for each S € W"1^) 
Ps(v) = Ps(v2)r(Wm(v2)/(r(Wm(vi)) + r(Wm(v2))) . (4) 
Together ( 3) and ( 4) lead to 




 г(\ т( і)) + r(Wm{v2)) 
7«(Pi)r(Wm(v1)) + ъ(у2)г(\Ут(у2)) 
г(1У т(гі)) + т(\ т(
 2)) 
and it follows that 7 satisfies (i). 
Let ƒ be a power index satisfying (i), (ii) and (iii). Let υ be a monotonie 
simple game with Wm(v) = {Si,S2,..., Sk}. For each / G {1,.., k} the game 
vi is defined by 




= \ 0 if TjSi. 
The games Vi,v2,..., гц are mergeable and ν = vi V v2 V ... V v*. From the 
null player and veto player property it follows that 
, . ν ƒ 0 if t ^ 5 | 
/ i W =
 \ l if ikSi 
or shortly, /¿(rj) = І5,(0· Using the inductive extension of the merge prop­
erty to a merge of к mergeable games leads to 
=










= г(\ ^( ))/г(\ т( )) 
= p(wr(y)) = ii(v). 
Thus, ƒ = 7 and the uniqueness of 7 is proved. Π 
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The ideas behind the null player and the veto player properties are clear. A 
null player has no power at all and this is reflected in the null player prop­
erty. A veto player is very powerful and the veto player property assigns to 
him the highest measure of power possible. The merge property states that 
the power of a player in the merge of two mergeable games is the weighted 
mean of his power in the separate games. Another way of interpreting this 
property is as follows. Let vi, v^ be two mergeable games and suppose player 
г G N is playing riwith probability т{\ т( -
і
))І{т{\ тп{ і)) + r(Wm(t>2))) 
and V2 with probability г( У т(г2))/(г(И^ т(иі)) + T{Wm(v2))). Then the 
merge property says that 7¿(ui V Uz) is his expected power in this situation. 
For example, if he has absolute power in v\ and is completely powerless in 
V2 then his expected power is equal to the probability that ri occurs. 
The Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index were characterized by 
Roth (1977) as utility functions for simple games which differ in their pos-
tures toward risk. Here a characterization of 7 as a utility function for simple 
games will be derived. 
2.3.7 Definition A set M is said to be a mixture set if with any a,b € M 
and any λ 6 [0,1] an element λα + (1 — \)b can be associated which is again 
in M and where 
• la + (1 - 1)6 = a 
• λ α - | - ( 1 - λ ) 6 = ( 1 - λ ) 6 - ( - λ α 
• μ(Χα + (1 - X)b) + (1 - μ)6 = (μλα + (1 - μλ))ο 
for all α, b E M and λ, μ ζ [0,1]. 
Let Л be a complete, transitive, continuous preference relation on M. For 
any a, 6 (Ξ M, aRb is interpreted as a is not less preferred than 6. HaRb and 
bRa then there exists indifference between α and ό and this is denoted by 
alb. If aRb and not bRa then α is more preferred than b and this is denoted 
by aPb. 
2.3.8 Definition Let M be a mixture set witii a compiete, transitive, con-
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tinuous preference relation R defined on M. A function и from M to IR is 
said to be a utility function which represents R if 
(i) u(a) > u(b) if and only ifaPb 
(ii) u(Xa + (1 - X)b) = λιι(α) + (1 - A)«(ò) 
for all a, 6 G M and all λ 6 [0,1]. 
The following result of Herstein and Milnor (1953) is stated here without a 
proof. 
2.3.9 Theorem Let M be a mixture set with a complete, transitive, con­
tinuous preference relation R defined on M such that for all a, 6 G M if 
alb then for any с G M, ( | a + | c ) / ( | 6 + | c ) . Then there exists a utility 
function и which represents R. Furthermore, и is unique up to an affine 
transformation. 
Let M be the mixture space generated by Μ5οΝχΝ. Let R be a complete, 
transitive, continuous preference relation on M which satisfies the condition 
of 2.3.9. For elements (v,i), (w,j) of MSGN X І , (v,i)R(w,j) is inter­
preted as: "It is as least as preferable to play position г in the game ν as 
to play position j in the game w." For elements X(v, i) + (1 — X)(w,j) and 
μ(ς, к) + (1 - μ)(ζ, I) of M, X(v, i) + (1 - λ)(«;, j)Rß(q, *) + ( ! - μ)(ζ, I) is in­
terpreted as: "It is as least as preferable to play with probability λ position 
i in the game ν and with probability 1 — λ position j inthe game w as it is to 
play with probability μ position к in the game q and with probability 1 — μ 
position I in the game z. From theorem 2.3.9 it follows that there exists a 
utility function и which represents R. For each S G 2 ^ \ {0} let the game 
vs G M SGN be defined by 
ƒ 1 if TDS 
Consider the following extra conditions which can be imposed on R. 
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C . I Let 5 С Ν, S φ 0. Then 
(г>{;},1).Г(г>5,г) for all г 6 S 
(»{i}> І) Π*** J) f o r a 1 1 J^ S,ie N\ {j} 
(v{iy,i)P(v{jy,i) for all i,j Ε N with г ^ j 
(v{iy,i)R(v,i)R(v{jy,i) for all υ G MSGN, i,j G JV with гф j . 
C.2 Let WI,Î?2 G MSGN be mergeable. Then 
С K W ^ P i ) ) .. r(Wm(v2)) .. 
Condition C.2 states that indifference existst between playing the game 
vi V V2 and playing with probability г ( 1 У м ( г ; 1 ) ) / ( г ( И л М ( и 1 ) ) + 7-(Vrm(r2))) 
the game υχ and with probability г( Г т ( и 2 ) ) / ( г ( Ж т ( г ; і ) ) + 7-(ІУта(г>2)))) 
the game ^г· 
The utility function и representing R is unique up to an affine transforma­
tion. Therefore it can be normalized to satisfy 
u(v{iy,i) = 1 and U(Ü{¿}, j) — 0 for all i,j G І with г φ j . (5) 
With the function и a strategic utility function м can be associated where ω 
is a function from MSGN toïï t" defined by 
щ{ ) := u(v, i) for each ν G MSGN and each г G JV. (6) 
2.3.10 T h e o r e m Let R be a complete, transitive, continuous preference 
relation on M satisfying the condition of theorem 2.3.9 and the conditions 
C.l and C.2. Let и be the unique utility function representing R which 
satisfies (5). Then the strategic utility function й associated with и by (6) 
is equal to the power index 7. 
Proof. Let ν E MSGN with Wm(v) = {5 ι , . . . ,5 2 } . For each l G {1, ...,*} 
let us, be denoted by «j. The games V\,V2,..., v^ are mergeable and 
ν = vi V г>2 V ... V Vk- From C.l, the definiton of и and ( 5) it follows that 
ui(v¡) = u(vi,i) = lSl(i) = 7,(1;/) for all l G {1,...,к}, i G Ν. 
Inductive extension of condition C.2 yields 
Щ( ) = Ui(vi V V2 V ... V Vk) 
29 
= (»"s,Isií«) + · · • + rshlsh(i)/(rsi + ••· + rSk) 




))/т(\ т( )) 
= fi(vi V «2 V ... V Vk) = ъ( ) . 
Thus, и equals 7. • 
2.4 Other propert ies of 7 
In this section some other properties of 7 will be studied. A property usu­
ally required for a power index is the symmetry property. A power index ƒ 
possesses the symmetry property if /^(πυ) = fi(v) for each π G Пдг, i £ Ν 
and ν G MSGN. Recall that the game ж is defined by πυ(π·(5)) = v{S) 
for each S G 2^. Because of the weights rg ocurring in the definition of 7 
which need not be the same for coalitions with the same size, 7 does not, in 
general, satisfy the symmetry property. This is in fact quite natural because 
if the probability that a coalition is formed really depends on the members 
of the coalition and is not the same for all coalitions with the same size, 
symmetry can not be expected in a power index evaluating such a situation. 
This is reflected in the following proposition. 
2.4.1 Proposi t ion The power index 7 satisfies the symmetry property if 
and only if rs = г
г
 for all S,Te2N with \S\ = |Г | . 
Proof. Suppose there exists 5, Τ with | 5 | = |T | and rs Φ τχ. Let π be 
a permutation of Ή such that π(5) = Τ and 7г(Г) = 5. Let i e S, i g T. 
Consider the monotonie simple game ν with Wm(v) = {S, Τ}. Then also 
Wm(nv) = {S,T}. Further, 
rS + TT TS + TT 
and thus, 7 does not satisfy the symmetry property. This proves the "only 
if" part. 
Suppose that for all 5,Τ G 2 * with | 5 | = |Γ | , r s = т
т
. Let ж G IIjv and 
ν G MSGN. For each S G 2 ^ the following holds 
. . f 0 if 8$.\ т(ж ) 
РЗ{Ж )
 = { ^ Й Е д , if S G W-(xr) 
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yielding 
/ О if π-\5) ? И"» 
Μπν)
 = { ^ й у if *- ) e w^í«) = P,r-l(s)(r) ' 
For г 6 N this leads to 






This proves the "if" part and the proof is completed. • 
A power index ƒ satisfies the dummy player property if fi(v) = v(i) when-
ever г is a dummy player in υ G MSGN. 
2.4.2 Proposi t ion TAe power index 7 satisfies the dummy player prop­
erty. 
Proof. Let ν G MSGN and let г be a dummy player in v. Then г is ei­
ther a null player or a dictator. If г is a null player then 7¿(u) = 0 = ν{ι) by 
2.3.6. If i is a dictator then W™(v) = Wm(v) = {г} and 7,(1;) = v(i). О 
Next the behaviour of the power index 7 when two players in a simple game 
quarrel, i.e. refuse to enter into a coalition together, will be investigated. 
Kilgour (1974) was the first to give a formal description of quarelling in 
the context of the Shapley-value. Brams (1975) gives an example in which 
the Shapley-Shubik Index and the Banzhaf index of two quarrelling players 
increase after their quarrel. Several other things may happen with these 
indices when two players quarrel. Straffin (1983) gives the following list 
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of things that can happen with power as measured by the Shapley-Shubik 
index and the Banzhaf index when two players quarrel. 
(i) They may both gain power. 
(ii) They may both lose power. 
(iii) One may gain power while the other loses power. 
(iv) Their power may not be affected at all but the power of innocent 
bystanders may be changed. 
(v) If one of them is a null player the other may lose power. 
When power is measured by the power index introduced by them, Deegan 
and Packel (1983) show that (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) can also occur but that quar­
relling with a null player does not affect anyone's power. When the power 
index 7 is taken as a measure neither (i), (iii), (iv) nor (v) will happen. 
2.4.3 Definition Let υ € MSGN, i,j€ N and denote by v® the game 
arising from ν when i and j quarrel. Then v® is defined by ИЛт(г!<?) = 
{s I s e w^iv), {ij} <t_ 5} = {s ι s e wm(v), s i w^{v) η итч«)}. 
The following theorem describes what can happen to the power index 7 
when two players quarrel. 
2.4.4 Theorem Let υ G MSGN, i,j Ε N and v® as defined in 2.4.3 
(a) nw™(v) Π Wp(v) = 0 then ι(υ<*) = -/(ν). 
(b) IfW™(v) η Wp(v) φ 0 and W? φ Wm{v), Wfiy) φ 0 then 
7»(*>Q) < 7.(w) and 7j(t><3) < η3(ν). 
(c) Let ζ E N with Wp(v) φ 0 and W™(v) П Wp(v) П Wp(v) = 0. If 
W™{v) Π W?(v) φ 0 then 7,(»9) >
 Ίζ
(ν). 
Proof, (a) Wm(vQ) = { 5 1 5 6 Wm(v), S $ W™(v) ñ W?(v)} = Wm(v) 
hence ps(v^) = Ps(v) for each S E 2N and 7(1;') = 7(v). 
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(b) Without loss of generality it is assumed that 
Wm(v) = {Si, Sa, .-..S*} 
Writ;) = {Si, Sj,..., S,} К к 
Wp(v) = {S1H.i,...,Si,Si+i,...,Sg} g < Ä , p + l < / . 
Then W7»(t>) # Wm{v), Wp(v) φ Wm{v) and W?(v) П Wf{v) = 
{Sp+i,...,Si} ^ 0. Furthermore, 
Η " > β ) = {S1,...SP,S,+1,...,SÇ} 
Ж Г ( ^ ) = {Si,...,Sp} 






< $ • 
< 
& 
7 i ( » 9 ) < 
(*·* + · · 
(г* + · · 
(г* + · · 
(rSl + • • 
(Г* + · · 
(»'s, + · · 
0 < (rs^ 
7^)^Р(^Г(^))<Р(^ГИ) 
• + i-SjMrs, + · · · + rsF + rs l + 1 + · 
• + rsl){rsl +--- + rsfc) 
• + rs,){rs1 +---+rsk) 
+Г5,)(г5і+---+Г5г + Г51+1 + ·· 
· + » · 5 , ) ( Γ 5 ι + 1 + · · · + Γ51ι) 
• » • 5 , ) ( г 5
І + 1 + - " + Г5») 
ц + - - ' + г5,)(г5
І+1 + - - - + r s j 
•• + r s j 
• + rs*) 
and the last inequality holds because Г5 > 0 for each 0 / S С N. In the 
same way "/¡(v^) < 7j(v) can be shown. 
(c) Without loss of generality the same assumptions as in (b) are made with 
the difference that instead of g < к, q < к is taken. Further Wp(v) is 
assumed to be equal to 
{S0, Sa+i,..., Sb, Sc, Sc+i,..., Sd} with a < ò < p , с > / + 1, d < к . 
Then W^(v) φ 0, W?{v) П W^{v) П W^[yi) = 0 and W?{v) П W^{v) = 










 + · · · + rSi 
rsi+---+rsp + rsl+l + · • • + Tsk 
rs* + · · · + rsb + rsc + · · · + Т5Л 
rs1 + • • • + rsk 
= 7z(v)· 
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Thus, the proof is completed. D 
From theorem 2.4.4 it follows that when two players who are not together in 
any minimal coalition quarrel, the 7-value of the game does not change. This 
implies that quarrelling with a null player can not hurt anybody. When two 
players who are not veto players and who are together in at least one mini­
mal winning coalition quarrel, they will both lose power and a third one who 
is not in any minimal winning coalition with both of them will gain power. 
A quarreller will never benefit from the quarel when power is measured by 
7. The power index 7 does not lead to the quarrelling paradoxes induced by 
the other indices mentioned. However, a paradox which does occur for the 
Deegan-Packel index and also for 7 but not for the Shapley-Shubik index 
and the Banzhaf index is the so called weighted voting paradox. Let ν be 
the 5-person weighted majority game with v(S) = 1 if Y^ÌQS wi ^ 5 and 
v(S) = 0 otherwise. Here wi = 3, W2 = 2, W3 = W4 = w^ = 1. Then 
f ) _ r{lt2} + r{2|3[4|5} 
r ν 41.3,4} + Г{1,3,8} + 42.3,4,5} 
7 3 1 ;
 г(1У«(в))) 
For certain rs it happens that 72(υ) < 7з(и) while u>2 < ^з- This paradox 
may not be as serious as it seems at first sight; when a player with less weight 
is a member of more minimal coalitions then a player with more weight, the 
former can be regarded as being more crucial for the game and hence having 
more power. 
In order to compute 7 the weights 7-5 have to be known. The assumption that 
all minimal winning coalitions are equally likely to occur will lead to a special 
form of 7 with fi(v) = |И л
і
т (и) |/ |И^ т (г;) | for each i € N. Another form of 7 
is obtained if the assumption 7-5 = 4т is made, meaning that the probability 
of the formation of a coalition of a certain size is inversely proportional to 
the size of the coalition. Then η/^υ) = Σ,5ζνν^(ν) щ/ T,sew^(v) щ-
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CHAPTER 3 
LINEAR PROGRAMMING GAMES 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter linear programming games will be considered. Linear pro­
gramming games are games in which for each coalition S the worth v(S) 
of S is given by a linear programming problem which depends on 5. In 
section 2 linear programming games are introduced and used to classify to­
tally balanced games. Two examples of linear programming games, namely, 
flow games and linear production games are studied. In section 3 linear 
programming games with committee control will be discussed. Since these 
games need not be balanced, sufficient conditions for them to be balanced 
are given. It is proved that every non-negative balanced game is a linear pro­
gramming game with committee control. The non-balanced case is treated 
in section 4 where two ways to handle non-balanced linear programming 
games are discussed. Finally, in the last section of this chapter, linear pro­
gramming games with claims are introduced. These games describe linear 
production situations with a fixed amount of resources which are claimed 
by the players. Claim games can be constucted to describe such a situation. 
These claim games turn out to be convex and therefore balanced and with 
the aid of core elements of the claim games a core element for the linear 
programming game with claims is constructed. Section 3 of this chapter is 
partly based on Curiel, Derks and Tijs (1987) and section 4 is based on work 
done in Curiel et al. (1988a). 
3.2 Linear programming games 
Consider the following linear programming problem. 
maximize с • χ subject to (1) 
xA<b 
xB = d 
χ > 0 
Неге с e lRm, 6 G Ш?, d e Е,г, Л is an m χ p-matrix, В is an m χ г-
matrix. Note that a linear programming problem like (1) but containing 
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only inequality constraints can be given the form of ( 1) by adding the 
void inequalities xB = d where D is the m X 1-matrix containing only 
zeroes and d is equal to zero. In a similar way a problem containing only 
equalities can be handled. An χ e lR m which satisfies the above conditions 
is called a solution of this problem. If there exists a solution the problem 
is called feasible, otherwise it is called infeasible. A solution χ 6 IRm of ( 1) 
is an optimal solution if с · χ > с · χ for all solutions χ. In this case the 
value vp(A,B,b,d,c) of ( 1) is equal to с · x. If the problem is infeasible 
then Vp(A,B,b,d, c) = — oo, if the problem is feasible but unbounded then 
vp(A,B,b, d,c) = oo. 
The dual problem of ( 1) is 
minimize у · b + ζ · d subject to (2) 
Ay + Bz > с 
У>0 
In an obvious way the definitions of the terms (optimal) solution, (in)feasible 
and value can be extended to problem ( 2). The value of ( 2) is denoted by 
v¿(A, B,b, d, c). From the duality theorem of linear programming theory it 
follows that ( 2) is feasible and bounded if and only if ( 1) is feasible and 
bounded and then vp(A,B,b,d,c) — vj(A,B,b,d,c). 
A cooperative game can be constructed from ( 1) by making all or some of 
the right hand sides in the constraints depend on the coalitions. This can be 
done in several ways. In this section the following case is studied. For every 
к б {1, ...,p} and for all S £ 2N \ {0} let bk(S) = E i e s M O with 6fc(i) еШ, 
given for all i G N. The vector in]Rp with k-th coordinate equal to òk(5)for 
all к G {I,...,ρ} is denoted by 6(5). 
A similar condition is assumed to hold for d(S) as well. So for every 
к G {1,..., г} and for all S G 2^ \ {0} let dk(S) = ¿ies dk(i) with dk(i) G Ж, 
given for all г G N. The vector in IT with Ar-th coordinate equal to dk(S) 
for all к G {1, —,Γ} is denoted by d(S). 
3.2.1 Definition A cooperative game ν is a linear programming game if 
there exist an m X p-matrix A, an m X r-matrix В and vectors b(S) G BP 
and d(S) G ШГ for all S e 2N \ {0} such that v(S) = vp(A, B, 6(5), d(S), c). 
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3.2.2 Remark Note that in order to obtain a game υ
ρ
(Α, В,b(S),d(S), c)) 
should be a real number for all 5 G 2 * \ {0}. Therefore, for all S G 2 * \ {0} 
the linear programming problem with the right hand sides in the constraints 
equal to 6(5) and d(S) should be feasible and bounded. Whenever the equal­
ity constraints are absent a sufficient but not necessary condition for this to 
hold is that all entries in the matrix A are non-negative with in each row at 
least one positive entry and that 6(5) is non-negative. 
3.2.3 Theorem A iinear programming game is totally balanced. 
Proof. Let ν be a linear programming game with for all 5 G 2 ^ \ {0}, 
17(5) = vp(A, B, 6(5), <i(5), c). Then for every Te2N\ {0} the subgame νχ 
οι ν is also a linear programming game with VT{S) = Vp(A,B,b(S),d(S),c) 
for all 0 ^ 5 С T. Consequently it is sufficient to prove that ν is balanced. 
Let (y, z) G И р X RT be an optimal solution for the dual problem of the 
problem which determines v(N). Define и GlRn by 
щ := у · b(i) + ζ · d(i). 
Then 
2 > ; : = у· £ 6(0 +¿-£(¿(0 
= y-b(N) + z-d(N) = v(N). 
Further, 
Σ Щ = У · КЗ) + г · d(S) > v(S) for ail 5 G 2N \ {0}. 
Here the inequality follows from the fact that (y, z) is a solution of the dual 
problem of the problem which determines v{S) as well. Thus it follows that 
и G C(v) and υ is totally balanced. D 
3.2.4 Theorem Every totally balanced game is a iinear programming game. 
Proof. Let υ be a totally balanced game. For each Τ E 2N \ {0} let zT 
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be a vector in Ж." with zf = M + 1 fot all i g Τ and such that its projec­
tion on ]R r is an element of С( т)· Here M > v(S) for all 5 G 2N. Let 
7i,T2, ...,T2n_i be an ordering of the non-empty coalitions. Let A be the 
η X 2 n — 1-matrix with all entries equal to one. For each г £ N define the 
vector ò(i) G Ж 2 "- 1 by bk(i) = zfk. Then, for every 5 6 2 * \ {0} , v(S) is 
equal to the value of the linear programming problem 
maximize χ · с subject to 
xA < b(S). 
Here с is the vector with all coordinates equal to one and b(S) = 5I» '
e
s40· 
Problem ( 3) is equivalent to the following problem. 





 > 0 
x
2
 > 0 
Let A' be the 2n X 2 n — 1-matrix with j-th row equal to the j'-th row of A 
for 1 < j < η and equal to minus the ( j — n)-th row of A for η + 1 < j < 2n. 
Let c' 6 ]R2n be the vector with the first η coordinates equal to 1 and the 
last η coordinates equal to -1. Then ( 4) is equivalent to 
maximize χ · с' subject to 
xA' < 0(5) 
χ < 0. 
Thus it follows that υ is a linear programming game with 
v(S) = vp(A',B,b(S),d(S),c) for all 5 e 2 * \ {0} where В is the m χ 1-
matrix with all entries equal to zero and d(S) = 0 for all 5 G 2N \ {0}. • 
3.2.5 Flow games are examples of linear programming games wich were 
introduced by Kalai and Zemel (1982a). Let G be a directed graph with 
finite set of vertices Ρ and finite set of arcs L. For every ρ G Ρ let B(p) de­




Two functions с and о are given on L. The function с is called the capacity 
function and assigns to every / G L a non-negative number, the capacity c(/) 
of /. The function о is called the ownership function and assigns to every 
/ G L a player, the owner o(/) of I. Two different vertices are distinguished 
from the others, a source s and a sink t. A flow from source to sink in such 
a graph is a function ƒ from L t o R with 0 < ƒ(/) < c(/) for each / G L and 
such that for every ρ G Ρ \ {s, t} the amount of flow which enters ρ is equal 
to the amount of flow which leaves p, formally, ^ІгеВЫ / ( 0 = ΣΐβΕ(ρ) /(О-
The value of such a flow is the net amount which enters the sink and is equal 
to the net amount which leaves the source. A flow with maximum value is 
called a maximum flow and this value is denoted by w(G). So, 
«(G) := Σ ДО - Σ /(о = Σ до - Σ ДО 
ΐ€Β(») ies(») í€S(t) JeB(t) 
where ƒ is a maximum flow in G. 
For each 5 G 2^ \ {0} a graph Gs can be obtained from G by keeping all 
vertices and removing all arcs which are not owned by a member of S. This 
new set of arcs is denoted by Ls- Note that G Ν = G and LN = L. 
3.2.6 Definition A game ν is said to be a flow game if there exists a graph G 
with capacity function с and ownership function о such that v(S) = w(Gs) 
for each S G 2 * \ {0}. 
3.2.7 Theorem Flow games are linear programming games. 
Proof. Let υ be a flow game with v(S) = w(Gs) for all S G 2N \ {0}, 
where Gpr = G is a directed graph with capacity function с and ownership 
function o. Let ¿i,/2, ...,Zr be an ordering of i such that {/χ,/2, .-,^} = B(s) 
and {lg+i,...,//»} = E(s). For every г £ N define the vector b(i) £ ]Rr by 
bk(i) — c(/fe) if o(l) = i, bk(i) = 0 otherwise. Let s = рі,р2,...,р
д
 — t be 
an ordering of the vertices. Define the г χ g-matrix Я = [hkm]k=Tim=i ^ У 
h-ici = hkq = 0 for each к G {l,...,r}; for m ^ 1 and m / q, hk
m
 = 1 if 
Ik e B(p
m
), hkm = - 1 if /fc G E(p
m
), hkm = 0 otherwise. Let d(i) be the 
zero vector in К* for every i £ N and let с G ]Rr be the vector with the first 
g coordinates equal to 1, the following h — g coordinates equal to -1 and the 
remainder of the coordinates equal to 0. Then v(S) = Vp(I, B, b(S), ¿(5), c) 
for each S £ 2N \ {0}. Thus, υ is a linear programming game. D 
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From the theorems 3.2.3 and 3.2.7 it follows that flow games are totally 
balanced. Kalai and Zemel (1982a) proved this by using the Ford-Fulkerson 
theorem which is a special case of the duality theorem of linear programming. 
In fact, Kalai and Zemel proved that every non-negative totally balanced 
game is a flow game. 
3.2.8 A slightly more general model is that of now games with losses. Es-
pecially when considering the transportation of perishable goods it seems 
plausible to incorporate losses into the model. Here the case is considered 
where the losses depend on the amount which is put through an arc and not 
on the arc. In other words, there exists a A with 0 < A < 1 such that if a 
flow ƒ(/) is put through an arc / going from pi to p2 only АД/) will reach 
P2. A graph with losses is a graph as in 3.2.5 for which a 0 < A < 1 is given 
to define the losses in the way described above. Here a flow from source to 
sink is a function ƒ from L to R with 0 < ƒ(/) < c(/) for each / e L and 
such that for each ρ G Ρ \ {s, t} the following holds 
Σ /(ο = λ Σ Я')· 
іев(р) ieE(p) 
The value of such a flow is the net amount which reaches the sink. Note 
that, contrary to the case without losses this will not be equal to the net 
amount that leaves the source. The value of a maximum flow in this graph 
is denoted by υ}(0, A). So, 
w(G,X)=X Σ ДО- Σ Λ')· 
l€E(t) i€B(t) 
In a similar way as for ordinary graphs a game can be constructed from a 
graph with losses. Such a game is called a flow game with losses. 
3.2.9 Definition A game ν is said to be a flow game with losses if there 
exists a directed graph G with losses described by a 0 < A < 1 such that 
v(S) = w(Gs,X) for each S £ 2N \ {0}. 
3.2.10 T h e o r e m Flow games with iosses are linear programming games. 
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Proof. Let и be a flow game with losses arising from a graph G with losses 
described by λ, capacity function с and ownership function o. Let /i,..., /P be 
an ordering of X such that {/h+i, ...,/r} = E(t) and {/
e
+i, ...,/&} = B(t). For 
every i G N define the vector 6(г) £ ΙΓ by òfc(i) = c(/fc) if о(/&) = г, bk(i) = О 
otherwise. Let s = pi,P2,-—Pq = t be an ordering of the vertices. Define 
the г x ç-matrix Π = [Λ*πι]ίϊϊ^=ΐ by /іц = Λ*, = 0 for each к e {l,...r}; 
ΐοτ τη φ Í and τη φ q, hkm = 1 if /fe G 5(Pm), hkm = - λ if /fc G E(pm), 
hkm = 0 otherwise. Let d(i) be the zero vector in R ' for every i Ε N and 
let с G ϋΐ' be the vector with the last г — h coordinates equal to 1, the h — g 
coordinates before those equal to -1 and the remainder of the coordinates 
equal to 0. Then v{S) = vp(I,H,b(S),d(S),c) for each 5 G 2N \ {0}. Thus, 
ν is a linear programming game. • 
From the theorems 3.2.10 and 3.2.3 it follows that flow games with losses 
are totally balanced games. 
3.2.11 Owen (1975b) introduced linear production games. In these games 
each player has a certain amount of m different resources described by a 
vector 6(г) where òfe(i) is the amount of the k-th resource that player г 
possesses. It is possible to produce r different products with the resources. 
Each of these r products can be sold at a given market price. The quantities 
needed of the resources to produce one unit of a certain product are given 
in a production matrix A = [ojfcHlï
 fc~j. Here α,·& is the amount of the k-th 
resource needed for the production of one unit of the j-th product. Every 
player wants to maximize his profit by producing a bundle of products that 
will yield most when sold. The players may consider to work together and 
pool their resources in doing this. This will lead to a linear production game. 
3.2.12 Definition A game ν is a linear production game if there exists 
a production matrix A, a price vector с and a resource vector b(i) for each 
г G N such that v(S) is the value of the problem 
maximize с · χ subject to 
xA < 6(5) 
ι > 0. 
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(5) 
It is obvious that a linear production game is a linear programming game. 
In the context of production and resources the coordinates of an optimal vec­
tor y for the dual problem of ( 5) for the coalition N can be interpreted as 
shadow prices of the corresponding resources. The core element constructed 
in the proof of theorem 3.2.3 can then be viewed as a way of paying to every 
player the amount that he would obtain, if instead of producing anything 
he would sell his resources by charging the shadow prices. 
Owen (1975b) showed that not all core elements can be obtained from the 
solutions of the dual problem. However, if the players are replicated, then 
in the limit the core will converge to the set of payoffs generated by the 
optimal solutions of the dual problem. In a special case it is shown by Owen 
that this will happen after finitely many replications. 
Samet and Zemel (1984) gave a necessary and sufficient condition for fi­
nite convergence of the core to the set of payoffs corresponding to optimal 
solutions of the dual problem. They also gave a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the equality of these sets even without replication. 
Dubey and Shapley (1984) considered totally balanced games arising from, 
not necessarily linear, programming problems with constraints controlled by 
the players. 
3.3 Linear programming games with committee control 
The concept of committee control in a linear programming game can be 
illustrated best with two examples. 
Suppose that the resources in the production situation are available in por­
tions. For к £ {l, . . . ,m} there are g/, portions of resource k. Such a por-
tion is denoted by B%. The total amount of resource к which is available is 
Bk = Y^q=i B%. Each portion is controlled by committees of players. These 
controls are modeled with the aid of simple games. For every B^ a simple 
game w\ describes the control. Coalition 5 can use B^ only if w^S) = 1. 
Let Bb(S) := BfaKS). The total amount of the fc-th resource available to 
coalition 5 is В
к
(5) := J%Li Bk(S)· T h e resource vector B(S) of coalition S 
has coordinates Bi(S), 82(8), ...,B
m
(S). Then v(S) is the value of problem 
(5) with 6(5) replaced by B(S). 
Another example of a linear programming game with committee control'is a 
flow game where the arcs are not owned by the players, but are controlled by 
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committees of players. So instead of an ownership function there is a control 
function which assigns to every arc / a simple game wi which describes the 
control of I. Coalition S may use I only if wi(S) = 1. From a graph G = G ff 
with the control of an arc / described by a simple game wi a network G s 
can be obtained for all S E 2^ \ {0}, by removing from G all arcs / with 
wi(S) — 0. The worth of S is then again equal to w(Gs)· 
In general it is possible to consider linear programming games with commit­
tee control. 
3.3.1 Definition A game υ is a linear programming game with commit­
tee control if there exist an τη χ p-matrix A, an τη χ r-matrix Η, a vec­
tor с G IR"1 and for each к G {l,...,p} and each j G {l,...,/·} there exist 
numbers gi, G IV and hj G IV such that there are g^ real non-negative 
numbers b\,b\,...,bff and д^ simple games w\,...,w^h and hj real non-
negative numbers dj, dj,..., d •' and hj simple games uj,..., Uj' with hfc(5) = 
Σ " ι b4kw
4
k{S) and dj(S) = Σ,%ι d4jU4j{S) such that 
v(S) = Vp(A,H,b(S),d(S),c) for each S G 2 " \ {0}. 
Linear programming games are in fact special cases of linear program­
ming games with committee control. A linear programming game ν with 
v(S) = vp(A,H,b(S),d(S),c) for each S e 2N \ {0} where A is an m X p-
matrix, # i s an m χ r-matrix, 6(5) = J2ies &(0 w ^ b b(i) G Ε.ρ given for 
each i e N and d(S) = ^ i e s ^ O w ^ ^ ^(0 ^ ^ г 6 ' у е п for e a c h i £ N can 
be seen as a linear programming game with committee control with дк = η 
for each к G {l,...,p}, hj = η for each j G {l,...,r}, 6^ = bk(i) and і 1
к
 is 
the simple game with player i as dictator for each к G {l,...,p} and each 
i G {l,...,<7fc = n}; <ñ = dj(i) and uj is the simple game with player i as 
dictator for each j G {l , . . . , r} and г G {l,...,hj = η}. 
A linear programming game with committee control need not be balanced 
as the following example from Curiel, Derks and Tijs (1987) shows. 
3.3.2 Example Let N = {1,2,3} and let G be the graph with only a 
source s and a sink t as vertices and a single arc / with capacity 10. the 
committee control is described by the simple game wi with wi(S) = 1 for 
all S with | 5 | > 2 and wj(5) = 0 otherwise. Then in the corresponding flow 
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game with committee control v, v(S) = 10 for all 5 with | 5 | > 2, v(S) = 0 
otherwise and it follows that C(v) = 0. 
However, if all the simple games which describe the controls in a linear 
programming game are balanced then the linear programming game is also 
balanced. 
3.3.3 Theorem Linear programming games with committee control for 
which nil the simple games that describe the controls are balanced, have a 
non-empty core. 
Proof. Let ν be alinear programming game with committee control described 
by balanced simple games. Suppose that v(S) = Vp(A,H,b(S),d(S),c) for 
each 5 e 2 ^ \ {0} with the fc-th coordinate of b(S) equal to ¿ " j 6 ^ 2 ( 5 ) 
and the j-th coordinate of d(S) equal to J^qLi ^u'i(S). Let zj G C(wl) and 
Vj 6 C(u^). Let (y, z) be an optimal solutions of the dual problem of the 
problem that determines v(N). Define the vector и e К," by 





= Σ » Σ Ч№ + Σ * Σ Ф1)І-
k=l q=l }=1 q=l 
Σ ^ = ί > Σ 4 + έ*ίΣ«5 
і€ЛГ fe=l ç = l j = l 9=1 
k=l j=l 
= yb(N) + zd(N) = v{N). 
Σ«« = е й е ч д а ) + е * і е о д ( 5 ) 
»es k=i «=1 j = i «=1 
> Σ ^ Σ ' Χ ί ^ + Σ ^ Σ ^ ί 5 ) 
fc=l fl=l i = l «=1 
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fc=l 9 = 1 j = l 9 = 1 
= yb(S) + zd(S) > v(S). 
Here the last inequality follows from the fact that (t/, z) is a solution of the 
dual problem of the problem that determines v(S) as well. Thus, it follows 
that и G C(v). • 
3.3.4 Theorem Linear programming games with committee control for 
which all the simple games that describe the controls are monotonie and 
non-balanced have an empty core. 
Proof. Let υ be a linear programming game wit committee control described 
by simple games w% and uj. Because w% (uj) is not balanced it follows that 
wk (uk) h 3 5 n o v e ^ 0 Payers, cf. theorem 2.2.6. From this and the monotonic-
ity of ω« (uj) it follows that wl(N \ {г}) = « £ ( # ) («ΐ(ΛΓ \ {г}) = иЦМ)) 
for each г e N. Therefore, b(N \ {»}) = b{N) and d{N \ {г}) = d(N) for 
each i £ N which yields v(N) = v(N \ {г}) for each г £ N. Consider the 
balanced collection {N \ {г}}«едг with all weights equal to l/(n— 1). Then 
-±-^
v




^ f n - 1 
So this balancedness condition is not satisfied by ν and ν is not balanced. • 
3.3.5 Theorem Every non-negative balanced game is a linear program­
ming game with committee control. 
Proof. Let υ be a balanced game. From theorem 2.2.7 it follows that 
there exist αχ,.,.,αρ > 0 and balanced simple games Wi,...wp such that 
ν = Y?j=1 OLjWj. Thus v{S) = Гр(Л,Я,о(5),а(5),с) for each 5 G 2 * \ {0} 
where A is the 1 X 1-zero matrix, H is the 1 X 1-identity matrix, 6(5') = 0, 
^(^) = YJ¡zz\ ajwj(S) a n d с = 1. Thus, ν is a linear programming game 
with committee control. D 
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Curiel, Berks and Tijs (1987) considered flow games and linear production 
games with committee control and proved that every non-negative balanced 
game is a flow game with committee control. Dubey and Shapley (1984) also 
studied committee control in their model of games arising from controlled 
programming problems. 
3.4 Non-balanced linear programming games 
As was already noted in section 3.3 a linear programming game with com­
mittee control need not be balanced. Still, a way to divide v(N) must be 
found. In this section two escapes which are treated in Curiel et al. (1988a) 
are considered. First the least tax core introduced by Tijs and Driessen 
(1986a) will be discussed. Let υ be a game such that v(N) > ^іе-г ЧОі 
then each player can be guaranteed at least an individual rational payoff. If 
this is not the case the players will be better of by not forming the grand 
coalition. The relative profit derived from the formation of a coalition S 
is v(S) — J2içs 40» that is, the difference between the worth of S and the 
sum of the worths of the members of S when they work alone. Now a tax 
relative to this profit, is imposed on any coalition S φ N which forms. So 
there is an ε with 0 < ε < 1 such that for each S ^ N the tax is equal to 
e(v(S) — Σί£3 v ( 0 ) · Thus a new game, the multiplicative ε-tax game arises. 
3.4.1 Definition The muitipiicative ε-tax game v' of a game ν is defined 
by 
v
e._iv(S) iîS = Nj 
-\v(S)-£(v(S)-Ziesv(i)) iiSÏNj. 
Now the smallest ε for which C(ve) φ 0 is considered. If С{ ) / 0 then 
this ε is equal to 0. For ε = 1 the multiplicative ε-tax game is given by 
v
1 (5) = Х3і€5и(г) ^ОГ S Φ N,§ and C(v) φ 0. For every game ν with 
12ieNv{i>) ^ v(N) define 
ε(ΐ>) := min{e | 0 < ε < 1, C{ve φ 0}. 
Then ε(ι;) is well defined since the balanced games form a convex polyhedral 
cone and С(г)1) / 0. 
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3.4.2 Definition The least tax core LTC(v) of a game ν is the core of 
the game v'M. 
If C(v) φ 0 then ε(υ) = О, И " ) = ν and LTC(v) = С (ν). So the least 
tax core can be seen as a generalization of the core. 
Let u; be a simple game with an empty core and with w(N) > I3teJVw(0· 
Two cases can be distinguished. 
1. There is an i* e JV such that w(i*) = 1. 
2. w(i) = 0 for all г £ N. 
In the first case there is an S С N \ {г*} with w(S) = 1 because г* is not a 
veto player. For ε < 1 we(S) = 1 — ε > 0 and we(i*) = 1 and it is evident 
that C{ve) = 0. Hence ε(υ)) = 1 and 
» '
w < s ) = { ; ii*: « - ' 1 * 1 = < . . . . . ^ 
In the second case 
v
 ' [ 1 - ε(υ)) if 
tB(5) = 0 
и;(5) = 1, 5 # TV. 
In case 1 we(w) is still a simple game and г* has become a unique veto player. 
In case 2 we(w) is no longer a simple game and a new interpretation of com­
mittee control as described by we(w} has to be found. Let w be the simple 
game which describes the control of a constraint b. Then we(w} can be seen 
as describing the situation where only part of 6 is controlled by a coalition 
S φ N with w(S) = 1, namely the part given by (1 — ε)£>. 
Let ν be a linear programming game with committee control described by 
simple games ιν% and «J. Then the least tax programming game correspond­
ing to ν is the linear programming game with control described by the least 
tax game constructed from the simple games ιυ% and uj . 
3.4.3 Theorem Let υ be a linear programming game with committee con-
troi. Then the corresponding ¡east tax linear programming game is balanced. 
Proof. Similar to the proof of theorem 3.3.3 by taking elements of the least 
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tax core of the simple games which describe the controls. D 
Another way to divide v(N) in the case of non-balancedness of the game can 
be constructed by means of normalized power indices. A normalized power 
index φ can be used to compute the power of the players in the controlling 
committees. If ФІ(Ю^) is a measure of the power of player г in the controlling 
game w% which describes the the control of 6J, then this can be regarded 
as if player i controls ^»(^jt)^· Let (i/, z) be an optimal solution for the 
dual of the problem which determines v(N). Then v(N) can be divided by 
giving to player i the amount £ £
= 1 yk Σ ^ фі(тІ) + Y?j=1 ij Σ ^ фі{ичк). 
An advantage of these two methods is that just as in the balanced case it is 
not necessary to compute all the v(S), which would involve solving 2 n — 1 
linear programming problems, but it is sufficient to solve only one linear 
programming problem and to analyze the simple games. 
3.5 A linear production game with claims 
Consider the following variation on linear production games. Instead of 
the resources being controlled by players or coalitions of players there is a 
fixed amount of each resource. Each player claims a certain amount of the 
resources.The amount claimed by a player depends on the production matrix 
and on his production capacity. Let A be the non-negative τ X m-production 
matrix and с G К г the non-negative price vector. For each player г Ε N 
the production capacity of г is equal to k(i) 6 RlJ.. This means that г can 
produce at most kj(i) of the j- th product. Let В = (Βχ,52,...,5
т
) be the 
total available amount of each resource. Then player г can be considered to 
claim a part of the resources which he will need to maximize his profit while 
keeping his limited capacity in mind. For each player i the following linear 
programming problem determines his claim. 
maximize с • χ subject to (6) 
xA < В 
0 < χ < k(i) 
Let i* be an optimal solution of this problem, them player i claims 6(г) = χ1 A 
of the resources. If there are more optimal solutions of ( 6) it is assumed 
that player г claims of each resource the maximal amount given by such a 
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solution. 
3.5.1 Definitoli The claim vector Ь(г) of player г is the vector with 
k-th coordinate equal to τηαχ{(χιΑ)ι,\χι G О*} where О* is the set of optimal 
solutions of (6). 
The production capacity of a coalition 5 is taken to be the sum of the 
production capacities of its members. Hence, k(S) = Y2ieS^(^)· The claim 
vector 0(5) of coalition 5 is the sum of the claim vectors of its members. 
In determining the worth of a coahtion S in a linear production game a 
somewhat pessimistic view is taken. Any coalition considers the maximal 
profie it can achieve when its complement has taken all the resources that 
the complement claims. 
3.5.2 Definition In a linear production game υ with claims v(S) is for 
each S G 2N \ {0} equal to the value of the linear programming problem 
maximize с • χ subject to (7) 
xA<(B-b{N\S))+ 
0 < χ < k(S). 
3.5.3 Definititon For each resource j let Wj be the claim game of j defined 
by 
WjiS) := (Bj - bjiN \ S))+ for each S E 2N \ {0}. 
3.5.4 T h e o r e m For each j G {1, ...,m} the ciaim game Wj is convex. 
Proof. Similar to the proof of theorem 5.3.2 • 
3.5.5 T h e o r e m Linear production games with claims are balanced. 
Proof. Let ν be a linear production game with claims. Then all the claim 
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games are convex and therefore balanced. Let q 6 C(WJ) for each claim 
game Wj. Consider the following problem. 
minimize By + k(N) · ζ subject to 
Ay + ζ > с 
у>о 
z>0 
This is the dual problem of ( 7) for S = N. Let (j/, z) be an optimal solution 
of this problem. Define и 6 К " by 
m г 
j=l 1=1 
Then и G C(v) and υ is balanced. D 




4.1 Introduct ion 
While the characteristic functions of the games in chapter 3 were determined 
by linear programming problems, the characteristic functions of the games 
in this chapter will mostly be determined by combinatorial optimization 
problems. A cooperative game ν with v(S) equal to the value of a combina­
torial optimization problem for all S 6 2N is called a combinatorial game. 
The three following sections are dedicated to two kinds of combinatorial sit­
uations, namely, matching and permutation situations. In section 4.2 they 
are introduced and some examples are discussed. Section 4.3 deals with 
combinatorial games arising from matching and permutation situations. In 
section 4.4 economies with indivisibilities arising from permutation situa­
tions are studied and section 4.5 handles ordinal matching situations. In 
section 4.6 combinatorial games arising from sequencing situations will be 
studied. This section is based on Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs (1988b). These, 
so called, sequencing games are convex and hence balanced. A division 
rule for sequencing situations is defined without game theoretic considera­
tions. Yet, it is proved that this rule always yields a division which is in 
the core of the corresponding sequencing game. Simple expressions for the 
Shapley-value and the r-value of a sequencing game are derived. In section 
4.7 which is based on Potters, Curiel and Tijs (1987) traveling salesman 
games are treated. These are combinatorial games arising from the well 
known traveling salesman problem. Traveling salesman games are not bal­
anced in general and some subclasses containing only balanced games are 
discussed. A variation on traveling salesman games, namely routing games 
are defined. In fact, these games are not combinatorial games since only 
v(N) is determined by a combinatorial optimization problem. It is proved 
that routing games are balanced. Section 4.8 discusses minimum cost span­
ning tree games. Both these games as well as the location games dealt with 
in section 4.9 are balanced. All the games in section 4.7, 4.8, 4.9 are cost 
games and the definitions given in section 1.7 apply to them. 
4.2 Matching and permutation situations 
Consider the following situation. In a group consisting of η women and η 
men each men has to be married to a woman. Each individual has a certain 
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preference over the members of the other sex. What criteria should one 
keep in mind when making an assignment of the men to the women and is 
it always possible to satisfy these criteria? The above marriage problem is a 
very well known example of a matching situation. Matching siuations have 
been studied extensively in the literature. Cf. Gale and Shapley (1962), 
Dubins and Freedman (1981), Crawford and Knoer (1981), Roth (1982) and 
(1984) and Gale and Sotomayor (1985). In a matching situation there is a 
group of people or institutions which have to be matched one to one or one 
to many, where many can be two or more. If the group can be partitioned 
into two sets such that any element of one set can only be matched with a 
members or members of the other set, the matching is called bipartite. In 
the following mostly bipartite matchings will be considered. Other exam­
ples of bipartite matching situations are the house market where each seller 
owns a house and each buyer wants to purchase a house and where the sets 
of sellers and buyers are disjoint, and the college admission problem where 
students have to be assigned to colleges. The preferences of the individu­
als can be given just by ranking lists, saying that they prefer this partner 
to that partner, that one to another one, and so forth or by real numbers 
assigned to each possible partner to denote his or her or its worth. In the 
former case the preferences are called ordinal, in the latter they are called 
cardinal. Cooperative games arising from matching situations are studied 
in Shapley and Shubik (1972). 
An example of a quite different situation is the following. A group JV = 
{1,2,..., π} of customers is standing in a queue waiting to be served. They 
all have the same service time. Each one of them has some cost which de­
pends on when he is finished. Since all the service times are the same, the 
cost for any customer can be seen as depending only on his position in the 
queue. The position of all the customers can be described with the aid of a 
permutation of N. So the cost of a customer can be seen as depending on a 
permutation. This situation is an example of a permutation situation. In a 
permutation situation each member of a group has a preference on the set of 
permutations of the group. Just as in matching situations these preferences 
can be either ordinal or cardinal. Another example of a permutation sit­
uation is the machine-job permutation situation where each producer owns 
one machine and has one job to be processed. Any machine can process 
any job, but no machine can process more than one job. Each producer has 
a preference over the machines. A permutation of the group of producers 
corresponds to a redistribution of the machines among the producers. Co­
operative games arising from permutation situations are studied in Shapley 
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and Scarf (1974), Tijs et al. (1984) and Curici and Tijs (1986). 
In the two following sections matching and permutation situations with car­
dinal preferences wil be discussed. In section 4.3 which is partly based on 
Curiel and Tijs (1986) cooperative games arising from matching and per­
mutation situations will be discussed and in section 4.4 economies with in­
divisibilities arising from permutation situations will be considered. Section 
4.5 will conclude the sections on matching and permutation situations by 
treating ordinal matching siuations. 
4.3 A s s i g n m e n t g a m e s and p e r m u t a t i o n g a m e s 
Consider the following bipartite matching situations. Let В and M be two 
disjoint sets. For each i £ В the value of being matched to j G M is д^ 
and for each j G M the value of being matched to г G В is hij. The value 
of a matched pair (i,j) is equal to a¿j := д^ + hij. From this situation 
the following cooperative game can be constructed. For each coalition 5 С 
BUM the worth v(S) of 5 is defined to be the maximum that 5 can achieve 
by making suitable pairs from its members. If 5 С В or 5 С M then no 
suitable pairs can be made and therefore v(S) = 0. If 5 £ В and S (f. M 
but for all г G S Π Β and all j G S Π M the pair (г, j) has value a¿j < 0 
then the maximum for 5 is achieved by making no pairs and is equal to 0. 
Formally, v(S) is equal to the value of the following integer programming 
problem. 
m a x
 Т,іс.вТ.і£Маізхі: subject to 
jeMxij ^ l s ( 0 f o r a 1 1 ¿ G 
içBxij ^^sü) for all j G 
Xij G {0,1} for ail i G Я, j G M. 
Hjeu'ij Ы*)  aU г  5
 m 
Е*в*И<ЫЛ e M ^' 
4.3.1 Definition A cooperative game ν is an assignment game if the set of 
players can be partitioned into two sets В and M such that for each г G В 
and each j G M there exist reai numbers д^ and hij with Cjj = QÍJ + hij 
such that for each coalition S the worth v(S) of S is equal to the value of 
problem (1). 
Some examples of matching situations which lead to assignment games are 
the following. Suppose M is a set of merchants who possesses one indivisible 
good, e.g. a house, each and В is a set of buyers who wants to buy exactly 
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one house each. Then g^ can be taken to be the worth of the house of mer­
chant j Ε M to buyer г G В. Let Cj be the worth to merchant j of his own 
house. If he is matched with an i 6 В then this can be considered as losing 
his house to г and the value of this situation to him is — c¿. Hence hij can 
be taken to be — Cj for each j ζ M and each i £ В and then dij := g^ — Cj 
is the value of the pair (i,j). Since α,-j > 0 iff buyer г values the house of 
merchant j more than j himself, it is clear that it is only profitable to match 
a merchant and a buyer if the former possesses something which is valued 
more by the latter than by himself. This model is a slight variation of the 
model of Shapley and Shubik (1972). 
Another well known example is obtained by taking M to be a set of men, 
В a set of women and by letting the numbers gij and hij express the satis­
faction of woman i in being married to man j and the satisfaction of man j 
in being married to woman г respectively. In this way a cardinal variation 
of the marriage problem discussed by Gale and Shapley (1962) is obtained. 
Let M be a set of firms and В a set of workers. Each firm wants to hire 
exactly one worker and each worker wants to work for exactly one firm. Let 
hij G IR be the profit of firm j if it hires worker г and let WÍJ G IR be the 
measure of worker г of how hard he has to work if he is hired by firm j . Then 
the value of a match with firm j is g^ = — Wij to worker г and the value of a 
pair ciij = hij + gij = hij — WÍJ. It is again obvious that it is only worthwhile 
to match a firm with a worker if the value of his work for the firm is higher 
than the cost of his work to himself. A more general example of such a job 
matching situation can be found in Crawford and Knoer (1981). 
Consider the following permutation situation. A set jV = {1,2, ...n} is given. 
Each i Ε N places the value /¡w,·) on a permutation π of N. Each subgroup 
S С N has the power to originate a permutation π such that only the mem­
bers of 5 are permuted, that is, 7г(г) = г for all i G N\S. In the cooperative 
game corresdponding to this situation the worth v(S) of a coalition 5 is 
defined to be th maximum of the sum of the values of all the members of S 
taken over all the permutations that S can achieve. Let u s be the set of all 
permutations π with w(i) = i for all г G Ν \ S. Then 
v{S)= max £ ) fc^i). (2) 
Another way of denoting ( 2) is with the aid of permutation matrices. 
For each permutation π G Π5 a corresponding permutation matrix Ρ = 
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[Ріі]\=?з=і c a n ^ е defined as follows. 
( 1 if г G S, j £ S and 7г(г) = j 0 otherwise. 
Let P(S) be the set of 5-admissible permutation matrices, i.e. permuta­
tion matrices which correspond to a π G Π5. Let A' be the η X n-matrix 
[*ч]а?і=Г· Then (2) is equivalent to 
v(S)= max K*P (3) 
P€P(S) 
where К * Ρ := £?=i Σ?=ι kijPij. 
4.3.2 Definition A cooperative game ν is a permutation game if there 
exists a matrix К such that v(S) is given by (3) for a/i S £2N \ {0}. 
4.3.3 Remark A third way to describe a permutation game ν is by means 
of an integer programming problem. Let kij be given for all i,j G N. Then 
v(S) is equal to the value of the following integer programming problem. 
max EieArEjew^O'Sy subject to 
ί'€ΛΓ
 xij = І5(0 for all г G 
ieNxij = IsiJ) for all j G 
ZO'6 { M } for all i,j G N 
Еіелг Sii (г) i  Ν
 ( . 
Hie 'ij ЫІ) r l jGiV KV 
An example of a permutation game is obtained by looking at the permu­
tation situation where customers are waiting in a queue. For i G N let 
c,j denote the cost of г if he is standing in the j - th position. Originally, 
г is standing in the г-th position. Define the matrix К = [¿о'])="і=" by 
kij = сц — Cij. Then the permutation game corresponding to this situation 
is given by (3). Another example is obtained by looking at the machine-job 
permutation situation. Suppose that the cost for г G N is equal to c¿j if his 
job is processed on machine .;' owned by j G N. The value k^ of machine 
j for г G N is defined by k^ = сц - c,¿. The characteristic function of the 
permutation game corresponding to this situation is given by ( 3). 
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4.3.4 Theorem Every assignment game ¡s a permutation game. 
Proof. Let ν be an assignment game with a partition of the set of play­
ers into two sets В and M and with Ojj given for all i € B, j Ε M such that 
г;(5) is defined by ( 1) for each S £ 2^ . Define for every г, j 6 В U M 
и..._ J α α i f г e в, j e м 
гз
 ' Ί θ otherwise. 
Let w be the permutation game defined by ( 4) with kij as given above and 
N = В U M. Note that the number of variables in the integer programming 
problem which defines t;(5) is | ß | X \M\ while the number of variables in 
the integer programming problem which defines w(S) is ( |Б | χ | M | ) 2 . For 
5 С В от S U M, w(S) = 0 = v(S). Let S С M U В with 5 £ В and 
S <£ M. Let χ G {0,1}ΙΒΙχΙΜΙ be an optimal solution of the problem which 
determines t;(S). Define χ G {0,1}(|В|х|М|)2 by 
Xij := Xij if г G В, j G M 
Xij := Xji if i e M, j e в 
χα ••= l s ( 0 - Σ , Έ Μ Xij if i G Β 
*ii •= ls{j) - Е і е в ХИ if J € Af 
Xij := 0 in all other cases. 
Then χ is a, not necessarily optimal, solution of the problem which deter­
mines w(S). Hence, 
W(S) > Σ Σ kiJ*iJ = Σ Σ ααχν = ^ ί5) · 
t'eBuMj'eBuM ieBjeM 
On the other hand let ζ G {0,1}(IBIXIMI)2 be an optimal solution of the 
problem which determines w(S). Let ζ G {0, IJl^M^I be defined by 
Jij := ZÍJ for i G 5 , j G M. 
Then J is a solution of the problem which determines v(S). Hence, 
v(s) > Σ Σ a ' ï y ü = Σ Σ * г ч = ^ ί 5 ) · 
içBjeM ieBjeM 
It follows that r = tu and therefore υ is a permutation game. • 
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4.3.5 T h e o r e m Assignment games and permutation games are totally bal­
anced. 
Proof. Because of theorem 4.3.4 it is sufficient to prove that permutation 
games are totally balanced. Since any subgame of a permutation game is 
again a permutation game it is sufficient to prove that permutation games 
are balanced. Let υ be a permutation game with matrix К = [fctj]ì=i j=". 
Then v(S) is given by ( 4). From the theorem of Birkhoff-von Neumann 
which says that the extreme points of the set of doubly stochastic matrices 












Xij > 0 
The dual problem of ( 5) is 
min Σί€Ν ls(i)ui + £,j€N ls(j)vj subject to _ . 
Ui + Vj > kij for all i,j G N. 
Let (û, ν) be an optimal solution of ( 6) for S = N. Then 
Σ(ΰί + ϋ
ί
) = ν(Ν) 
and for all S G 2N 
Σ>< + vi) = Σ is(0«i+Σ ^ (Ou ^ "(s) 
íes ieN ieN 
where the inequality follows from the fact that (û, ν) is a solution of problem 
( 6) for all 5 e 2^. Thus the vector ζ e Жп defined by 
Zi := щ + щ 
is an element of the core of ν and υ is balanced. D 
Generalizations of the assignment game and the permutation game are the 
multi-assignment game and the multi-permutation game, respectively. An 
example of a multi-assignment situation which yields a multi-assignment 
subject to 
for all t e JV 
for all j G N 
for all i,j G N. 
(5) 
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game is the sellers-buyers market where each seller possesses one item of 
different types of indivisible goods, e.g. one house, one car, one television, 
one compact disc player, which he wants to sell and where each buyer wants 
to buy exactly one item of each type of good. A buyer need not buy all the 
goods from the same seller. Suppose there are ρ different type of goods. Let 
В be the set of buyers and M the set oiseliers. Let (ji, J2,—,jp) € Mp de-
note a bundle consisting of the good of type 1 of seller ji, the good of type 2 
of seller J2 and so forth. For each г 6 В let ді(іі,іг, —ijp) denote the worth 
of a bundle (І\,Іг, —ijp) to buyer г. For each j 6 M and each q 6 {1, ···,?} 
let /i¿(g, г) denote the worth for seller j of selling his good of type q to buyer г. 
This situation, where for each of the ρ types of goods an assignment of buyers 
to sellers must be made is called a p-assignment situation. A p-assignment 
game ν corresponding to a p-assignment situation can be defined by taking 
for each S ζ. 2N the worth v(S) of S equal to the maximum that S can 
achieve by making suitable matchings among the sellers and buyers belong­
ing t o 5 . Leta(t,ji,..., jp) := (/.-(ji,..., ^-f/ i j^ l , t)-|-ftÄ(2,i) + · · ·+Λ^(ρ,ι) 
denote the value of assigning the bundle (j\,...,jp) to buyer i. Then v(S) is 
the value of the problem 
m a x
 Е(»,л jp)eBxMPα(*>Λ. -ιІрМ*»ii» ···»Ір) subject to 
E(i,» j,)eB»Mp-i *(*\І.Іа. - . i p ) < l s ( i ) for all j e M 
E ( t j , м і,)евхмр-і x{i, i i , i, із,..., Ір) < l s ( i ) for all i e M 
Е ( І , Й Л Л з,)евхмг-і x(i,ji,J2,j,J4, ...,Ір) < l s ( i ) for aU j e M 
Σ(»,Λ jp-OeflxMp-i x{i,ji, ...,Ір-і,І) < l s ( i ) for all j G M 
Σ ( Α і
Р
)еМтФ,Я,-.ip) < І5(*) for all i € Б 
x(i,ji,...,jp) E {0,1} for all г 6 5 , 
( І і , . . . , І р )€М і · . 
(7) 
4.3.6 Definition A cooperative game υ is a p-assignmen t game for a ρ € IV if 
the set of players can be partitioned into two sets В and M such that there 
exist real numbers gi(ji,...,jp) for each i E В and each (Іі,...,Ір) € Mp 
and real numbers hj(q,i) for each j G M, q £ {l,.. . ,p} and i € В with 
в(»,Іі ,-іІр) = Л(іі.-.чір) + Л * ( M ) + / i j j^ i ) + · · · + hj
r
(p,i) such that 
for each coalition S the worth v(S) o f S is given by (7). 
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Note that whenever \B\ < \M\ it is possible to add extra elements to В 
without really changing the game by assuming that for such an extra ele­
ment г*, gi-(ji,—,jp) = 0 for all (ji,—,jp) £ Mp and hj(q,i*) = 0 for all 
j G M and q 6 {1, .",ρ}· Therefore it will be assumed in the following that 
\B\ > \M\. 
An example of a multi-permutation situation is given by a variation of 
the machine-job situation where each job has to be processed on differ­
ent types of machines and each producer owns one machine of each type. 
Suppose there are ρ different types of machines. For each producer i and 
each q G {l,...p} let i(q) denote the machine of type q that г owns. Let 
кі(пі(і),Ж2(і), ...,7Гр(г)) be the value for producer г of using the machines 
jri(i) of type 1, тггСО of type 2 and so forth. Here Χι,Χ2ι ••·πρ are permu­
tations of N, the set of producers. Such a p-permutation situation yields 
a p-permutation game ν where the worth v(S) of a coalition S is the max­
imum of the sum of the values of all the members of S taken over all the 
permutations for which nothing changes for the players not in 5. Formally, 
v(S) is the value of the problem 
m a x
 Ei.-J, jr)€Nr+* ki(h. h, - , ІрМг, Ju J2, - , jp) subject to 
Е ( . - , Й , . . . , І
Р
) 6 ^ *(»» ¿> Λ, .. ·, jp) = l s (І) for all j e N 
Е(.\лJJ і,)елг» *(*'.Jij,J3, ·.·, Jp) = l s ( j ) for all ; G N 
Е(»,л jf-iìeifpxiiJiJì, -Jp-iJ) = Ыз) f o r aU j G І 
Σ(Α j^eNr^iJuh, -Jp) = ls(0 for all i G Ν 
x(iJi,J2, -Jp) G {0,1} for all г G JV, 
(Ju-J,)eN'. 
(8) 
4.3.7 Definition A cooperative game ν is a p-permutation game for a ρ G W 
if there exist real numbers ki(ji,..., jp) for each (г, ji, ...Jp) G Ν1*1 such that 
v(S) is given by (8) for each S G 2*. 
4.3.8 Theorem Forp > 2 both p-assignment games as well as p-permutation 
games need not be balanced. 
Proof. Let ρ = 2. Let the p-assignment game < В U Μ, ν > be given by 
В = {1,2}, M = {3,4},
 Л
( 3 , 3 ) = 5,
 л
( 3 , 4 ) = 2,
 л
( 4 , 3 ) = 4,




( 3 , 4 ) = 3, 32(4,3) = 7,
 Л
( 4 , 4 ) = 3, Л,(1,1) = - 1 , 
М 1 . 2 ) = - 1 , Лз(2,1) = - 2 , fcs(2,2) = - 2 , /»4(1,1) = - 2 , /i4(l,2) = 
- 2 , /i4(2,l) = - 1 , /i4(2,2) = - 1 . Then α(1,3,3) = 2, α(1,3,4) = Ο, 
α(1,4,3) = Ο, α(1,4,4) = 2, 0(2,3,3) = Ο, α(2,3,4) = 1, ο(2,4,3) = 3, 
α(2,4,4) = 0. The characteristic function υ is given by v(S) = 0 for S С В 
от S С M and i7(l,3) = »(1,4) = v(l,2,3) = 41,2,4) = »(1,3,4) = 2, 
r(2,3) = t>(2,4) = 0, »(2,3,4) = »(1,2,3,4) = 3. Consider the balanced 
collection В = {{2,3,4}, {1,3}, {1,4}, {2}} with weights Xs = \ for each 
S G ß . Then 
Σ Xsv(S) =1-3+1-2+1-2+1-0 = 31->Z = v(N). 
Thus, » is not balanced. From this example a p-assignment game which is 
not balanced can be constructed for any ρ > 2 by taking gi(ji,J2i •••,jp) — 
9і{3и3г) for each г E В and each (j'i, •••jp) 6 Mp and hj(q, i) as given above 
for q E {1,2}, /ij(ç, г') = 0 for q > 2 for each j E Л/, г' Ε -В. 
Again for ρ = 2, let < jV,v > be the p-permutation game given by JV = 
{1,2,3}, * ! ( ! , ! ) = 0, ^ ( 1 , 2 ) = 0, ^(1 ,3) = 0, ^ ( 2 , 1 ) = 1, к
х
{2,2) = 0, 
^ ( 2 , 3 ) = 0, fci(3,l) = 0, ^(3,2) = 0, ^(3 ,3) = 2, * 2(1,1) = 0, fc2(l,2) = 
1, *j(1.3) = 0, * 2(2,1) = 0, ¿2(2,2) = 0, *2(2,3) = 0, fc2(3,l) = 0, 
*2(3,2) = 0, fe2(3,3) = 2, As(l,l) = 1, k3{l,2) = 0, ¿3(1,3) = 0, *8(2,1) = 
0, )кз(2,2) = 2, ¿з(2,3) = 0, ¿з(3,1) = 0, *з(3,2) = 0, ¿з(3,3) = 0. Then 
t,(l) = »(2) = »(3) = 0, »(1,2) = 2, »(1,3) = 3, »(2,3) = 4, »(1,2,3) = 4. 
Hence, 
ì » ( l , 2 ) + ί » ( 1 , 3 ) + ì»(2,3) = A1- > 4 = »(1,2,3) 
and it follows that » is not balanced. For ρ > 2 a p-permutation game 
which is not balanced can be constructed by taking ¿¿(ji, ••;j¿) = ¿¿(ji, J2) 
for each (г, j
u
 ...,ip) E І Р+Ч Π 
4.3.9 Remark For a p-assignment game » with \B\ = 1 or \M\ = 1 a 
core element is obtained by assigning v{B U M) to the unique element of В 
or M. For a p-permutation game ν with \N\ < 2 it follows that the core is 
not empty from the superadditivity of the game. 
Although it was shown in theorem 4.3.8 that in general p-assignment games 
and p-permutation games need not be balanced, it is possible to define a 
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class of p-assignment games and p-permutation games which contains only 
balanced games. 
4.3.10 Definition A p-assignment game < В U Μ, ν > is said to have ad­
ditive revenues if there exist reai numbers g}(ji), 9i{J2),---,gi(jp) such that 
9i(ju -JP) = 9i{Ji) + · · • + 9i(jp) for each i Ε В and each (j j, ...,jp) 6 Mp. 
A p-permutation game < N,v> is said to have additive revenues if there 
exist reai numbers k}(ji), k^(J2),...,k^(jp) such that ki(ji, ...,jp) = k}(ji) + 
•••+ Äf(jp) for each (t, л , . . . , jp) 6 iV^ 1. 
A concrete situation which may give rise to a p-assignment game with ad­
ditive revenues is the sellers-buyers market with ρ indivisible commodities 
where the value of any commodity is independent of the other commodities. 
This may be the case when the commodities are not related to each other, 
such as, for example, a house, a car, a television. The value of a bundle 
consisting of different commodities is then simply the sum of the values of 
the separate commodities. It is not always reasonable to assume that the 
revenues are additive. The commodities may be parts of a big machinery 
which can only be operated with all parts together and such that not all 
parts of different types can be fitted together. Then the value of a bundle 
really depends on the combination of the commodities. 
A situation which may lead to a p-permutation game with adittive revenues 
is the following. Suppose each player needs to process a job for which he 
needs ρ different types of machines. Each player possesses one machine of 
each type. The value of using a certain combination of machines is equal to 
the sum of the values of using each machine. 
4.3.11 T h e o r e m if ν is a p-assignment game or a p-permutation game 
with additive revenues then υ is totally balanced. 
Proof. Let < В U Μ, ν > be a p-assignment game with additive revenues 
gi(ji,-,jp) = 9ί(3ι) + ··· + 9Ϊ(3ρ) for each г 6 В and each (ji,..., jp) € MP. 
Define ρ assignment games <Βΐ)Μ, ν1 >, < В \J Μ, ν2 >,...,<B\jM,vl>> by 
taking jf?· = ff*(j) and /i^ · = hj(q,i) for each q G {l,...,p} and each г G В, 
j G M. Then v(S) = v1(S) + v2(S) + ••· + v*(S) for each 5 G 2*. Now 
theorem 4.3.5 implies that all the games v1,v2,...,vp are totally balanced, 
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therefore ν is totally balanced as well. The proof of the total balanced ness 
of a p-permutation game with adittive revenues can be given in the same 
way as this proof. D 
Consider the machine-job permutation situation with ρ types of machines. 
Suppose that the value of processing on a certain combination (ji, ...,jp) of 
machines is the same for each job, namely, fc(ii, ••••,jp)· Further, there is an 
additional value which depends on the job. This situation gives rise to the 
following class of games. 
4.3.12 Definition A p-permutation game < Ν, ν > is said to have sepa­
rable revenues if there exist k(ji,...,jp) and ¡i such that ki(j\, ...,jp) = /» + 
k(ji, ...jp) for each (г, ji,..., jp) £ N1*1. A p-assignment game < В U Μ, ν > 
is said to have separable revenues if there exist ƒ» > 0 and a(ji, ...,jp) > 0 
such that ai(ji,..., jp) = fi + a(ji,..., jp) for each i G В and (ji,..., jp) G Mp. 
A p-assignment game with separable revenues may arise from a sellers-buyers 
situation with ρ indivisible commodities where each bundle (ji, ...,jp) has a 
certain intrinsic value g(ji, ...,jp) and where /¿ denotes the value for buyer i 
of possessing any bundle of goods and where a seller is indifferent to whom 
he sells his good, i.e. hj(q, i) = hj(q) for all j G M, г G В, q G {1, ...,p}. 
4.3.13 T h e o r e m 2-permutation games and 2-assignment games with sep­
arable revenues are totally balanced. 
Proof. Let ν be a 2-permutation game with separable revenues ki(ji,J2) = 
HJiih) + '» for e a c h ( г)Ji) J2) G Ν3. Let <N,l> be the additive game de­
fined by l(S) := Y^içs^i for e a c h $ € 2N. Let <N,w> be the permutation 
game with к^ = k(i,j) for each (i,j) G Ν2. Then v(S) = l(S) + w(S) for 
each S G 2N. From the total balancedness of / and w the total balancedness 
of ν follows. 
Let < В U Μ, ν > be a 2-assignment game with separable revenues а(г, j i, іг) 
= fi + a(ji,J2). Consider the permutation game < M,w > with fc^j, = 
aUiih) for all hi h G M. This game is balanced. Let y G C{w). Re­
call that \B\ > \M\. Let B' consists of \M\ elements of В with high-
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est f-values and let B" = В \ B'. Denote тах^сдн fi by ƒ. Define χ G 
R |B |x |M| b y x . _ y. + ƒ for a l l j e M i x . = f._ f for aU г G i?' 
and Xi = 0 for all г G Я". Then *(ΛΓ) = v(N) and for aU 5 G 2 W , 
x(S) = y(S Π M) + / ( 5 Π ß ' ) + |5 Π Μ| ƒ - | 5 Π Β') ƒ > v(S). Thus, 
x G C(v) and it follows that ν is balanced. The totally balancedness of ν 
follows from the fact that each subgames of ν is again a 2-assignment game 
with separable revenues. • 
4.3.14 Theorem For ρ > 2 p-permutat/on games and p-assignment games 
with separable revenues need not be balanced. 
Proof. Let ρ = 3 and let < Ν, υ > be the p-permutation game with sep­
arable revenues given by N = {1,2,3}, fciO'i^Ja) = h + Кі\,І2,Зг) where 
U = 0 for each г G N and k(ji,J2,ja) is equal to к^^2, ja) as given in the 
proof of theorem 4.3.8 for each (ji,J2,J3) G Ν3. Then ν is equal to the 2-
permutation game in the proof of theorem 4.3.8 and it follows that ν is not 
balanced. In the same way a p-pemutation game with separable revenues 
which is not balanced can be constructed from a ρ - l-permutation game 
that is not balanced for any ρ > 2. 
For ρ — 3 let < M U В, w > be the p-assignment game with separable 
revenues given by В = {5,6,7,8}, M = {1,2,3,4} and a(i,ji,J2,jz) = 
fi + ti(i,ji,J2,J3) where fi = 0 for each г G В and α(1,3,3), α(1,3,4), 
α(1,4,3), α(1,4,4), α(2,3,3), α(2,3,4), α(2,4,3), α(2,4,4) are the same as 
in the proof of theorem 4.3.8 and a(ji,J2,J3) = 0 for all other combinations 
of ОьІг , jz) G M3. Then v(B U M) = 3. Consider the balanced collection 
В = {{2,3,4,5,6,7},{1,3,5,6},{1,4,7,8},{2,8}} with weight Х$ = \ for 
all S G В. Then 
^ Xsv(S) = \з + Ì2 + ^2 + io = ЗІ > 3 = v(B U M). 
SÇ.B 
Hence < В U Μ, υ > is not balanced and the proof is completed. • 
4.4 Economies with indivisibilities 
Economies with indivisibilities arising from permutation situations have been 
studied by many authors. Cf. Shapley and Scarf (1974), Kaneko (1982), 
Kaneko (1983), Kaneko and Yamamoto (1986), Gale (1984), Quinzii (1984), 
Wako (1984) and Wako (1986). However, all these papers consider only 
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the l-permutation case. Here economies with indivisibilities arising from 
multi-permutation situations will be considered. An economy with indivis­
ibilities E is an ordered tuple < N,p, ((е*)ве{1,...,р})»бЛГ,(^)^^, (иі)»елг > 
where the finite set N is the set of agents and ρ e IN is the number of 
different types of indivisible commodities in the economy. For every type 
of indivisible commodity q, the commodity of this type possessed by agent 
i at the beginning is denoted by e'. The amount of money that agent ι 
possesses at the beginning is denoted by u;¿ e Ец.. For each agent г 6 Ν, 
щ is an utility function which describes the value for agent г of a bundle 
consisting of one indivisible commodity of each type and a certain amount 
of money. Let T4 = Ui6JVe¿ ^ОГ each q 6 {l,...,p} then ω,· is a function 
defined on Τ1 χ Τ 2 χ · · · χ Τρ χ Ш+ with values in lit An allocation in such 
an economy is a distribution of the commodities and the money among the 
agents whereby every agent obtains exactly one commodity of each type. 
Such an allocation can be denoted with the aid of ρ permutations, each one 
describing how the commodities of one type are redistributed among the 
agents and a vector m describing how the money is redistributed among the 
agents. Thus, (тг1, тг2,..., π ρ , m) is an allocation which assigns to agent i the 
indivisible commodities e^w^, ^a(¿\, ···> ew¿) a n d an amount of money equal 
to m,i, the i-th coordinate of m. 
Every subgroup S С N of agents can redistribute the indivisible commodi­
ties and the money available in S among its members. Let A(S) be the set 
of feasible allocations for S, i.e. 
-4(5):= { (7Γ 1 ,π 2 , . . . ,πΡ,7η)6Π^χΠΙ η | jr«(S) = S for each q G {l,...,p} 
and m(5) < ω(5)} . 
A coalition S can improve upon an allocation (тг1, π 2 , . . . , πρ, τη) if there exists 
an allocation (σ 1, ...,σρ, τη') £ A(S) such that 
«¿(«¿ι(0'<£*(<)'•••'eSj>(0'mi) > ui(eli(i), ···><„(,·), mi) for each i e S. 
4.4.1 Definition The core C(E) of an economy E with indivisibilities is 
the set of allocations that no coalition can improve upon. 
A coalition S С N can weakly improve upon an allocation (π 1 , . . . ,π ρ , m) 
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if there exists an allocation (σ 1, ...,σρ,τη') 6 A(S) such that 
ui(eli(iy - C i i ) ' m i ) ^ u <( e l i(0' - ' <P(, ·) ' m¿) f o r a11 ¿ G 5 ' 
и
і ( е І і ( Я ' ·•·» e ^ ( i ) ' mí·) > u i(e!r40' " · ' ^ ' ( O ' m ^ f o r s o i n e ^ e 5· 
4.4.2 Definition The strong core SC(E) of an economy E with indivis-
ibilities is the set of allocations that no coalition can weakly improve upon. 
It is evident that the strong core of an economy is contained in the core 
of the economy. 
4.4.3 Definition A price equilibrium for an economy with indivisibilities 
E is a tuple < ρ1,..., ρ?, (π 1 , . . . , πρ, m) > where ря G Ж" is a price vector for 
the q-th commodity such that 
(a) P Ì l ( 0 + · · · + frP{i) + пи < ρ] + · · · + ρ? + u>i for all i £ N. 
(b) Foralli G І and(e1ji,...iepjr,m,i) G T^x- • -xT^xJ^ ¡fu^, ...,ε^,τη^ 
> " » ( ^ ( i ) , ···, е ^ ) , mi) then pj, + · · · + p£ + mj > pj + · · · + p£ + wj. 
If ^ 1 , . . . ^ , (π 1 , . . . , тг?, m ) > is a price equilibrium then the vectors p 1 , . . .,p p 
are called equilibrium price vectors and the allocation (π 1 , . . . , πρ, τη) is called 
an equilibrium allocation. 
АЛЛ Theorem Let <p 1 , . . . , jP, (π 1 , . . .π ρ, m) > be a price equilibrium. Then 
(χ1,...,πΡ,πι)£θ(Ε). 
Proof. Let S С N. Suppose there exists a (σ1,...,σρ,τη') G A(S) such 
that «t(ej 1 ( i ) , . . . ,c^ i j ,m<) > Щ^^, ...,βζ^,πΐί) for all i G S. Then 
PU(Í) + ••• + Í ÍF(Í) + "»i > PÎ + · · • + pf + " Í for aU ¿ e S. Since σ«(5) = 




» > Ziies^» contradicting 
(σ1,...,σρ,m¿) G A(5). Therefore no 5" can improve upon (π 1 , . . . ,π , > ,m) 
and (π 1 , . . . , π?, m) G ^ Е 1 ) . D 
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4.4.5 Theorem An economy with indivisibilities E can have an empty core. 
Proof. Let TV = {1,2,3}, ρ = 2, ωχ = иг = ω^ = 3, u ^ e ^ e ^ m i ) = mi + 1, 
ui{el,el,тг) = mi + 2, игСе^е^тг) = т г + 1, U2(eJ,e|,m2) = тпг + 2, 
из(еі,е^,тз) = гпз + 1, из(еІ,еІ,т2) = тз + 2 and u¿(ej,e£,mi) = m^ for 
all other combinations of i,j, k. For any allocation (π 1 , тг , m) the following 
holds. 
Щ1(е]г1(1)'е^(1)'т1) + и 2 ( е ^ ( 2 ) ' е » а ( 2 ) ' т 2 ) + г / 3 ( е ^ ( 3 ) ' е ^ ( 3 ) . т з ) < 13 (9) 
For an allocation π, σ, m) to be in the core of E the following must hold. 
U l ( 4 ( l ) > e ! ( l ) ' m l ) + U2(4(2)'4(2)>m2) > 8 (10) 
и
і ( 4 ( і ) ' е І ( і ) ' т і ) + , / з(4(з)> е І(з) ' т з) > 9 
и 2 ( 4 ( 2 ) ' 4 ( 2 ) ' т 2 ) + «з(е^ ( 3 ) ,е | ( з ) ,тз) > Ю 
Straightforward verification shows that it is impossible for both (9) and ( 10) 
to hold simultaneously. Therefore, C(E) = 0. • 
Under the assumption that u,- is continuous and non-decreasing with re­
spect to the amount of money for all i G Ν, Quinzii (1984) proved that the 
core of of the economy E is non-empty for ρ = 1. Under certain additional 
assumptions Quinzii proved that in this case the core of E and the set of 
equilibrium allocations of E coincide. 
4.4.6 Theorem Let E = < . / V ^ , ^ ) ) , ^ ^ } ) , · ^ ^ ) ^ , ^ ) ^ > be an 
economy with щ(е^, e\, mi) = u{e1^ e\, m¿) + fi for all i, j , к £ Ν, where и is 
a function from Τ1 χ Τ 2 хШ+ toШ. which is continuous and non-decreasing 
with respect to the amount of money and where /¿ 6 R. Then C(E) φ 0. 
Proof. Define the economy E =<N, l,(€¿)teJV, (ûijiçN, (u,)¿ejv> byêj = e?, 
ùi = Ui and üi(èj,mi) = íí(ej,e^,m¿) for all ¿,j G N. Then Quinzii's re-
sult yields C(Ê) φ 0. Let (ττ,τη) G С {È). Then (σ,ττ,τη), where σ is the 
identity permutation, is an allocation that can not be improved upon by 
any coalition. Namely, suppose that a coalition S could improve upon the 
allocation (σ, π, m) by means of an allocation (π 1 , л-2, m'). Consider the al­





1)-1(^,т<) = ¿»»(»(β,ί^,τηΐ) = 
u(eír>(¿)'e^(j)'m¿) > u ( e b e Í ( 0 ' m i ) 
й
»(е*(0'т»)· 
This contradicts (ττ,τη) G C(É) and therefore it is not possible for an 5 to 
improve upon (σ, π, m). Hence (σ, π, m) € C(£^) and C(£ ) ^ 0 . • 
Note that theorem 4.4.6 is the analogue of theorem 4.3.14. in terms of 
economies with indivisible commodities. 
4.5 Ordinal match ing s i tuat ions 
In this section matching situations with ordinal rather than cardinal pref-
erences are considered. The matching situations studied here are many to 
many matching situations. These are bipartite matching situations in which 
any member of one of the two groups is matched to more than one member 
of the other group. Let H and G be two disjoint, finite sets. As an example 
to fix the ideas H could represent the set of hospitals in a certain area while 
G represents the set of medical students in that area. Each hospital offers 
ρ types of jobs, e.g. a job in surgery, one in psychiatry, and so forth. Each 
hospital offers exactly one job of each type. Every medical student has to 
fulfil each type of job once for the practical part of his study. Students 
have to be matched to jobs. A student need not fulfil all the jobs at the 
same hospital. The students have preferences over combinations of jobs. 
For instance, a student may prefer to fulfil all the jobs at the same hospital 
while another one prefers to work at as many hospitals as possible. The 
preferences of the students are defined on the set Hp. It is assumed that 
these preferences are complete, transitive and strict and hence they can be 
represented by ordered lists. Tipically the preference P(g) of student g G G 
can be described as follows. 
P(g) : most preferred combination least preferred combination 
With respect to the preferences of the hospitals two different models will 
be studied. In the first model each hospital h Ε H has separate preference 
relations Ρ1(Λ),Ρ2(/ι),...,Ρΐ'(Λ) defined on the set G of students. The pref­
erence relation P^(h) describes the preference of h over the students for the 
j-th job. .These preferences are taken to be complete, transitive and strict 
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and can be described by ordered lists in the same way as the preferences of 
the students. In the second model each hospital h Ε H has a joint prefer-
nce P(h) defined on Gp. In the first case the matching situation is called 
a p-matching situation with separate preferences while in the second case it 
is called a p-matching situation with joint preferences. Note that in both 
models the preferences of the students are joint preferences and that it is 
the difference in the type of preferences of the hospitals that accounts for 
the difference in the names of the matching situations. 
4.5.1 Def init ion A p-matching situation with separate preferences con­
sists of two disjoint sets H and G which have the same finite number of 
elements and where for each д 6 G a complete, transitive and strict prefer­
ence relation P(g) on Hp is given and for eac/i h £ Η ρ complete, transitive 
and strict preference relations і5 І(/г)і ^> 2(' l)> ···•> Pp(h) on G are given. 
4.5.2 Def init ion A p-matching situation with joint preferences consists 
of two disjoint sets H and G which have the same finite number of elements 
and where for each д E G a complete, transitive and strict preference re­
lation P(g) on Hp is given and for each h Ε H a complete, transitive and 
strict preference relation P(h) on Gp is given. 
Let μ be a function from G to Hp. For all д E G let μ(д) be denoted 
by (pi(g), ß2{g), ..·, μρ^)). 
4.5.3 Def in i t ion A function μ from G to Hp is called a matching if and 
only if 
я(д) Φ ßqW) for all q E {\,...,p} and all g,g' E G with g ¿ g'. 
In the example considered above a matching assigns to every student a 
combination of the Ρ types of jobs in such a way that no job is assigned 
twice. Let μ be a matching. The element g oî G for which μj(g) = h is 
denoted by //J 1(/i). 
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4.5.4 Definition A matching μ in a p-matching situation with separate 
preferences is called stable if there is no pair (g, h) G G Χ Η such that g 
prefers {piig),...^^!^),h,μ
ί+ι(ο),...,μρ^)) to 
(μι (y),..., μ j-iig), μ jig), А»,-+і(<7), - , /Up(sO) and according to Pj(h), h prefers 
g ί ο μ τ ^ / ι ) . 
For the case with ρ = 1 Gale and Shapley (1962) proved that there ex­
ist stable matchings and gave an algorithm to arrive at a stable matching. 
Note that in this case the two types of matching situations defined above 
are the same. 
4.5.5 Theorem For ρ > 2 there need not exist a stable matching for each 
p-matching situation with separate preferences. 
Proof. Consider the following 2-matching situation with separate prefer­
ences. G = {<7і,<72}> H = {/ΐχ,hi] and the preferences are given by 
Р(д\) : /ΐχ/ΐχ /12/12 hih2 /12^1 
Ρ(<72) : h,2hi /11/12 hihi /12/12 
Pl(hh): 9i 32 for fcG {1,2} 
P2(hk): 92 9i for* G {1,2}. 
There are four possible matchings, none of which is stable. 
The matching μ with /i(<7i) = {hi, hi), ^((72) = (^г ,^) ' s I I 0 * s t a b l e since 
92 prefers (/12,^1) to (/ігі^г) and according to P2{h\) h\ prefers 52 to g\. 
The matching μ with μ{9\) = (/12,^2), μ(<72) = {hi, hi) is not stable since 
92 prefers (/ii,/i2) to {hi, hi) and according to -P2(/i2) /12 prefers 52 to 9ι· 
The matching μ with μ{9ι) = {hi,h2), μ(<72) = (^2,Ίι) is not stable since 
gi prefers (/i2,/i2) to (Ль/іг) and according to P1(/i2) ^2 prefers 51 to 52· 
The matching μ with μ(<7ι) = (/i2,^i), μ(52) = ( Ί ι » ^ ) is not stable since 
51 prefers {hi, hi) to ( / Í 2 , ^ I ) and according to P1(/ii) /ii prefers gi to ^2-
This matching situation can be extended in a straightforward way to a p-
matching situation with separate preferences for which no stable matching 
exists for any ρ > 2. D 
An extra condition on the preferences of the elements of G is sufficient 
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to ensure the existence of a stable matching. This condition was introduced 
by Roth (1985) in a slightly different context. 
4.5.6 Definition A preference relation Ρ defined on a product set 
Χι X X? X · · · X Xk is said to be responsive if there exist separate, complete, 
transitive and strict preference relations P 1 , P2,..., Pk on Xi,X2,..., Xk such 
that if two elements of X\ χ X2 У. · · · x. Xk differ only in the j-th coordi­
nate, the element which contains the most preferred job according to Pi is 
preferred by P. 
Note that if a preference relation is responsive then the separate prefer­
ence relations are uniquely determined. 
4.5.7 T h e o r e m If in a p-matching situation with separate preferences the 
preferences of the elements of G are responsive, then there exists a stable 
matching. 
Proof. Let Р1(д),Р2(д), ...,Рр(д) be the separate preferences of д £ G. 
Consider ρ 1-matching situations given by the sets G and H and the pref­
erence relations Р1(д),Р2(д), ...,Рр(д) for all д £ G and the preference 
relations Р1^),?2^),...^^) for all h £ H. With the Gale-Shapley al­
gorithm it is possible to find stable matchings μ\,μ2,...,μρ for all these 
situations. Let μ be the matching in the p-matching situation defined 
by μ9(ί7) = £9(<7) for each д 6 G and each q £ {l,...,p}. Then μ is 
stable, since if there existed a pair (</, h) £ G Χ H such that д prefers 
(Mff),»-i/*j-l(0),A|A*j+l(iOi-..,Mp(0)) t o 
(MI( Í?) , - ,MJ-I (S ' ) ,MÍ(5 ' ) , / Í¿+I (<7) , - ,MP(Í?) ) and д is preferred by Pi(h) to 
μ^(/ι) then this would imply that in the 1-matching situation with pref­
erences Pi(g) and Р'{К) g prefers h to μ^ί/) = ïij{g) and h prefers g to 
^J1(/i) = Aj1(/i) contradicting the stability of p,j in this situation. Thus, it 
follows that μ is stable. D 
For the hospitals-students example it follows that when the jobs are as­
signed to the students according to a stable matching μ, it is not possible 
that a hospital h prefers another student g for the g-th job to the one who 
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obtains the job and that this student g prefers the combination where μq(g) 
is replaced by h to the original combination assigned to him. However, it 
is still possible, even under a stable matching μ, for a hospital to prefer 
a student g for several jobs 91,92, —, Як t o the ones who obtained the jobs 
while the student g prefers the combination where μ4ι^),μ4ί^), ...,ßqh{g) 
are replaced by h to the original combination assigned to him. Hence even 
an assignment according to a stable matching can be destabilized if the hos-
pitals and the students are allowed to change more than one of the students, 
respectively, jobs which are assigned to them. Therefore, strongly stable 
matchings are introduced. 
4.5.8 Definition A matching μ in a p-matching situation with separate 
preferences is said to be strongly stable if there is no pair (g,h) G G Χ Η 
such that for some {91,92, —iQk} С {l,...,p} g prefers the element of Hp 
arising from //(5) by replacing μ , , ^ , μ , , ^ ) , ...^
Як
(д) with h to μ^) and 
for all q e {91, -,9*} -P'C1) prefers д to μ~1{1ι). 
It is obvious that every strongly stable matching is stable. Hence it fol­
lows from theorem 4.5.5 that a strongly stable matching need not exist. 
4.5.9 Theorem If in a p-matching situation witii separate preferences the 
preferences of the elements of G are responsive, then every stable matching 
is strongly stable. 
Proof. Let μ be a stable matching. Then for each g G G and each h G Я if 
д is preferred by Ρ*(h) to μ^(/ι) then д prefers 
(μ1(5),...,μ;,·_ι(ρ),μ;,·(9),μ,·+ι((7),...,μρ(9))ΐο 
(μι(5),...,μ^·_ι(9),/ι,μ^+ι(5),...,μΙ)((7)). Suppose there exists an h G H and 
a set {9i,...,9fc} С {l,...,p} such that д is preferred by Pq(h) to μ ^ / ι ) 
for all 9 G {9i,...,9fe}. From the stability of μ it follows that д prefers 
(μι(9), -,μ4-ι(9),μ<,(5), μ,+ι(ί7), - , M P ( Ö ) ) to 
^i{g),...^q-i(g),h^q+i(g),...^p(g)) for all 9 G {9i,-,9fc}· This and the 
responsiveness and the transitivity of P(g) lead to the conclusion that g 
prefers μ(9) to the element of Hp arising from μ(g) by replacing 
μ,, (g), ...,μ,
Μ
(9) with h. Since this argument holds for every (g, h) G G Χ Η 
the strong stability of μ is proved. D 
71 
Combining theorem 4.5.7 and theorem 4.5.9 yields the following corollary. 
4.5.10 Corollary If in a p-matching situation with separate preferences the 
preferences of the elements of G are responsive then there exists a strongly 
stable matching. 
4.5.11 Definition A matching μ in a p-matching situation with joint pref­
erences is called stable if there does not exist a pair (g, h) G G Χ Η such 
that g prefers (^i(ff), ...^j-i(g),h^j+1(g), ...,μρ^)) to 
(μι(9),-,μά-ι(9),μί(9),μί+ι(9),-,μρ(9)) and h prefers 
(мГЧН ···'μ7Λ(Ηg,μίΐ№),...,//рЧМ)to 
(μ^(Η),...,μ;11(Η),μ^(Η),μ-11(Η),...,μ;\Η)). 
4.5.12 Theorem For ρ > 2 there need not exist a stable matching in a 
p-matching situation with joint preferences. 
Prooi. Consider the following 2-matching situation with joint preferences. 
G = {51,52)1 H = {hiy /12} and the preferences are given by 
gi : hihi /12/12 hi/12 Лг^і 
52 ' /l2^1 hi/12 h\hi /12/12 
hk · 5152 5i5i 5252 525i for к € {1,2} . 
There are four possible matchings, none of which is stable. 
The matching μ with /i(5i) = (hi, hi), ^(52) = (/12,^2) is not stable since 
52 prefers (/12, hi) to (/i2,/i2) and hi prefers (51,52) to (51,51). 
The matching μ with μ(5ι) = (Лг,^), м(52) = (Λι,Λι) is not stable since 
52 prefers (/11,^2) to (hi, hi) and /12 prefers (51,52) to (51,51)· 
The matching μ with μ(5ι) = (Ль^г), м(52) = (/i2,/ii) is not stable since 
51 prefers (/12,^2) to (/іь/гг) and /12 prefers (51,51) to (52,51)· 
The matching μ with //(51) = (^2,^1), M52) = (Λι,/12) is not stable since 
51 prefers (hi, hi) to (/i2,M and hi prefers (51,51) to (52,51)· 
This matching situation can be extended in a straightforward way to a p-
matching situation with joint preferences for which there is no stable match­
ing for any ρ > 2. • 
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4.5.13 Theorem If in a p-matching situation with joint preferences the 
preferences of the elements of both G as well as H are responsive, then 
there exists a stable matching. 
Proof. Consider ρ 1-matching situations given by the sets G and H where 
the preferences of а д £ G and an h G H are taken to be the separate 
preferences P 1 (</),...,Pp(g) and Ρ^/Ο,.,.,Ρ^/ι) defined by P(g) and P(/i) 
respectively. With the Gale-Shapley algorithm it is possible to find stable 
matchings μι,μ2,:.,μρ for all these situations. Let μ be the matching in 
the p-matching situation defined by //j(<7) = ßj(g) for each g £ G and each 
j £ {Ι,.,.,ρ}. Suppose that there exists a pair (g,h) G G Χ Η such that g 
prefers (μ1^),...,μί-1(ς),ίι,μ}+1(ς),...,μρ^)) to 
( Р І ( 0 ) , . . . , / * , - - І ( 0 ) , 0 І Ы , / * І + І Ы , . . . , / І Р ( $ ) ) and h prefers 
(μϊ1^),..., μ/ΛΜ' 5, ¿íJ+iCO' -ι tÇ4h)) t o 
(μ^ 1(/ι),. . .,^ 1(/ι),μΤ 1(Λ),μ^ 1(/ ι),.. .,/χ- 1(Λ)). Then in the 1-matching 
situation with preferences P*(g) and P'(h) g prefers h to μ^) = ßj(g) and 
h prefers g to μ^1(/ι) = /ij 1 (h) contradictiong the stability of /ij. Therefore 
such a pair (g, h) can not exist and μ is stable. Π 
4.5.14 Definition A matchingμ in a p-matching situation is called strongly 
stable if there is no pair (g, h) G G χ Η such that for some {ci, ç j , . . . , qk) С 
{Ι,.,.,ρ} g prefers the element of Hp arising from μ(<7) by replacing μς(<7) 
with h for all q G {qi,..., qk} to μ(д) and h prefers the element ofGp arising 
from μ_ 1(/ί) by replacing μ^1(/ι) with д for all q G {ci,..., qk) to μ - 1 (/ί) . 
Again a strongly stable matching is necessarily stable. But, contrary to 
the case of p-matching situations with separate preferences in this case the 
responsiveness of the preferences does not guarantee that a stable matching 
is strongly stable as well. Indeed, even the existence of a strongly stable 
matching is not guaranteed by the responsiveness-of the preferences. 
4.5.15 Theorem For ρ > 2 there need not exist a strongly stable matching 
in a p-matching situation with joint preferences where all the preferences 
are responsive. 
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Proof. Consider the 2-matching situation with G = {91,92)1 Π = {Λι,Λΐ} 
and where the preferences are given by 
P(9i) '· hih2 hihi /12/12 /12^ 1 for г G {1,2} 
Ρ (hi) : 9192 9292 9ι9ι 929ι 
-P(M : 9i92 929i 
where the open places in P ( / Ï 2 ) are not important. These preferences are 
responsive. The separate preferences are 
РЧЯі)· hi h2 for г G {1,2} 
Р
2
Ы· hi hi for г G {1,2} 
PHhk): 9i 92 for к G {1,2} 
P2(hk): 92 91 for/: G {1,2}. 
The only stable matching here is the matching μ with μ(9ι) = (hi,hi), 
Мог) = (/*2>^2) but μ is not strongly stable since 92 prefers (hi,hi) to 
(/іг^Лг) and hi prefers (92,92) to (171,51). Since every strongly stable match­
ing is stable it follows that there does not exist a strongly stable matching 
in this situation. D 
A corollary to theorem 4.5.15 is given by 4.5.16. 
4.5.16 Corollary For ρ > 2 a stable matching in a p-matching situation 
with joint responsive preferences need not be strongly stable. 
A stronger condition on the preferences in a p-matching situation with joint 
preferences will give the existence of a strongly stable matching. 
4.5.17 Definition A preference relation Ρ defined on a set Xk is said 
to be strongly responsive if there exists a complete, transitive and strict 
preference relation Ρ on X such that if two elements of Xk differ only in 
the j-th coordinate then Ρ prefers that element with most preferred j-th 
coordinate according to P. 
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Note that a strongly responsive preference relation on Xk defines a unique 
preference relation on X. 
In the hospitals-students example if a student g has a strongly responsive 
preference relation this means that he can rank the hospitals in such a way 
that if he prefers hospital h to hospital h' then he always prefers to fulfil 
a certain job at h rather than at h' regardless of where he fulfils the other 
jobs. In a similar way strongly responsiveness of the preference relation of 
a hospital can be interpreted. 
It is clear that a strongly responsive preference relation is responsive. 
4.5.18 Theorem if in a p-matching situation with joint preferences all 
the preferences are strongly responsive then there exists a strongly stable 
matching. 
Proof. Consider the 1-matching situation given by the sets G and H and 
with preference relation P(g) oí g E G defined on H by the strongly respon-
sive preference relation P(g) oí g on Hp and the preference relation P(h) of 
h ζ H defined on G by the strongly responsive preference relation P(h) of 
h on Gp. Let μ be a stable matching for this 1-matching situation. Define a 
matching μ in the p-matching situation by ßj(g) = fi(g) for all j 6 {1, ···,?} 
and all g £ G. Let (g,h) G G χ Я and {<7ι,92> ···>?*} С {!,...,ρ} be such 
that g prefers the element of Hp which arises from ß(g) by replacing ßq(g) 
by h for all q 6 {<Zi,...,<7fc} to μ(<7). This implies that in the 1-matching 
situation g prefers h to fi(g). From the stability of μ it follows that h prefers 
μ - 1(/ι) to g in the 1-matching situattion. The strong responsiveness and the 
transitivity of P(h) yield that in the p-matching situation h prefers μ - 1 (Λ) 
to the element of Gp arising from μ - 1(Λ) by replacing μ" 1 (Λ) with g for all 
4 € {Яі,—іЯк}· Since this argument holds for any (g,h) £ G x Я it follows 
that μ is strongly stable. D 
4.β Sequencing games 
Sequencing situations and sequencing games are closely related to permu­
tation situations and permutation games in the sense that in a sequencing 
situation just as in a permutation situation the people involved place some 
value on each permutation of JV and each subgroup S С N can achieve some 
permutations. However, while in a permutation situation S can achieve all 
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permutations π with ж(г) = г for all г G Ν \ S, in a sequencing situation an 
original permutation which need not be the identity is given and S has in 
general less possibilities to change this permutation. Another difference is 
that while in a permutation situation the value for г G N of a permutation 
π only depends on ж(г), in a sequencing situation this value depends on 
Ρ ( π , ι ) , the set of predecessors of г according to π. An example will help 
to clarify the ideas involved in sequencing situations. Consider a situation 
where a set of customers N is standing in a queue before a counter waiting 
to be served. The original position of each customer is given by a permuta­
tion σ of N. For г G JV, σ(ί) = j means that i has the j-th position in the 
queue. Each customer i has a certain service time of Si units of time where 
Si > 0 and a cosí function c¿ : ELf —• IR. The cost of a customer г depends 
on his waiting time plus his service time. If the sum of these two equals t 
then his cost is Ci(t). In the following it is assumed that c; is linear for all 
i G N and therefore there exist α», ßi G IR such that Ci(t) = QJÍ + /3¿. The 
total cost of the group N if served according to σ is given by 
C<r := Ci( 5 3 5» + s l ) + c2( 5 1 Si + S2)+ ••• + C
n
{ 5 1 Si + Sn). 
ieP(<r,i) »еР(<т,2) t€P(<r,n) 
By rearranging the customers, N can decrease this cost. Each rearrange-
ment corresponds to a permutation π G П^. What is gained by this rear­
rangement is equal to €
σ
 — С». To compute this difference the /3,'s are not 
important. That is why they are not included in the following definition of 
a sequencing situation. 
4.6.1 Definition A sequencing situation consists of a fin ite set N = {!,...,n} 
and ал ordered triplet (σ; α; s) where σ G П^, α G IR" and s G JR+. 
Whenever no confusion is possible about the identity of the set І it will 
not be mentioned explicitly. 
To find an optimal permutation, i.e. a permutation where the total cost of 
N is minimal, the urgency indices oí the members of N can be used. 
4.6.2 Definition In a sequencing situation (σ; α; s) the urgency index щ of 
ii G N is given by Ui := а,-/д,·. 
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For a certain permutation τ of N let i,j £ N be neighbours, i.e. |г(г) — 
T(J)\ = 1. Assume that r^ ') = т(г) + 1, then if г and j switch positions 
the total cost changes by an amount etjSi — a¿s¿ regardless of their position 
in the queue. If щ < Uj then this amount will be positive and the total 
cost will decrease, if щ > Uj then it will be negative and the total cost will 
increase, if щ = Uj then it will be zero and the total cost stays the same. 
This leads to the following proposition. 




ПдгСт iff 1/^-1(1) > ^,-1(2) > - > ^ - » ( n ) · 
Proof. Let r be a permutation which does not satisfy the condition on 
the right hand side. Then there exist ¿, j G N with r ( j ) = г(г) + 1 and 
Ui < Uj. By switching i and j the cost will decrease and it follows that CT is 
not minimal. Let ρ be a permutation which does satisfy the right hand side 
condition. Then it is possible to go from any permutation r of N to ρ by 
switching only neighbours. In fact only neighbours i,j with T(J) = r(i) + 1 
and Uj > щ have to be switched in this process. Such switchings will either 
decrease the cost of JV or leave it unchanged. It follows that CT > Сй and 
therefore that Cp = m i n ^ n ^ С». Π 
Not only the group N but every subgroup S oí N can decrease its cost 
by rearranging its members. However, in this process of rearrangement it 
is not allowed for any member of S to jump over non-members of S. Thus, 
if i,j G 5 and there is а к G І \ S standing between them then г and j 
are not allowed to change position. This situation can be modeled with the 
aid of a cooperative game, a sequencing game. The set of players will be ,of 
course, equal to N. Before defining the characteristic function ν some con­
cepts which will be helpful for the definition of ν will be introduced. First 
the gain </,j that two players can achieve when standing next to one another 
with i in front of j in a sequencing situation (σ; α; s) will be defined. This 
gain is equal to the difference of the sums of the costs of г and j before and 
after they change position. If щ > Uj then г and j can gain nothing by 
switching positions, if Uj > Ui then i and j can gain otjSi — ctiSj. Therefore, 
gij := {otjSi - aiSj)+ . 
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4.6.4 Definition Let (er; α; s) be a sequencing situation then Τ С N is 
called a connected coalition ¡fi,j 6 Τ and к E N with σ(ί) < а(к) < a(j) 
imply к G T. 
In a connected coalition there are no non-members of the coalition standing 
between the members and therefore all rearrangements of its members are 
allowed. From proposition 4.6.3 it follows that an optimal way to rearrange 
the members of a connected coalition is in order of decreasing urgency in­
dex. This can be done by switching neighbours who are not standing in the 
right order. Every time this is done in a sequencing situation (σ; α; s) with 
two neighbours г and j such that σ(ι) < a(j) and щ < Uj the gain will be 
equal to g^. This leads to the following definition of the worth v(T) of a 
connected coalition. 
ν(τ)·=Σ Σ ЯЫ. (Π) 
»eTfceP(<r,»)nr 
4.6.5 Definition Let S С N be a non-connected coalition in a sequenc­
ing situation (a;a;s). Then Τ с N is said to be a component of S if (i) 
Τ С S, (ii) Τ is connected and (Ui) TU{i} is not connected for each i G 5\Γ. 
The components of a non-connected coalition 5 form a partition of 5 which is 
denoted by S/σ. Maximal cost savings are achieved by S when the members 
in all its components are rearranged in decreasing urgency index order. The 
total cost savings of 5 is the sum of the cost savings of all its components. 
This leads to the following definition of the worth v(S) for a non-connected 
coalition S. 
v(S):= ^ v(T) (12) 
res/ir 
4.6.6 Definition A cooperative game ν is a sequencing game if there exist 
a sequencing situation (σ; α; s) such that for a connected coalition Τ the 
definition ofv(T) is given by ( 11) and for a non-connected coalition S the 
definition ofv(S) is given by (12). 
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4.6.7 Theorem Seq u ел ring games are convex games. 
Proof. Let υ be a sequencing game arising from the sequencing situation 
(σ; α; s). Let Si С S2 С N \ {i}. Then there exist Γι, tfi G Si/σ U {0} and 
T2, U2 e 52/σ U {0} with Ti С Т2 and C/i С Щ such that 
»(S,, U {г}) - v(Sp) = £ gki + £ ffjy for ρ G {1,2}. 
From the non-negativeness of the ^¿¿'s it follows that r(5i U {г}) - ι>(5Ί) < 
v(S2 U {г}) — v(S2) and therefore ν is convex. D 
Not all convex games are sequencing games since sequencing games are zero-
normalized and convex games need not be zero-normalized. Actually, even 
not all zero-normalized convex games are sequencing games. In the follow­
ing proposition a characterization of the 3-person zero-normalized convex 
games which are sequencing games is given. 
4.6.8 Proposi t ion A 3-person zero-normalized convex game ν is a se­
quencing game iff (i) ai least one 2-person coalition has worth zero, (ii) 
v(N) = v(S) + v(T) with \S\ = \T\ = 2 implies v(S) = 0 or v(T) = 0 and 
(Hi) v(S) = 0 for all coalitions S with \S\ = 2 implies v(N) = 0. 
Proof. Let JV = {1,2,3} and suppose that the game ν arises from the 
sequencing situation (σ;α;5). Without loss of generality it is assumed that 
σ(1) = 1, σ(2) = 2, σ(3) = 3. Then w(l,3) = 0 by definition. Sup­
pose v(N) = v(S) + v(T) with | 5 | = \T\ = 2 and v(S) > 0, v(T) > 0, 
say 5" = {1,2} and Τ = {2,3}. Then U2 > ui and U3 > щ and it fol­
lows that v(N) = gi2 + 523 + <7із > Ui2 + 923 = v(S) + v(T) which con­
tradicts v(N) = v(S) + v(T). Therefore, either v(S) = 0 or v(T) = 0. 
Suppose v(S) = 0 for all S with | 5 | = 2, then щ > U2 > из and hence 
v(N) = 0 as well. This completes the proof of the "only if" part. For 
the "if" part, note that there are three possible cases: either only one 
2-person coalition or two 2-person coalitions or all three 2-person coali­
tions have worth zero. In the last case υ is the game with v(S) = 0 
for all 5 G 2N. This a sequencing game arising from a sequencing situ­
ation (a ;a ;s) with «„-im > ^0-1(2) > ^-»(3)· Without loss of general-
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ity it is assumed that in the first case υ(1,3) = 0 and in the second case 
v(l, 3) = v(l, 2) = 0. Let (p; 7; t) and (p; 6; w) be sequencing situations with 
p(l) = 1, p(2) = 2, /КЗ) = 3, 7 = (0,β(1,2),»(1,2,3)- »(1,2)- r(2,3)), t = 
( l , ( t ; (2,3)+t;( l ,2))/( t ; ( l ,2,3)-t ; ( l ,2)- i ; (2,3)) , l ) , i = (v(2,3),0,i;(2,3)) 
and w = («(l,2,3)/r(2,3),l, l) . Straightforward verification shows that in 
the first case ν is the sequencing game arising from (p; 7; t) and in the sec­
ond case ν is the sequencing game arising from (p; ¿; w). This completes the 
proof. • 
Because sequencing games are convex games they are also balanced and 
the Shapley-value is the barycenter of the core. There exists a simple ex-
pression for the Shapley-value of a sequencing game which does not involve 
computing the characteristic function for all the coalitions. 
4.6.9 Theorem Let ν be a sequencing game corresponding to the sequenc­
ing situation (σ; α; s). Then the Shapley-value <p(v) of ν is given by 
4>i{v) = У* —TTT τγτ for each г e N. 
<r(fc)<<7(t)<<r(j) 4 · ' ' ν ' 
Proof. For each г, j G N with a{j) > σ(ί) define a game Vij by 
**)'{·? o, {/1 ff(i) < <r(0 < σ(ί)} с s otherwise. 
Let Τ be a connected coalition; then Vij(T) = д^ iff {г, j) С T. For a 
non-connected coalition 5, Vij(S) — ^2тсз/а із(Т). It follows that for a 
connected coalition Τ 
Σ ««(Γ) = Σ Σ 94 = "Ρ) 
^(fc)<(7-(j·) jeTkeP{*,j)nT 
and for a non-connected coalition 5 
Σ ws)= Σ Σ МЛ= Σ v(T) = v(s). 
'(fe)<»(í) »CO«^) Tes/σ res/e-
Thus, ν = 5r<r(fc)<(T(j) »fej. Because of the efficiency, symmmetry and dummy 








 - \ 0 ot 
i e {/ I а(к) < σ(1) < a(j)} 
otherwise. 
80 
From the linearity of the Shapley-value it follows that 
w(«)= Σ w(»*i)= Σ
 а
(і)-9ык) + і 
and this completes the proof. • 
Since sequencing games are balanced and balanced games are quasi-balanced 
the r-value of a sequencing game ν is given by 1.6.2. 
4.6.10 T h e o r e m Let ν be a, sequencing game corresponding to the se­
quencing situation (σ; α; s). Then the r-vaJue r(i>) of ν is given by 
Ti(v) = Σ ^кjχ for a l l i ^ N 
°-(*)<»(i)<<K¿) 
where λ = EjeivEfceP(<T1j) fffcj/EjeArEff(fc)<<r(j)<<r(0 9м· 
Proof. From 1.6.5 it follows that for a convex game w, Ti(w) = ΧΜ™ + 
(1 — X)w(Í) where λ 6 [0,1]. Since ν is convex and ν(ϊ) = 0 this yields 
φ) = \M?. Further, M? = v(N) - v(N \ {¿}) = Σσ(*)<σ(.·)<σ(,·) 9kj. 
Efficiency of the r-value leads to 
v(N) EjeAT T,k€P(a,j) 9kj 
Ejejv M,-(w) EjeAT Ea(fe)<<r(j)<(T(0 5w 
and the proof is completed. D 
4.6.11 Remark As was already noted at the beginning of this section there 
are some similarities and some differences between permutation games and 
sequencing games. The situation where customers are waiting in a queue 
to be served which was used as an example of a sequencing situation is an 
example of a permutation situation whenever all the service times are the 
same. However, in general it is not possible to define a matrix К as used 
in the definition of permutation games for sequencing games. The reason 
for this is that although for both permutation games as well as sequencing 
games the worth of the grand coalition can be found by maximizing a func­
tion on the set of permutation matrices which correspond to permutations of 
N, in the case of permutation games it is possible to give a linear extension 
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of this function to the set of doubly stochastic matrices while in the case of 
sequencing games this need not be possible as the following example from 
Curici (1987) illustrates. 
4.6.12 Example Let N = {1,2,3}, σ(1) = 1, σ(2) = 2, σ(3) = 3, si = 7, 
S2 — 3, S3 = 5, ai — 10, аг = 20, аз = 30. Consider the six permutation 
matrices corresponding to the permutations of TV. 
/ i o o \ / i o o \ 
P1= 0 1 0 Рг = 0 0 1 Рз = 
0 1 0 
Р4 = 
\ / 



















Then the function к to be maximized on {РьРг, Рз, Ρ*, Ρβ,Ρβ} in order to 
find v(N) has the foUowing values: ВД) = 0, ¿(Pj) = -10, к{Рз) = 110, 
к(Р
л
) = 150, fc(P6) = 270, k(P6) = 260. Let D be the doubly stochastic 
matrix defined by D := ^Ρχ + l p * + ІР5 then D = ÌPz + ^Рз + ^Pe-
For к to have a linear extension on the set of doubly stochastic matrices 
| P i + ІР4 + IPs has to equal ^Рг + | Р з + ^Ρβ- But the first expression 
equals 140 and the last equals 120. Therefore it is impossible to extend к to 
a linear function on the set of doubly stochastic matrices. 
A way of dividing the gains in a sequencing situation without using game-
theoretic concepts is given by the Equal Gain Splitting or EGS-mle. 
4.6.13 Definition A division rule for sequencing situations is a function 
f which assigns to every sequencing situation consisting of a set N and an 
ordered triplet (σ; α; s) a vector /(σ; α; s) = (/ι(σ; α; s),..., /
η
((τ; et; s)) such 
that 
(i) /¿(σ;α;θ) > 0 for eadi i G N. (individual rationality) 
(») EieJv/tí0";«;5) = С,, - тіп
т е
і і„ CV- (efficience 
An example of a division rule is the equal division rule which divides the 
cost savings equally among the members of N. A drawback of this method 
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is that it does not distinguish between customers who actually contribute to 
the savings and those who do not. The EGS-rule avoids this disadvantage. 
4.6.14 Definition The Equai Gain Splitting rule (EGS-rule) is the division 
rule for sequencing situations which assigns to every sequencing situation 
(a;a;s) the vector (EGS\(a;a;s),...,EGS
n
(a;a;s)) defined by 
EGSi{a; a; s) := - 5Z 9 k i + 2 ^ 9ii f o r each i G N· 
keP(<r,i) j:ieP(<r,j) 
In a sequencing situation (σ; α; s) an optimal arrangement can be reached 
by switching neighbours who are not standing in decreasing order of ur­
gency index. Every time such a switching takes place between г and j with 
a(j) = σ(ί) + 1 and щ < Uj the gain equals д^. The EG5-rule divides 
the gain that arises whenever two neighbours are switched equally between 
them. That the EGS-rule is indeed a division rule can easily be checked 
by the reader. The EGS-rule can be characterized by three properties for 
division rules. 
4.6.15 Definition Let (a ;a ; s ) be a sequencing situation. Then i ζ N is 
said to be a dummy in (σ; α; s) ifc(j) > σ(ι) implies Uj < щ and а(к) < σ(ί) 
implies u* > u¿ for all j , к £ N. 
4.6.16 Definition Two sequencing situations (σ; α; s) and (r; α; s) are called 
i-equivalent if Ρ(σ,ι) — Р(т,г). 
4.6.17 Definition Let (<7;a;s) be a sequencing situation and let i,j Ε N 
with \σ(ί) — a ( j ) | = 1. Then (т;а;з) with т(г) = a(j), T(J) = <r(t) and 
т(к) — <7(k) for all к £ N \ {i,j} is called the i j-inverse of (σ; α; s). 
4.6.18 Definition A division rule f for sequencing situation is said to satisfy 
the dummy property if /¿(σ; α; s) = 0 whenever i is a dummy in (σ; α; s); 
f is said to posses the equivalence property if /¿(σ; α; s) = /¿(r; α; s) for 
83 
each i E N and each pair of г - equivalent sequencing situations (σ; α; s) and 
( r ; α; s); f is said to posses the switch property if / ¡ ( r ; a; s) — /¿(σ; a; s) = 
/j(r ; a; s) — fj(&; a; s) for all i,j 6 N and all pairs of sequencing situations 
(iTjajs) and ( r j a ; « ) where (τ; a; s) is the i j-inverse of (σ; a; s). 
4.6.19 T h e o r e m The EGS-rule is the unique division rule for sequenc­
ing situations that possesses the dummy property, the equivalence property 
and the switch property. 
Proof. Let (σ; α; s) be a sequencing situation such that г is a dummy. Then 
д
кі
 = 0 for all к G Ρ(σ,ί) and д^ = 0 for all j with г 6 Ρ ( σ , j ) . From the 
definition of the .EGS-rule it follows that EGSi{o\ a; s) = 0 and hence the 
.EGS-rule possesses the dummy property. 
Let (σ; α; s) and ( r ; α; s) be two ¿-equivalent sequencing situations. Then 
Ρ ( σ , ι ) = Р ( г , г ) and hence {j G N \ i G Ρ ( σ , j)} = {j G N \ i G P ( T , J ) } . 
Now EGSi(a\ Q; S) = EGSÍ{T\ α; s) from the definition of the EGS-rule and 
so the .EGS-rule possesses the equivalence property. 
Let ( σ ; α ; 5 ) be a sequencing situation and ( r j a ; s) its ij-inverse. Without 
loss of generality it is assumed that σ(ζ) < σ{ί). Then - E G S ¿ ( T ; α; s) -
E G S ¿ ( a ; a ; s ) = \gji — \gij = E G S j ( r ; a ; s ) - E G S j ( a ; a; s) . Thus, the 
£GS- ru le possesses the switch property. 
Suppose ƒ is a division rule for sequencing situations which possesses these 
three properties. Let the set of misplaced pairs of neighbours in a sequencing 
situation (a;a;s) be defined by Μ
σ
 := {{i,j) \ σ(ί) = a(j) + 1, щ > Uj}. 
By induction on the cardinality of Μ
σ
 it will be proved that ƒ is equal to the 
EGS-rule . Let (σ; α; s) be a sequencing situation with M„ = (9, then every­
body is a dummy and it follows that / ( σ ; Q; s) — (0,0,.. ., 0) = E G S ( a ; α; s). 
Suppose / ( σ ; α; s) = E G S ( C T ; α; s) for all sequencing situations (σ; a; s) with 
\Л4<Г\ < m, where m > 0. Let ( r ; a ; 5 ) be such that \Л4Т\ = m + 1. Then 
there exist a sequencing situation (σ; α; s) and a pair (k, l) G A<T such 
that <г(г) = т(г) for all г £ {λ;,/} and a(k) = r ( f ) , σ(/) = т(/с). Then 
Л І ^ = М
т
\{(к, /)} and the equivalence property and the induction assump­





 = ды and the efficiency, the switch property and the 
induction assumption yield Д ( т ; α; s) = Д ( σ ; α; s) + ¿ды = EGSk((T\ α; θ) + 
I^W = E G S f c ( r ; a ; s ) . In the same way /і(т;а;з) = EGSi(T;a;s) is ob­
tained. Hence / ( r , Q ; S ) = EGS(T;a;s) and the proof is completed. • 
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4.6.20 T h e o r e m Let ν be the sequencing game corresponding to the se­
quencing situation (a;a;s). Then EGS(a;a;s) £ C(v). 
Proof. Because of the efficiency of the EGS-rule the equality 
Е.елг EGSt(a; a; s) = v(N) holds. Let S G 2 ^ , then 
££GS,(a;a;5) = £ i ( £ д
к% + £ д13) > 
tes »es keP(<r,i) j ieJV. j) 
Σ,Ιί Σ 9*+ Σ ^) = Σ Σ s* > v(s). 
»es fceP(ff,t)ns j e s teP(<7,j) »es keP^,i)ns 
Thus,EGS(a;a;s)£ C(v). 
The meaning of theorem 4.6.20 is that even though the £ G 5 - r u l e has been 
introduced without considering the sequencing game arising from a sequenc­
ing situation it still yields a division which is in the cores of the game. 
4.6.21 R e m a r k A kind of abstract sequencing situation can be defined 
where only the original permutation σ and the non-negative g^s are given, 
with the property that if gtj > 0 then <7Я = 0, without the interpretation 
that they result from costs and sevice times. From these abstract sequencing 
situations, abstract sequencing games can be defined in the same way as in 
( 11) and ( 12) because only the g.j's and σ are needed in these definitions. 
In fact, everything that has been defined and proved for sequencing situ­
ations and sequencing games can also be defined and proved for abstract 
sequencing situations and abstract sequencing games. The following exam­
ple shows that there exists indeed abstract sequencing situations which are 
not sequencing situations. 
4.6.22 E x a m p l e Let N = {1,2,3}, <7(1) = 1, σ(2) = 2, cr(3) = 3 and 
gi2 = 023 = 031 = 1, <7із = 532 = 521 = 0. Suppose that there existed a e E.3 
and s 6 R ' such that д = (α^θ, - а , з
л
) + for all i,j £ {1,2,3}. Then 
«2/52 = Qi/si + l/siS2, 0:3/53 = 0:2/52 + 1/52*3 and α ϊ / θ ! = 03/53 + 1/5153 
which lead to the contradiction 0:2/52 > ai/si > аз/53 and аз/53 > 02/52-
Therefore, such an α and s do not exist and this situation is an abstract 
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sequencing situation but not a sequencing situation. 
The idea of connectedness can also be found in a somewhat different frame­
work in Myerson (1977) and Owen (1984) Myerson considers games with 
cooperation structures described by graphs. The nodes of such a graph are 
the players and the edges are unoredered pairs of distinct players. Given a 
set of players N and a graph which describes the cooperation structure in 
N, for each S E 2N two players in 5 are connected iff there is a path going 
from one to the other and staying in S. For a game ν Myerson introduces 
an allocation rule for ν as a function defined on the set of all possible graphs 
describing cooperation structures in Ν, with values in]Rn such that for each 
component 5 of a given graph the sum of the quantities allocated to the 
members of S is equal to v(S). Myerson calls such an allocation rule fair if 
for any two players i,j 6 N the difference between the quantities the rule 
assigns to г in a situation where {i,j} is an edge and a situation where this 
is not the case, is equal to the difference between the quantities the rule 
assigns to j in these two situations. He calk an allocation rule stable if for 
any two player i,j£ N the quantity the rule assigns to i(j) in a situation 
where {г, j} is an edge is at least equal to the quantity assigned to i(j) when 
this is not the case. Myerson proves that there exists a unique fair alloca­
tion rule and that this rule is stable whenever υ is superadditive. This rule 
assigns to a certain graph g, describing a cooperation structure in N, the 
Shapley-value of the graph restricted game v/g defined by 
v/9(S):= Σ «(Τ) for each 5 € 2^ , 
Tes/g 
where S/g is the partition of S into components in the graph g. 
For a given graph g, Owen(1984) studies the mapping which assigns to each 
game υ the game v/g. This mapping is linear and Owen proves that its 
image is the set spanned by the unanimity games uy, where Τ is connected 
in g. For several games v, Owen computes the Shapley-value of v/g in the 
case that g is a tree. The difference between the games with cooperation 
structure considered by Myerson and Owen and sequencing games is that 
for sequencing games the cooperation structure is described by a directed 
graph rather than an undirected one. For a coalition containing i,j G N it 
really matters whether (г, j ) or (j, г) is an arc of the graph. 
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4.7 Traveling salesman games 
The traveling salesman problem is a very well known combinatorial opti-
mization problem. In one of the formulations of the problem a directed 
graph is given with weights on the arcs and a cycle which visits each node 
exactly once and has minimal weight has to be found. Here the weight of a 
cycle is the sum of the weights of the arcs belonging to it. In a arbitrarily 
given graph there need not exist a cycle which visits each node exactly once. 
Even when such a cycle exists there may be a cycle with lesser weight which 
visits some nodes more than once. However if the graph is complete and 
the weights satisfy the triangle inequality (i.e. if for any two nodes i, j of 
the graph WÍJ denotes the weight of the arc beginning in i and ending in j 
then WÍJ + Wjk > wo, for all nodes i,j,k) then there is a cycle in the graph 
which visits each node exactly once and such that no cycle which visits some 
nodes more than once has lesser weight. Every traveling salesman problem 
on a graph can be transformed into a problem on a complete graph with 
weights satisfying the triangle inequality by defining the complete graph on 
the same set of nodes and taking the weight WÍJ in the new graph to be the 
weight of a minimal path from i to j in the original graph. In the following 
it is assumed that the traveling salesman problems under consideration are 
on a complete graph with weights satisfying the triangle inequality unless 
stated otherwise. 
Traveling salesman games arise from situations like the following. Each of 
η universities has invited a speaker to deliver a lecture. The speaker has to 
travel from his home town to all the universities and back. The problem of 
finding a cheapest way for him to visit all the universities and then return 
home is a traveling salesman problem. The problem of how to divide his 
travel cost among all the universities which invited him is a cost allocation 
problem which can be modeled with the aid of a cooperative game, namely 
a traveling salesman game. In the definition of the characteristic function 
of a traveling salesman game it is assumed that every coalition (in the ex­
ample above every subset of universities) looks at the traveling cost if the 
speaker visits only members of the coalition and then returns home. Such 
a round trip of the speaker can be described with the aid of a bijection 
e : {1, ...,|S|} —• S where e(l) is the university visited first, e(2) the one 
visited second and so forth. Let the set of all such functions be denoted by 
E(S). Let 0 denote the home of the speaker and let for each S E2N the set 
S U 0 be denoted by So· 
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D e f i n i t i o n 4.7.1 A cooperative game с is called a traveling salesman game 
whenever for all i,j G -/VQ tiiere exist WÍJ > 0 such that c(S) is given for all 
S e 2N by 
c(S) := mm{u;0 e(1 ) + we(i)e(2) + · · · + We(|5|)o I e 6 E(S)} . 
Another way to express c(5) is with the following integer programming 
problem. (Cf. Tucker 1960) 
c(5) = min £ i € S o E,€5o wi3xi3 o b j e c t to 
£jeSo\{»} хч = l s ^ f o r a 1 1 г € N 
Σί€5ο\0·} *ij = l s ( j ) for all i G ΛΓ (13) 
Ui - IÍ¿ + nxij < η — 1 for all г, j G S with г' ^ j 
х
*з G {0,1}, u¿ G m for ail г, j G N. 
Here l i j = 1 means that the speaker travels directly from university г to 
university j and Xjj = 0 means that he does not visit university j directly 
after university г. The first 2n conditions ensure that each university is vis­
ited exactly once, while the next | 5 | 2 conditions guarantee that the travel 
plan described by the i j j ' s does not contain loops without 0. 
4.7.2 R e m a r k Note that while in definition 4.7.1 no town including 0 can 
be visited more than once, in the definition given by ( 13) it is possible for 
0 to be visited more than once. However, because the weights satisfy the 
triangle inequality the two minima are the same. 
4.7.3 T h e o r e m Traveling salesman games need not be balanced. 
Proof. Let JV = {1,2,3,4} and let the tujj's for i,j G NQ be given by: 
WOl = 1 «702 = 2 Wo3 = 2 W04 = 1 
wio = 1 и>і2 = 1 Wi3 = 2 wu = 2 
W20 = 2 W21 = 1 W23 = 1 W24 = 2 
W30 = 1 гУзі = 2 W32 = 2 u>34 = 2 
ΐί>40 = 1 W41 = 2 U>42 = 1 W43 = 1 . 
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Then a minimal cycle for N is given by e ( l ) = 1, e(2) = 2, e(3) = 3, e(4) = 4 
which yields c(N) = 6. A minimal cycle for {1,2 ,3} is given by e ( l ) = 1, 
e(2) = 2, e(3) = 3 yielding c( 1,2,3) = 4, a minimal cycle for {1 ,2 ,4} is 
given by e ( l ) = 4, e(2) = 2, e(3) = 1 yielding c ( l , 2 , 4 ) = 4, a minimal cycle 
for {3,4} is given by e ( l ) = 4, e(3) = 2 yielding c(3,4) = 3. Then 
^ c ( l , 2 , 3 ) + ¿ c ( l , 2 , 4 ) + i c ( 3 , 4 ) = 5 ^ < 6 = c ( l , 2 , 3 , 4 ) 
violating a balancedness condition. Thus, с is not balanced. • 
For a traveling salesman game to have an empty core it must have at least 
4 players as the following theorem shows. 
4.7.4 T h e o r e m Let с be a traveling salesman game with three or less 
players. Then с is balanced. 
Proof. If с is a game with only one player then с is trivially balanced. 
If с is a traveling salesman game with two players then the balancedness of с 
follows from the subadditivity of c. Let с be a traveling salesman game with 
set of players N = {1,2,3}. To prove that с is balanced only the inequality 
c ( l , 2 ) + c( l ,3) + c ( 2 , 3 ) > 2 c ( l , 2 , 3 ) (14) 
has t o be checked. (Cf.l.3.7) Two cases will be distinguished. 
(i) In the expression c( l , 2) + c( l ,3) + c(2,3) there is a WQÌ occurring twice. 
Without loss of generality it is assumed that u>oi is occurring twice. Then 
c ( l , 2) + c ( l , 3) + c(2,3) = WQI + w^ + W20 + woi + ^ і з + ^30+ 
Tnin{wo2 + W23 + U>30, W03 + «>32 + W20} . 
Let the minimum be equal to W02 + W23 + W30. The other case can be treated 
similarly. Then 
c ( l , 2) + c ( l , 3) + c(2,3) = wQ1 + Ш12 + W20 + WQI + W13+ 
W30 + w02 + W23 + W30 
= WQI + W12 + W23 + ttfao + •W02+ 
VJ20 + WQI + W13 + W30 
> c ( l ,2 ,3) + W02 + 1^ 20 + " O l + W13 + W30 
> C(l,2,3) + W02 + W21 + Wi3+W30 
> 2c( l ,2,3) 
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(ii) In the expression c ( l , 2 ) + c ( l ,3 ) + c(2,3) there is no WQÌ occurring twice. 
Then for each г G N woi occurs exactly once. Then 
c( 1,2) + c( 1,3) + c(2,3) = WQI + w
n
 + W20 + ^02 + W23 + "'зо + >оз + ^ з і + «Ίο 
or 
c ( l , 2 ) + c ( l , 3 ) + c ( 2 , 3 ) = Woi+Wi3 + W3o + W03+'W22 + W20 + Wo2 + W2l + W1o· 
Both cases can be treated similarly. Consider the first case. Then 
c ( l , 2 ) + c ( l , 3 ) + c(2,3) = woi + wn + W20 + W02 + ^23+ 
W3o + W02 + W31 + W10 
= WQI + W12 + W23 + №30 + W20+ 
г
 02 + Wo3 + W31 + wio 
> с(1,2,3) + гі>20 + woi + ^03 + ^31 + ww 
> c( 1,2,3) + W02 + №23 + W31 + WlO 
> 2c( l ,2,3) 
It follows that inequality ( 14) holds and hence с is balanced. D 
4.7.5 P r o p o s i t i o n Let с be a traveling salesman game such that for each 
i G No there exist u¿, Zi with u>,¿ = щ + Zi for all i,j G ÍVQ. Then 
C(c) = { χ G Ж.п I Xi = щ + Zi + Xi(u0 + zo) with 0 < A < 1 for all i G Ν 
a n d E i e t f ^ = 1}. 
Proof. For such a traveling salesman game all travel plans for a certain 
coalition S have the same cost, namely Хл
е
5 0(и» + -г»)· Let y G C(c). Then 
Уі < Щ + Zi + uo + ZQ and yi > c(N) — c(N \ {г}) = щ + z¿ for all t G N. 
This and the efficiency of y imply that y is an element of the set on the right 
hand side. Let y be an element of this set. Then y(N) = c(N) and for all 
S G 2 ^ , y(S) < E»65o(u¿ + zi) = c(s)· Hence y G C(c) and the proof is 
completed. Π 
4.7.6 R e m a r k The numbers u¿,Zj could be seen as taxes which have to 
be paid when entering and leaving a town respectively. If there are no other 
travel costs that matter , the cost of traveling from г to j is simply equal to 
ii» + Zj. 
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4.7.7 P r o p o s i t i o n Consider a traveling salesman problem with set of nodes 
NQ where N = {1,2, . . . ,n} and weights WÍJ for i,j G NQ. Then there ex-
ist Ui,Zi for all г G No such that WÍJ = щ + z¿ for all i,j G No iff for all 
j G Ν, Wij—Wio is the same for all i G NQ where woo is taken to be equal to 0. 
Proof. Let WÍJ be such that there exist u^Zi for all г G NQ with WÍJ = щ + Zj 
for all i,j G NQ. Then WÍJ — Wio = щ + Zj — щ — ZQ = Zj — ZQ for all 
i G No- This proofs the "only if " part. Suppose WÍJ — W,O is the same for 
all i G iV"o, say и>,·,· — Wio = bj. Define a¿ = w^ for all i G NQ and 6o = 0. 
Then WÍJ = ai + bj for all i, j G -/VQ. Thus, the "if" part is proved. • 
It seems intuitivly clear that when the home town is relatively far away 
from the universities while these are more or less clustered together, caus-
ing the travel cost of a trip around all the universities to be rather cheap 
compared with the cost of traveling from the home town to any university 
and back to the home town (not necessarily from the same university), it 
is profitable for the universities to cooperate and it should be possible to 
distribute the travel costs in such a way tha t no coalition will prefer to work 
on its own. Tha t this is indeed the case is shown in the following theorem. 
4 .7 .8 T h e o r e m Let с be a trave/ingsaiesman game such that for all i, j £ N 
(woi + Wjo)/n > max{ii>e(1)e(2) + we(2)e(3) + • · · + ^ n - i ^ n ) I e € E(N)} . 
Then с is balanced. 
Proof. Without loss of generality it is assumed that c(iV) = WQI + u>i2 + 
h ги
п
о. Let χ G Κ.η be defined by 
Xi = Wii+1 + (woi + Wfioi/n for г G η \ {η} 
Xn - (woi + w
n
o)ln . 
Then x{N) = ΣίζΝ\{η} wii+i + woi + ™no = c(N). 
Let 5 С Ν, S φ Ν with e G E(S) such that c{S) = w0e^ + ti>e(i)e(2) + · · · + 
w
e








(з + • · · + ^(151-1)^151) is denoted 
by Ms and max{w^1^2) + · • · + we(n-i)e(n) I e G E(N)} is denoted by M. 
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Then 
c(S) = w0 e ( 1) + we(|s|)o + Ms 
i c i i c i 
= (WOe(l) + We(\S\)o) + («»Oe(l) + "'«(SJo) + ^ 5 
> ^ ( » « Ц ! ) + We(\S\)0) + (n- \S\)M + Ms 
=
 l





 ' η η 
> ^-(w01 + wno+ Σ ^ і+г) + (η - 1^ 1 - — )M + Ms 
i6S\{n} 
> \^.(W01 + Wn0+ V Щі+1)+т}—1пм + М5 
»€S\{n} 




Here the second inequality follows from the fact that г«о«(і) + we(|5|)o + M < 
woi + Wno + Eies\{n} U7»»+i < w oi + Wno + Еіелг\{п} «'ü+i would contradict 
с(І ) = шоі + ^іг + · · · + Wno because then any travel plan starting with go­
ing from 0 to e(l) and ending with going from ε(|5Ί) to 0 would be cheaper. 
Hence χ 6 C(c) and с is balanced. • 
4.7.Θ Remark A situation as described in theorem 4.7.7 could arise when 
a speaker from the United States or Canada is invited to deliver a lecture 
at some universities in the Netherlands. The cost of travleing around the 
universities in the Netherlands would be neglible compared with the cost of 
the transatlantic flights. 
Consider the following variation on traveling salesman games. In the exam­
ple of the speaker and the universities the cost c(iV) of the grand coalition 
N is again taken to be the total cost of a cheapest travel plan of the speaker. 
The cost c(5) of a coalition 5 С N, S φ N however, is no longer the cost of 
a cheapest travel plan along the universities in S but it is the cost arising 
from skipping the universities not in 5 and visiting those in 5 in the same 
order as in the travel plan for N. 
92 
4.7.10 Definition A game с is called a routing game if for all i,j € iVo 
there exist WÍJ > 0 such that there is а едг G E(N) with 
c(N) = w0eN{1) + weN(1)eN{2) + •••+ we„(„)o 
= min{tü0e(l) + We(l)e(2) + ' ' ' + ^
е
(п)0 I « 6 E(N)} 
and 




(2) + · · · + »».,(151)0 for ali 5 G 2 ^ 
where es is defined by 
4.7.11 Remark A justification for using a routing game rather than a 
traveling salesman game to model a situation like the one described above 
could be that each coalition S С Ν, S -φ N prefers to construct a travel plan 
from an optimal travel plan for the grand coalition rather than computing 
an optimal plan for itself since the finding of an optimal plan tends to take 
a lot of computation time which could induce more costs than benefits. In 
fact routing games are not combinatorial games since only the computation 
of c(N) involves solving a combinatorial optimization problem. Note that 
beside the grand coalition the one-person coalitions also have the same cost 
in a routing game as in the corresponding traveling salesman game so that 
the imputation set is the same for the two games. 
4.7.12 Definition Let с be a routing game and let e G E(N). A coalition 
Τ is said to be an e-connected coalition if Τ is of the form {е - 1 (г),е - 1 (г + 
Ι ^ - , β - ^ ΐ + ρ)} with {¿,і '+1,...,*' + р} С Ν. 
4.7.13 Definition Let с be a routing game and let e G E(N). Let S С N. 
A coalition Τ is called an e-component of S if (i) Τ С S, (ii) Τ is e-connected 
and (Ui) Τ U {г} is not e-connected for all г G S \ T. 
4.7.14 Theorem Let В be a balanced collection with weights {\т}тев· 
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If there exists an e £ E(N) such that Τ is e-connected for each Τ Ε В then 
there are partitions Bi,B2, ··., Bq ofN with Ufc
=
i B/, = В and oti, Q2, .·., «ς > 
0 with ^
= 1 ak = 1 such that λ Γ = ^ J = 1 а А 1в 4 (Т) for ai/ Τ 6 ß. 
Proof. Let ß be a balanced collection with weights {Аг}те0 such that 
each Τ G β is e-connected for an e 6 E(N). Without loss of generality it 
is assumed that e(i) = г for each i G ΛΓ. Hence each Τ G В is of the form 
{г, г + 1,..., г + ρ} С ЛГ. The proof will proceed by induction on the number 
of elements of B. If В has only one element then В = N and the prop­
erty stated in the theorem is trivially satisfied. Suppose that all balanced 
collections with m or less elements satisfy the property. Here m > 1. Let 
β be a balanced collection with m + 1 elements. There is a Τχ G В with 
Τι = {1,2, ...,ji} where ji < n. Because β is a balanced collection there 
is a T2 G ß with Γ2 = {ji + 1,..., J2}· И h < η then there is a T3 G В 
with T3 = {J2 + 1,..., jz}· Proceeding in this way a row Г^Гг, Тз,Т4, ...,T
r 
of elements of В is obtained with Tì = {1,. . . , j i } , Ti = {ji-i + 1,..., ji} for 
г G {2,..., r} with j
r
 — п. Let Βχ = {ΤΊ,Τ2,..., T
r
} then Bi is a partition of 
ΛΓ. Define 
Qi := min λ τ . 
геВ! 
Let В' be the collection containing all the elements of В except those Τ in 
ßi with Χτ = αχ. If B' is empty then the induction step is completed with 
ßi and αχ as defined above. Otherwise, define 
A j : = Ä s / ( l - a i ) i f 5 G ß , \ ß i 
\'s := (\s - сцУІІ - сч) if 5 G ß 'Π ß i . 
Then A¿ > 0 for all S G ß ' and 
Σ ^
1
* = Σ 1 S * S / ( 1 - Ö I ) + Σ 1 г ( А г - а 1 ) / ( 1 - а 1 ) 
Se Β' SeBXBx Γ€βι 
= 1/(1 - аа) Σ <^І5 - сцДі - α*) Σ I r 
ses геві 
= 1 ^ / ( 1 - α ϊ ) - І л г а і Д і - а і ) = Ілг. 
Thus, ß ' is a balanced collection with weights {X^seB1 a n d τη or less ele­
ments. From the induction assumption it follows that there exist partitions 
ßz, ßa,..., ß , of Ν with {Jl
=2 ßfc = β' and 72,7з, - , 7, > 0 with £2=2 7* = 1 
such that AJj = £ «
= 2 7 * 1 Β 4 ( 5 ) for all 5 G ß ' . Define 02,03, ···,<*<, by 
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a fe = 7fc(l - a i ) for all к 6 {2,...,g}. Then α* > 0 for all к e {2,...,ç} 
and X3fc=i Qk = ai + (1 _ ai) = 1- Furthermore, 
¿ <*klBh(S) = ¿ aklBk(S) = (1 - aM = Х3іот5еВ\В1 
k=l k=2 
and 
¿ α*ΐΒ4(Γ) = ¿ afclBi(T) + αχ = (1 - α^λ^, + aj = ΑΓ for Τ G ß j . 
fc=l fc=2 
Because Ufc=i Bk = Bi \J B' = В the induction step and the proof are com­
pleted. • 
Theorem 4.7.14 is needed for the proof of the following theorem. 
4.7.15 T h e o r e m Äouiing games are balanced. 
Proof. Let с be a routing game. Without loss of generality it is assumed 
that 
c(JV) = Í¿>OI + и>12 H h Wno and 
c(5) = w0es{1) + •·• + wes^)o for ail 5 € 2 ^ 
where 65 is defined by 
es(0 < es(j') <=> г' < J · 
In the following ejv is denoted by e. Let β be a balanced collection with 
weights {A5}5
eS. For each S G В let S/e = {Τ^,Τξ,...,Τ^$)} be the 
partition of 5 into e-components. For each 5 G В and each к G {1, ...,p(S)} 
let the e- component T^ of 5 be of the form {¿*(5),ζ"*(5)-|-1,..., jk(S)} with 
ik+i(S) > jk(S). Then for all 5 G В 
p(5) p ( S ) - l p ( S ) - l p(S) 
c ( s ) = Σ с ( г * ) + Σ wh(s)ik+1(s) - Σ адй(*)о - Σ woik(s) · 
fc=l fc=l fe=l k=2 
This yields 
p(S) p ( S ) - l 
Σ λ 5 ^ 5 ) = Е м Е с ( г * ) + Σ «
Α(5)ΰ+1(β) - (is) 
ses see fc=i fc=i 
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p ( 5 ) - l p(S) 
Σ ^»(5)0 - Σ woik(s)) · 
fe=l fe=2 
Let the collection В' of elements of 2^ be defined by 
TeB'&TeS/e for an S G В. 
Then each element of B' is e-connected. For each Τ E B' let Aj. be defined 
by 
X'T:= J2 λ 5 · 




τ 1 τ = Σ Σ ^ г 
гев' тев'seB:Tes/e 
= Σ** Σ ir 
se в Tes/e 
= Σ
λ 5 1 Α = ΐΛΓ. 
se в 
Thus В' is a balanced collection with weights {Aj}r
e
B» containing only e-
connected sets. From theorem 4.7.14 it follows that there exist partitions 
B1,B2,...,Bqo{N with UJUi β * = ß ' and а ! ,аг , . . . ,a , > 0 with ^ J = 1 a fc = 
1 such that λ ,^ = Σΐ=ι <*к1в
к





ε ( τ * 5 ) = Σχ'τ«τ) (iß) 





Let ß* be a partition of JV containing only e-connected sets. Say B* = 
{Ti,T2,...,Tm} with Т
к
 = {ik,ik + l,...,Jfc} where ¿i = 1 and j m = η and 
і*+і = ifc + 1- Then 
m—1 m m—1 
Σ с(Г) = c(JV) + 5 3 «»¿»о + Σ w°ik - Σ «Άΰ+ι · 
гев· fc=i fe=2 fc=i 
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Because ( J J U I Bk = В' and Τ 6 В' iff Τ G 5/e for an 5 G ß and 
¿afclBfc(T) = Ài,= £ λ5 
fc=l S€B:TeS/e 
it follows that 
¿ a f c £ c(T)=¿afec(JV)+ (17) 
P(S) P ( S ) - I 
Σ
Α
ί ( Σ wik(S)0+ Σ «OibíS)- Σ ^ ( 5 ) ^ ( 5 ) + ! ) · 
SeB fc=ljfc(5)^n fc=l,»a(5)9Íl fc=l 
Combining ( 15),( 16) and ( 17) yields 
J2^sc{S) = c(N)+ Σ bswj,(s)0+ Σ λ5«Όή(5) + 
5ев S€B,jr(s)¿n seBMS)& 
p(5)- l p(S)-l 
Σ
 X s
 Σ «Άί^ Λ+ι(S) - Σ Χ* Σ ^»(^ÄiSi+l 
s e s fc=i s e e к=і 
= C(7V)+ J ] XSWjp(s){S)0+ Σ λ5«Ό.·1(5) + 
íeB.i.Ksjí5)?4'» seB. i i íS)^! 
p(S)-l p(S) 
Σ
λ 5 Σ ωΛ(5)4+1(^) + Σ λ 5 Σ Σ vii+i + 
s e s fc=i s e s fc=i »eràs\{i4(S)} 
p(S)-l 
•ШОІ + ^пО - Σ XS Σ ^¿*(5)Л(5)+1 - №οΐ - WnO -
s e s fc=i 
p(S) 
Σ
 λ5 Σ Σ ш»+і · 





s Σ ^»(^»(^+і + Σ λ 5 Σ Σ u,«+i + ^оі + ^ηο = 
ses fe=i ses fc=i »eT/\{ià(s)} 
Σ ^s Σ ^« '^
1
 + ^ 0 1 + ^пО = Σ u , » + 1 + ^ 0 1 + wnO = c{N) 
s e s ¿es,»^n »eJV.i^n 
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the following holds. 
Y/Xsc(S)= Σ Х*тЫ5)(3)о+ Σ λ5«Ό.·1(5)+ (18) 
ses seBj^s^s^n seB.ii(s)#i 
p(5)-l p(S) 
Σ
λ 5 Σ WJk(S)ik+i(S)+ Σ λ 3 Σ Σ «'ií+l + «Ol + WnO • 
зев k=i see k=i іет^\{з
к
(з)} 
Because β is a balanced collection the sum of the weights of the terms Wji 
with j G NQ \ {i} equals 1 for all i £ N in the expression ( 18). The same 
holds for the sum of the weights of the terms WÍJ with j £ No\ {¿} for all 
г G η . Therefore, for each г £ N there exist α£ > 0 for each к £ NQ \ {i} 
with EfcetfoU»} аІ = 1 s u c h t h a t 
^ A 5 c ( 5 ) = ^ Σ α ^ + Σ ^ Κ ο (19) 
SeB iÇNkeN0\{i} k€N 
where a ° > 0 for all к £ N and JZfeeJV ак ^ 0. T h e expression in ( 19) equals 
7i Ci + 72^2 + • • · + 7iCi 
with 7, > 0 for all </ G {1,...,/} and Σ ^
= 1 Aj = 1 and C , equal to the cost 
of a semi-travel plan for each q £ {1, ...,k}, i.e. a travel plan in which the 
home town 0 may be visited more than once and each other town is visited 
exactly once. Because of the triangle inequality each С
я
 is higher than c(N). 
This yields 
Σ λ 5 ^ 5 ) = Σ Σ akw>4 
s e e ieNo keNo\{i} 
ι I 
«=1 ς=1 
and the proof is completed. • 
An example will clarify the last part of the proof of theorem 4.7.15. 
4.7.16 E x a m p l e Let N = {1,2,3,4,5}, В = {{1,3,5}, {2,3,4},{1,2,5}, 
{1,4,5}, {1,3,4,5}, {1,2,3,4}} with weights | , | , | , | , I , 1 respectively. 
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Then {l,3,5}/e = {1},{3},{5}}, {2,3,4}/e = {{2,3,4}}, {l,2,5}/e = 
{{1,2},{5}}, {2,4,5}/e = {{2},{4,5}}, {l,3,4,5}/e = {{1},{3,4,5}} and 
{l,2,3,4}/e= {{1,2,3,4}. Further, 
У] A5c(5) = -(u;oi+ и;із + и;з5 + lugo) +-(шо2 +^23 + ^34+ ^4o) + 
5 І 8 6 3 
- ( ^ 0 1 + Wl2 + ^25 + №50) + -(W02 + W24 + W45 + W50) + 
о 0 
1/ 
-(U?01 + 1^13 + W34 + ^45 + ^ Б О ) + 
1/ 
-{Woi + W12 + W23 + W34 + W40) 
О 
Л 1 1 I, 1 1 1 1 
= (g + з + з + Q)Wn + 3^02 + 2^12 + gW02 + 0^12 + 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Wl3 4. W23 4. ^ 3 4- u , ^ 4. ^34 4. W u 4. ^34 4. 
6 3 3 6 3 6 3 
1 1 1 1 1 
-U;34 + -W3B + -W2S + - ^ 4 5 + Г^45 + 
6 6 3 6 3 
, 1 1 1 1 , 1 1 
(б + З + б + З ^ + З ^ + б ™ 4 0 
This last expression is the anlogue of ( 19) and equals 
-(tüOl + WU + ">23 + W34 + W46 + WSO) + 
1/ 
-(U>01 + ^13 + W34 + W40 + W02 + W2S + WbO) + 
-(Woi + ^13 + ^ З Б + 1^ 50 + ^02 + ™24 + ^40) + 
1, 
-(•Шоі + Wi3 + Was + Wso + W02 + W24 + ^40) 
D 
-(tüOl + Wi3 + №35 + ll>62 + 1024 + W40) 
> lc(N)+y(N)+1-c(N) = c(N). 
4.8 Minimum cost spanning tree games 
Consider the following situation studied by Claus and Kleitman (1973). Sev­
eral customers who are geopgraphically separated have to be linked to a 
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certain supplier. The supplier could be for instance an electricity plant, and 
the customers could be various towns. A customer can be linked directly to 
the supplier or through other customers. Each link induces a non-negative 
cost. Claus and Kleitman raised the question of how to allocate the total 
cost, incurred by connecting all the customers to the supplier, among the 
customers. They considerd several methods to allocate this cost and dis­
cussed their pro's and contra's. They also gave a list of desirable criteria for 
a cost allocation in this situation. 
Formally, this situation can be described as follows. Let TV = {l,2,...,n} be 
the set of customers and let the supplier be denoted by 0. Let GN be the 
complete graph with set of nodes N U {0}. Let Ejf denote the set of edges 
of Gff. A tipical edge of Gлг is denoted by /;,· = /¿j where i,j G Λ^ are the 
endpoints of the edge. To each edge /¿j G EN a cost k(lij) is attached where 
k(lij) is the cost induced when i and j are linked. The problem of finding 
a cheapest way to connect all the customers to the supplier is equivalent to 
the problem of finding a minimum cost spanning tree of the graph Gff. Bird 
(1976) was the first to apply cooperative game theory to the cost allocation 
problem described above. The cost of a coalition 5 G 2 ^ is defined to be the 
cost of linking all members of S to the supplier in a cheapest possible way 
without using links involving customers not in 5. Let Gs be the complete 
graph with set of nodes equal to So = S U {0}. Then the cost c(S) of a 
coalition S is the cost of a minimum cost spanning tree of the graph (7$. 
Let £5 be the set of edges of Gs-
4.8.1 Definition A cooperative game с is a minimum cost spanning tree 
game if there exists a graph G Ν with set of nodes equal to No and set of 
edges EN, with costs k(lij) > 0 attached to each edge /,j where i,j G Λ^ ο, 
such that for each S G 2^, c(5) is the cost of a minimum cost spanning tree 
of the graph Gs obtained from G Ν by removing all nodes in N \ S and all 
edges which at least one endpoint in N \ S. 
4.8.2 Theorem (Bird) Minimum cost spanning tree games are balanced. 
Proof. Let с be a minmium cost spanning tree game with corresponding 
graph Gtf. Let Тдг be a minimum cost spanning tree of Gff. For each г G TV 
let e,- be the edge on the unique path from 0 to г in Tjf with one endpoint 
equal to i. Let χ G Ht" be defined by Xi := /¡;(e¿) for each г G TV. Then 
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x(N) = YlieNk(ei) = C(N)· F o r S £ 2N\ {0} let Γ 5 be a minimum cost 
spanning tree of Gs- For each i G S let ef be the edge on the unique path 
from 0 to г in T5 with one endpoint equal to t. Then c(5) = £»€$ ^(ef )· 
Suppose x(S) > c(5), then there exists an i G S with k(ef ) < k(ei) and 
fc(ef) > ^(ej) for all І o n t^16 P a t h from 0 to ζ in T5. Replace in Τχ the 
edge e¿ by ef. This results in a spanning tree of G Ν with lesser cost than 
Xjv which contradicts the fact that TV is a minimum cost spanning tree of 
GN- Therefore, x(5) < c(5) for all S £ 2N and χ G С (с). О 
The Shapley-value of a minmum cost spaning tree game need not be in 
the core of the game. However, for every minimum cost spanning tree game 
it is possible to define at least one weighted Shapley-value which will lie in 
the core of the game. The following result is due to Bird (1976). Let с be a 
minimum cost spanning tree game with corresponding graph Gff. A permu­
tation 7Г G Пдг is called feasible if there exists a minimum cost spanning tree 
TV of GN such that TV contains minimum cost spanning trees of Gs for 
all coalitions 5 of the form {π· - 1 (1),π - 1 (2), ...,7r-1(g)} where q G {1, ...,n}. 
Let TV be a minimum cost spanning tree of G if. Then any permutation 
π G IIjv for which ir(i) > v(j) whenever j is on the unique path from 0 to 
г is feasible. Consider the weighted Shapley-value with weights {pw}rçuN 
where pT > 0 for all π G Плг, ΣπεΠ,* Ρ* = 1 and ρ
τ
 = 0 whenever π is not 
feasible. Bird proves that the weighted Shapley-values defined in this way 
will always be in the core of c. 
Granot and Huberman (1982) introduced permutationally convex (concave) 
games. 
4.8.3 Definition A game с is called permutationally concave if there exists 
a permutation π such that for all i G N and all S С Τ С Ν \ {г} with S and 
Τ of the form { т г " 1 ^ ) , ? ! - 1 ^ ) , . . . , ^ ^ ) } where q G {l,...,n} 
c(S UU)- c(S) > c(T U U) - c(T). 
By reversing the inequality sign in 4.8.3 the definition of a permutation­
ally convex game is obtained. 
Granot and Huberman proved that the core of permutationally concave 
game is not empty and that minimum cost spanning tree games are permu-
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tationally concave. The following relation exists between the result of Bird 
and that of Granot and Huberman. If с is a minmum cost spanning tree 
game then the inequality in 4.8.3 holds for each feasible permutation. Fur­
ther, for every permutationally concave game c, if тг is a permutation such 
that this inequality holds, then the marginal vector 7nir(c) is in the core of 
c. Hence, every convex combination of such marginal vectors is in the core 
of c. This implies that for minimum cost spanning tree games every convex 
combination of marginal vectors corresponding to feasible permutations is an 
element of the core of the game and therefore the weighted Shapley-values as 
defined above are in the core of the game. In another paper Granot and Hu­
berman (1981) proved that if a minimum cost spanning tree game <N,c> 
can be decomposed into q minimum cost spanning tree games < Nk, c* > 
where the iVfc's form a partition of N, then the core and the nucleolus of 
< N, с > is the cartesian product of the cores and the nucleoli of the games 
<JVfc,Cfc>. 
Another way of denoting the cost c(5) of a coalition 5 in a minimum cost 
spanning tree game is by means of an integer programming problem. For 
each S E 2N the cost c(S) is equal to the value of the following integer 
programming problem. 
nun Еіелго Еіелв
 k(Uj)xij subject to 
Еіб5, Е,е5о *«1τ(0(1 - M i ) ) > 1 for all 0 ji Τ С S (20) 
Xije{0,l} for all ¿ j e No. 
Here Xij = 1 means that /¿j is an element of the edge set of the minimum 
cost spanning tree Г5 for S and Xij = 0 means that lij is not an element of 
the edge set of Г5. Edmonds (1967) proved that (20) is equivalent to 
m i n
 Еіелг0 Σ,-еЛв
 k(lij)xi} subject to 
Е І € 5 . Е І
€
5 . * І І М 0 ( 1 - 1 Г ( І ) ) > 1 for all 0 ¿ T c S (21) 
Xij > 0 for all г, j 6 No-
This leads to a new proof of the non-emptiness of the core of a minimum 
cost spanning tree game. Consider the dual problem of (21), namely 
max E e ^ r c s Ут subject to 
E r c J < r ! № l r ( t ) ( l - l r ( j ) ) < * ( í ü ) foraUi , j€JVo (22) 
yT > 0 for all 0 φ Τ С Ν. 
Let у be an optimal solution of ( 22) with S — N. Define ζ G И " by 
Q¿TCN 
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From the duality theorem of linear programming it follows that 
Let S £2Ν \ {0} be a coalition with minimum cost spanning tree 7$. For 
each i £ S let p{ï) be the node which immediately precedes ι on the unique 
path from 0 to i in T5. Then 
c{s) = Σ *('*<)) 
and 
E i e s * = Στη3&ντ\ΤΠ SIITI-1 < ЕтпзфъУт 
< Ei65ErcJvyrir(t')(i - ЫКО)) 
< Eies Wird)) = c(5). 
Thus, 2 6 (^(c). The second inequality follows from the fact that a Τ С JV 
with Τ Π S / 0 can not contain both i and p(i) for all г G Γ Π S because 
then Ts would not be a spanning tree of Gs· 
Megiddo (1978a) studies a situation where the customers may use other links 
besides those connecting two customers or a customer with the supplier. The 
cooperative game arising from such a situation can have an empty core. 
Another type of game related to minimum cost spanning tree games was 
studied in Megiddo (1978b). In these games a spanning tree Tff of G Ν is 
given and the cost of a coalition S is defined to be the total cost of the edges 
that belong to some path from 0 to any node of S. In a straightforward 
way it can be proved that these games are concave and therefore balanced. 
Megiddo gives algorithms to compute the nucleolus of such a game within 
ö(n3) operations and the Shapley-value within ö(n3) operations. 
4.9 Location games 
Location game as considered here were introduced by Tamir (1980a). Let 
G be a given graph with set of nodes V and set of edges E. Each edge 
has a certain positive length. The lenght of a path in G is the sum of the 
lenghts of the edges that belong to the path. For two nodes ^1,^2 € V the 
distance d(vi, V2) between vi and V2 is defined to be the lenght of a shortest 
path from vi to V2. Two, not necessarily disjoint, subsets N and Q of V are 
given. І = {1,2,...,n} is the set of players. Each player is considerd to be 
located in the corresponding node. Service centers have to be located in G 
in order to provide services to the players. The set Q — {9i,...,çt} denotes 
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the possible locations for service centers. The cost of establishing a center 
at qj is kj > 0. Player г demands that at least one center shall be located at 
a distance of at most r¿ > 0 from him. The problem is to locate the centers 
in such a way that all the demands are fulfilled and the cost is minimized. 
It is assumed that all the demands can be met. The cooperative game 
с constructed from this situation is called a location game. In this game 
c(5) is defined to be the minimum cost needed to locate service centers in 
such a way that the demands of all the members of 5 are fulfilled. Let 
A = [flijl^"^! be the m χ í-matrix defined by 
„ . . . _ ƒ ! i f d ( ^ 9 ¿ ) < ^ /9оч 
^ " \ 0 otherwise. ^6' 
4.9.1 Defintion The cost c{S) of a coalition S in a location game с is 
given by 
c(S) := mink·! subject to 
Ax > es 
i ,-€ {0,1} for all j e {!,...,*} 
where e s 6 Rn is defined by ef = ls(t) and where the matrix A is as defined 
in (23) and the vector к £ Ж' is as given above. 
4.9.2 Theorem (Tamir) iet с be a location game for which the given graph 
G is a tree. Then C(c) ^ 0. 
Proof. From Tamir (1980b) it follows that 
c(S) = min к • χ subject to 
Ax > €s (24) 
χ > 0 . 
The duality theorem of linear programming yields 
c(S) = max у · es subject to 
yA < с (25) 
У > 0 . 
Let у be an optimal solution of ( 25) with e1*. Then y(N) = c(JV) and у is 
feasible for all problems ( 25) with 5 e 2 ^ \ {0}. Therefore, y(S) - у • es < 




5.1 In t roduc t ion 
In this chapter the claim games introduced in section 5.3 will be studied in 
more detail. However, here they will be called bankruptcy games as this is 
how they are usually called in the current literature. They are considered 
here as arising from so called bankruptcy situations. The essential feature of 
such situations is that a certain amount of money has to be divided among 
claimants who have valid claims on it and who together demand more than 
the available amount. An event which could lead to such a situation is 
the bankruptcy of a firm which has borrowed money from various money 
lenders. Now they all claim back the amount they have lended but there is 
not enough to satisfy all the claims. O'Neill (1982) discusses an example of 
a bankruptcy situation where a man dies leaving behind four sons and four 
wills assigning to one his entire estate, to the second half of his estate, to 
the third one third and to the fourth one quarter. It is evident that there 
is not enough to satisfy the claims of the four brothers. This example has 
been given around the year 1140 A.D. by Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra. Other 
examples of bankruptcy situations can be found in the Babylonian Talmud, 
a great collection of Jewish religious and legal decisions set down during the 
first five centuries A.D. 
This chapter is based on the papers by O'Neill (1982), Aumann and Maschler 
(1985) and Curiel, Maschler and Tijs (1987). Three division rules for bank-
ruptcy problems which play a prominent role in these papers will be dis-
cussed here. In section 5.2 bankruptcy problems and division rules for 
bankruptcy problems will be defined formally. Several division rules will be 
given and three of them, the recursive completion rule introduced by O'Neill, 
the contested garment consistent rule introduced by Aumann and Maschler 
and the adjusted proportional rule introduced by Curiel et al. will be exam-
ined in more detail. Various properties of these rules are treated. In section 
5.3 bankruptcy games are defined, these are cooperative games arising from 
bankruptcy problems. It is proved that bankruptcy games are convex and 
that all 3-person zero-normalized convex games are bankruptcy games. For 
cooperative games which are in some sense majorized by bankruptcy games 
it is proved that the core and the core cover coincide. Game theoretic divi-
sion rules are defined and a necessary and sufficient condition for a division 
rule to be a game theoretic division rule is established. It is proved that the 
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three division rules mentioned above are game theoretic division rules and 
that they correspond to three well known solution concepts from coopera­
tive game theory, namely, the Shapley-value, the nucleolus and the r-value. 
A necessary and sufficient condition for a division rule to generate an out­
come for a bankruptcy problem which is in the core of of the corresponding 
bankruptcy game is given. In section 5.4 an axiomatic characterization of 
the adjusted proportional rule is given. Other papers which treat situa­
tions closely related to bankruptcy situations are Moulin (1985) and Young 
(1987). 
5.2 B a n k r u p t c y problems 
Consider a situation where an estateE has to be divided among η claimants. 
The set of claimants is denoted by N = {1,2, ...,n}. Claimant г advances a 
claim di on E. The problem is how to divide E among the claimants. Unless 
stated otherwise it is assumed in this chapter that ¿i < ¿2 < — < dn. This 
leads to the following definitions. 
6.2.1 Definition A bankruptcy problem is an ordered pair (E; d) 6 ЖхЛГ1, 
where 0 < di < di < ... < d
n
 and 0 < E < άχ + • · · + d
n
 =: D. 
5.2.2 Definition A division rule is a function ƒ that assigns to every 
bankruptcy problem (E; d) for every positive number of claimants a solution 
/(E; d) = (ME; d),..., ƒ„(£; d)) such that 
(i) fi{E\ d) > 0 for each ι' G N (individual rationality) 
(H) EieNfi(E;d) = E (efficiency) 
If E = 0 then (г) and (г'г) imply that fi(E;d) = 0 for all i G N. In the 
following it is assumed that E > 0. 
Examples of division rules are the proportional division rule which assigns to 
claimant г the amount ^ - , the constraint equal award or CEA-rule which 
assigns α Λ di to claimant г, where α G [0, d
n
] is uniquely determined by 
the efficiency property. The constraint equal loss or CEL-ruie assigns to 
claimant г the maximum of di — β and 0 where β G [0,<ί
η
] is uniquely de­
termined by the efficiency property. O'Neill (1982) discusses several ways 
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to divide E. One of them is a generalization of a division method given 
by Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra around the year A.D. for a specific problem. 
In this problem E = 120, di = 30, ¿2 = 40, ¿з = 60, and ¿4 = 120. Ibn 
Ezra divides E by giving 7 | to the first claimant, 101 to the second, 201 
to the third and 801 to the fourth. The reasoning behind this division is 
as follows. The first claimant claims 30. This amount is considered to be 
a specific part of the estate which is also claimed by the others. Therefore 
it is divided equally among the four claimants, each one receiving 71. This 
settles the claim of the first claimant. The second claimant claims 40 but he 
has already received his share of 30, so his actual claim is 10, which is also 
claimed by 3 and 4, therefore he receives | of the 10. Together with the 7 | 
he already had this gives him 7 | + 3 | = 101. The third claimant claims 60 
but he has already received his share of 40 so his claim becomes 20 which is 
also claimed by 4. Therefore he receives 10 of this 20 and his total share is 
I χ 20 + § X 10 + \ X 30 = 201. The fourth claimant claims 120, but he has 
already received his share of 60 and since the remaining 60 is claimed by him 
alone, he obtains it all and his total share is 60+ \x20+ | x 10+^x30 = 8 0 | . 
A special feature of this example is that there is one claimant who claims 
all of the estate. When this is not the case it is not clear from this example 
what Ibn Ezra would have done. O'Neill gives a division rule for general 
bankruptcy problems which yields the solution arising from Ibn Ezra's way 
of reasoning whenever there is one claimant who claims all of the estate. 
Another method to divide E introduced by O'Neill is the method of recur­
sive completion. This method was designed to fulfil the following consistency 
property which is different from the consistency property considered in the 
papers of Aumann and Maschler (1985), Young (1987) and other authors. 
Let (E;d) be a bankruptcy problem with set of claimants N. From this 
bankruptcy problem η different bankruptcy problems with one claimant 
less can be derived by giving to an i G N the minimum of his claim di 
and E and considering the bankruptcy problem (Ε%\άι) with total estate 
El = (E — di)+, set of claimants N \ {i} and claims d*· = dj for each 
jeN\ {¿}. 
5.2.3 Definition A division rule ƒ is said to be consistent according to 
O'Neill if for all bankruptcy problems (E; d) 
ME;d)=-(EAdi+ Σ ME'; di)). (1) 
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The method of recursive completion solves a problem (E; d) by recursion 
as the name already indicates. The problems (Е*; d J) are constructed from 
(E;d) for each j G N. From each problem (ϋ^; <P) η — 1 problems with η — 2 
claimants are derived in the same way as the problems (E3; di) were derived 
from (E\d). This process continues until the stage where each bankruptcy 
problem has only one claimant who then receives everything which is left. 
Note that this amount will always be less then or equal to his claim because 
D > E. With the aid of formula ( 1) and the outcomes of the one-claimant 
problems the outcome of the two-claimant problems can be computed and 
with these outcomes and (1) the outcomes for the three-claimant problems 
can be computed etc. until f(E; d) has been computed. 
Another way to look at the recursive completion method is given by the 
following process. Suppose that the claimants arrive one after the other to 
stake their claims. The one who arrives first receives the minimum of his 
claim and E. The second one receives the minimum of his claim and what is 
left. Continueing in this way each claimant who arrives receives his claim or 
what is left of the estate after the ones before him have obtained their shares. 
The expected outcome of this procedure if all orders of arrival are considered 
to be equally likely is equal to the outcome of the recursive completion 
method. This way of looking at the recursive completion method suggests 
the following formula for this method. An order of arrival corresponds to a 
permutation π 6 П# of the set of claimants N. Let RCi(E\d) denote the 
amount assigned by the recursive completion method to claimant i. Then 
RCi{E;d)= \ Y\ i f where (2) 
*€ІЬг 
di if E > Ej-ePíir,.) аз + d» 
E - EjeP(ir,t) di i f Ü<E- EjeP(ir,») di ^ d» 
0 if E < EjeP(ir,t) d3· 
Aumann and Maschler (1985) consider the following three examples given 
in the Talmud. 







In all these examples there are three claimants with claims 100, 200 and 300. 
The estate is repectively equal to 100, 200 and 300 and the numbers in the 
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table show the division of the estate prescribed by the Talmud in this three 
cases. At a first glance it is not clear what rule ƒ lies behind these divisions. 
Aumann and Maschler give a division rule for bankruptcy problems which 
for the three examples of the Talmud has the same outcome as given by 
the Talmud. This rule is called the Contested Garment consistent or CG-
consistent rule because it is consistent with the division prescribed by the 
Talmud in a case where two people have claims on a garment, one claiming 
all of it and the other half of it. The Talmud then assigns | to the first 
claimant and | to the other. The principle behind this division is that only 
half of the garment is considered to be at stake. The lesser claimant has 
no claim on the other half, so that goes directly to the greater claimant 
and the half which is at stake is divided equally between both claimants. 
The CG-consistent rule applied to a bankruptcy problem (E; d) gives a 
solution (ΐχ, ...,x
n
) such that for any two claimants i and j the division of 
Xi + Xj prescribed by the contested garment principle is (XÍ,XJ). The CG-
consistent rule distinguishes between bankruptcy problèmes with E < |£) 
and bankruptcy problems with E > |£) . Let CG(E; d) denote the solution 
assigned by the CG-consistent rule to a bankruptcy problem (E; d). Then 
CG(E;d)=<. „ r > 1 i n „ ¿ ν - r r ^ í n (3) CEA(D-E;%) if E > | D . 
The CG-consistent rule satisfies the following self-consistency property, 
5.2.4 Definition A division rule ƒ is said to be self-consistent if 
f(E;d) = χ implies f(x(S);ds) = xs 
wAere ds (xs) means the restriction of d (x) to S and x(S) = J2i€Sxi · 
Let ƒ be a self-consistent rule; then for any set of claimants 5 in a bankruptcy 
problem (E; d), if the members of 5 create a new bankruptcy problem with 
estate equal to the sum of the amounts assigned to them by f(E; d) and 
their old claims and apply ƒ to find a division for this new problem, each 
member of 5 gets his original payoff back. 
Curiel, Maschler and Tijs (1987) propose a division rule which is an ad-
justment of the proportional rule. The reason given for this is that the 
proportional rule is not invariant under strategic equivalence. Consider the 
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following two bankruptcy problems with the same two claimants 1 and 2. 
In the first problem the estate equals 60 and 1 claims 40, 2 claims 60. In 
the second problem the estate equals 80 and 1 claims 40, 2 claims 80. The 
proportional rule divides the estate in parts 24, 36 and 261, 531 respectively 
and does not reflect the fact that the second problem seems to arise from 
the first one through an extra loan from claimant 2 to the holder of the 
estate which should be given back to him without any dispute. Therefore 
the proportional rule is not invariant under strategic equivalence. The ad­
justed proportional от ЛР-rule introduced by Curiel et al. is invariant under 
strategic equivalence and proceeds as follows. First each claimant ι receives 
his minimal right m„ that is the amount that is not claimed by the others. 
Formally, 
m. := (25-(f(JV\ {*}))+• 
Here and in the following ¿(5) := Σ ,
€
5 dt for all S С N. In section 5.3 it will 
be shown that it is possible to give each claimant his minimal right because 
m(N) := ^ . е я 7 7 1 * ^ E- The amount which is left, that is E' = E - m(N), 
has to be divided yet. Since claimant г has already received m, his claim is 
lowered and becomes d't = d, - m,. Note that d't = dt - (E — d(N \ {г}))+ > 
d, — (D — d(N \ {г}))+ — d, — d, = 0. Further, it is considered irrational 
to claim more than what is available. So each claim greater than E' is 
truncated to E'. This defines new claims d" with d" = Ε' Л d't > 0 for each 
i G N. Now E' is divided proportionally to the claims d". Let AP(E;d) 
denote the outcome of the AP-rule for a bankruptcy problem (E; d) and let 
m G R" (d" e Ж.п) be the vector with coordinates m, (d") for each г e N. 
Then 
Г m i f £ ' = 0 
AP(E;d)=l
 m + ** otherwise. (4) 
Note that Е.елг< = D - m(N) > E - m(N) = E' and hence from 




' = 0 impbes £ ,
е
л d't = 0 
or £ ' = 0. 
A bankrupcy problem for which all the minimal rights of all the claimants 
are equal to zero is called zero-normalized. A bankruptcy problem (E;d) 
with dt < E for each г G iV is called a simple claims bankruptcy problem. 
For a zero-normalized simple claims bankruptcy problem the АР-тиІе re­
duces to the proportional division rule. 
A property for division rules introduced by Aumann and Maschler is the 
self-duality property. 
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5.2.5 Definition A division rule f is said to be self-dual if 
f(E;d) = d-f(D-E;d). (5) 
If a self-dual rule is used to compute the losses of each claimant the outcome 
will be the same as when the rule is applied directly to divide the estate. 
From ( 3) it follows in a straightforward way that the CG-consistent rule is 
self-dual. The self-duality of the ЛР-rule will be proved in section 5.3 and 
the self-duality of the ДС-rule is proved in the following theorem. 
У i = S 
Vi = S 
5.2.6 Theorem The RC-rule is a self-dual rule 
Proof. Let (E;d) be a bankruptcy problem. From ( 2) it follows that 
RCiiD -E;d)=à Σ*επ
Ν
 УІ where 
di if D - E > ЕІСРОГ,,·) dj + di 
D-E-Zj€P(,.i)dJ if 0 < Д - £ - Е ;
е
Р О г , о ^ < й 
0 if Ό - E < ЕібР^.о dj . 
Let Р(ж,г) = {j\ n(j) > х(г)} for all тг € Π^. F(T,Ì) is the set of claimants 
who arrive after г in the order according to π. Then 
di if E < YljçF^.i) dj 
S j e í W ) dj + di- E if 0 < E - Σί€Γ(*,ί) dj < di 






di-yi=< E- EjeFfir.i) dj if 0 < E - EjeJ^, .) dJ ^ d¿ 
di if E>Y,jzF{.*,ï)dj + di. 
Consider the following bijection on П#. To each ж G П# a χ ' 6 IIjv is 
assigned with тг' defined by 
""'(i) = n- ж(з) + 1. 
Then Е(ж,і) = Р(ж',г) and it follows that 
0 if E < E¿€P(ir',t) dj 
di - у? = { E- Eiep(x',¿) dj if 0 < E - EiePC^.i) dj < di (6) 
di if E > EjgPC»',.) dj + di. 
I l l 
Further, 
di - RCi(E; d) = di - Ι Σ y? = Ι Σ (d< - »') = R C ^ d)· 
ti ' *-^ TI ' 
Here the last inequality follows from (2) and ( 6). 
For a self-dual rule it is sufficient to know the outcome in all cases with 
E < \D. The self-duality yields the outcome in the other cases. With this 
in mind explicit formulas for AP{E\ d) can be given. Let E < ¿D. Two cases 
are distinguished: (1) dn < \D and (2) ein > \D. Let I<¡ := [0,dn], h '·= 
[d1,d1\r..Jn-1:=[d^l,^d(N\{n})\ìIn = [dnhd{N\{n})ì\D]. Incase 








а{М \ {η})], 
I
n
 = [d(N \ {n}), \D]. Straightforward calculations yield: 
Case 1 




 \ £2/(Efc<¿ dk + (n- j)E) for E e Ij with ¿ > j (7) 
Case 2 
APi(E; d) = « 
the same as in case 1 for E G Ij with j < η - 1 
Idi for E e In, i φ η (8) 
\d
n
 + E - \D for E e /„, г' = η 
From the formulas ( 7) and ( 8) it follows that APi(E\d) is a continuous 
function of E on [0, l-D] and hence the self-duality property implies that it 
is a continuous function of E on the whole interval [0, D\. 
5.2.7 Definition A division rule f satisfies the monotonicity property if 
E'>E implies fi{E'\ d) > fi(E; d) for all i £ N. (9) 
The monotonicity property is a reasonable property to ask for in a divi­
sion rule as it seems unfair that a claimant should suffer when the estate 
becomes higher. From ( 2) and ( 3) it follows that the ÄC-rule and the 
CG-consistent rule are monotonie. Because of the self-duality property of 
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the ЛР-rule it suffices to show that ( 9) holds for |£) > E' > E to prove 
that the АР-ти\е is monotonie. This will be done by calculating the partial 
derivatives — ¿ ^ ' ' in the open intervals Ι$,Ι°,...,Ι° with IQ,h-,.-•,In as 









the same as in case 1 
0 
1 
for E e Ij, j < η - 1 
for E G In, i φ η 
for E £ In, i = η 




A d(N\ {n}). 
From the fact that — ^ ' ' > 0 on the open intervals it follows that 
APi(E·, d) is monotonie on these intervals. Together with the continuity 
of APi(E·, d) with respect to E this yields the monotonicity of APi(E; d) on 
[О, ¡В]. 
The following property was introduced by Aumann and Maschler. 
5.2.8 Definition A division rule f is called order preserving if 
0 < / i ( £ ; d) < f2{E; d) < ... < fn(E; d) and 
0 < di - Λ ( £ ; d) < ... < d
n
 - ƒ„(£; d) 
for every bankruptcy problem (E; d). 
An order preserving division rule assigns to a claimant with a higher claim 
an award and a loss that is not less than the award and the loss assigned to 
a claimant with a lower claim. For a self-dual rule ƒ only the inequalities 
0 < fi{E;d) < ... < f
n
(E;d) have to be checked to see whether ƒ is order 
preserving. Because the ДС-rule, the CG-consistent rule and the AP-rule 
all three satisfy these inequalities it follows that they are all order preserv­
ing. 
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5.2.9 Definition A division rule ƒ satisfies the homogeneity property if 
for every bankruptcy problem (E;d) 
f(XE;Xd) = Xf(E]d) for all λ > 0. 
It is easy to verify that all division rules mentioned in this chapter satisfy 
the homogeneity property. 
5.3 B a n k r u p t c y games 
In this section a game theoretic analysis of bankruptcy problems will be 
given. For every bankruptcy problem a corresponding cooperative game 
can be defined. The set of players in this game will be the same as the set of 
claimants in the problem. The worth of a coalition S in the game is defined 
to be that amount of the estate which is not claimed by the complement of 
S. 
5.3.1 Definition A cooperative game ν is a bankruptcy game if there exists 
a bankruptcy problem (E; d) such that 
v(S) = (E- d(N \ S))+ for all S С N. 
In fact, v(S) in a bankruptcy game ν is a generalization of the minimal right 
concept. Note that v(i) = mj. 
5.3.2 Theorem Bankruptcy games are convex. 
Proof. Let υ be a bankruptcy game arising from a bankruptcy situation 
( £ ; d). Let Τ С S С N \ {г} and denote E - D by A. Then 
v{S U {i}) + v(T) =тах{ А + d(S) + ¿¿,0} + тах{А + d{T),0} 
= тах{ 2А + d(S) + d(T) + ¿¿, А + d(S) + di, 
A + d(T),0} 
and 
v(T U {г}) + v(S) =τηαχ{ A + d(T) + άί,Ο} + max{A + d(S),0} 
= max{ 2A + d(S) + d{T) + di, A + d(T) + di, 
A + d(S),0}. 
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From d(S) > d(T) it follows that А + а(Т) + а^ < A + d(S) + di. Furthermore, 
A + d(S) <A + d(S) + di. Therefore, v(S U {г}) + v(T) > v(T U {г}) + v(S) 
yielding v(S U {г}) - v(S) > υ(Τ U {г}) - v(T) and thus, ν is convex. • 
Now it can be proved that m(JV) < E as stated in section 5.2. From the def­
inition of υ and the superadditivity of υ it follows that m(N) = 5Ii
e
j\r v(¿) < 
υ{Ν) = E. 
Not all non-negative convex games are bankruptcy games as the following 
example shows. 
5.3.3 Example Let υ be a coopperative game with set of players І = 
{l,...,n}and v(N) = 1, v(N \ {i}])= | for all г 6 Ν, v(N \{i,j}) = \ for 
all i,j G N and v(S) = 0 for all other S 6 2^. Then г; is a convex game. 
Suppose ν were a bankruptcy game corresponding to the bankruptcy prob­
lem (E,d). Then E = 1 and di = E-v(N\{i})= | for all г G N. But then 
v(N\{i, j}) = (E-di-dj)+ = 0, contradicting v(N\{i, j}) = | . Therefore, 
there does not exist a bankruptcy problem (E; d) with v(S) = (E—d(N\S))+ 
for all S G 2N and υ is not a bankruptcy game. 
5.3.4 Proposition All 3-person zero-normalized convex games are bank­
ruptcy games. 
Proof. Let ν be a 3-person zero-normali zed convex game with set of players 
N = {1,2,3}. Define E = v(N) and d¿ = v(N) - v(j,k) for each г G Ν, 
where {j,k} = N \ {г}. Then di = v(N) - v(j,k) > v(i) - v(0) = 0 and 
D = 3v(N) — v(i,j) — (г,к) - v(j,k) > v(N) = E where the inequality 
follows from the balancedness of v. Hence, (E; d) is a bankruptcy problem 
with (E - d(N \ {j,k}))+ = (E- di)+ = (E-E + v(j,k))+ = v(j,k) for 
aU {j,k} с N and (E - d(N \ {i}))+ = {E - E + v(i,k) -E + v(i,j))+ = 
(v(i,k) + v(i,j) - v(N))+ = 0, where the last inequality follows because ν 
is convex and zero-normalized. D 
The following theorem states that the core cover CC(w) (defined in 1.3.9) 
of a game w which is in a certain sense majorized by a bankruptcy game, 
coincides with the core of w. 
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5.3.5 Theorem Let w be a game such that there exists a bankruptcy game υ 
withO <w< vandw(S) = v(S)if\S\ € {Ο,π-Ι,η}. ThenCC(w) = C(w). 
Proof. Let (E; d) be a bankruptcy problem corresponding to the game v. 
Note that χ G C(v) implies χ G C(w), so C(w) φ 0. Let χ G CC(w), then 
x{S) =x(N)-x(N\S)>w(N)-Mv>(N\S) 
= v>(N) - Σ*Ν\5(™(Ν) - w(N \ {г})) 
= ν(Ν)-Σ^\5(ν(Ν)-ν(Ν\{ι})) 
>E-d(N\S). 
Furthermore, x(S) > μν(8) > E i e S ^ O > 0. Thus, it follows that x(S) > 
(E—d(N\ S))+ = v(S) and χ G C(v) implying χ G C(w). Since the inclusion 
C(w) С CC(w) was already proved in 1.3.10 it follows that CC(w) = C(w) 
and the proof is completed. Π 
Let υ be a bankruptcy game corresponding to a bankruptcy problem (E; d). 
Then M* = v(N) - v(N \ {i}) = (E - (E - <*;)+) = E A di for aU 
i £ N. Because ν is a convex game, μ? = ΐ7(ι') = mj for all г G Ν. 
(cf. 1.6.5) and C{v) = CC(v) = {χ G ]Rn| x(N) = v(N), тщ < χ < 





]sf\^su{k})) with m^ < x^ < EAd^ and with 
coordinates summing up to v(N). 
5.3.6 Definitori A division ruie ƒ is agame theoretic division rule if there 
exists a solution concept F for cooperative games such that f(E;d) = 
FivEj) for all bankruptcy problems (E; d) where VE;d is the bankruptcy 
game corresponding to (E; d). 
Because the bankruptcy games corresponding to the problems (E;d) and 
(E; E A d), where E A d G К " is the vector with г-th coordinate equal to 
E Adi are the same, a necessary condition for a division rule ƒ to be a game 
theoretic division rule is that ƒ(£; d) = f(E; È A d). The following theorem 
states that this is also a sufficient condition. 
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5.3.7 Theorem A division mie ƒ is a game tiieoretic division ruie if and 
only ¡f f(E;d) = f{E; È Λ d). 
Proof. The "only if" part was shown above. Suppose ƒ is a division rule with 
ƒ ( £ ; d) = f(E;Ê/\d). Define a solution concept F for cooperative games as 
follows. For every cooperative game ν let F(v) := f(v(N);Kv) where Kv 
is the vector with г-th coordinate A'v = (M? + (v(N) - Mv(N))+)/n. For 
a bankruptcy game VEJ this yields F(vE;d) = f(E; Μυ) = /(Ε; Ε Λ d) = 
f (E; d) and the proof is completed. • 
It is immediate that the proportional rule is not a game theoretic rule be­
cause in general it assigns different outcomes to (E;d) and (E; E A d). For 
the same reason the CEZ-rule is not a game theoretic rule. Since this is 
less clear than for the proportional rule it will be illustrated by the fol­
lowing example. Let (E; d) be the 3-claimant bankruptcy problem with 
E = 100, ¿ι = 40, d2 = 50, d3 = 110, then CEL(E;d) = (6§,16§,76§) 
while CEL(E; È A d) = (10,20,70). 
Recall that CEAi(E\ d) — diAa where α G [0, d
n
] is determined by efficiency. 
Therefore α < E and CEA^E; ÈAd) = EAdiAa = diAa = СЕАІ(Е·, d) 
for each i £ N and the CEA-rule is a game theoretic rule. The ÄC-rule, the 
CG-consistent rule and the AP-rule are all three game theoretic rules and it 
will be proved that they correspond to three well-known solution concepts 
from game theory. 
5.3.8 Theorem Let (E;d) be a bankruptcy problem and let ν be the cor­
responding bankruptcy game. Then RC{E; d) — <p(v) where φ(ν) is the 
Shapley-value of the game v. 
Proof. Recall that the marginal vector τη*(υ) of a game ν with regard 
to a permutation π is defined by 
mj(v) = ν(Ρ(π, i) U {i}) - ν(Ρ(π, i)). 
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The Shapley-value (p(v) assigns to each player г 6. N the amount 
where 
η ' 
m?(t;) = <P(7r , i )U{¿}) - r (P(7r ,0 ) 
= (^- Σ ¿ih-ν- Σ 4-4)+· 
It follows that 
τη7(υ)= < 
4 if -E > EieFCir.i) 4 + 4 
£ - Е ; е * . і ) 4 i f 0 < Д - EjgFi*,,·) 4 + 4 
о if £ < Σ , · 6 ί χ ΐ Γ , ο 4 · 
Consider the bijection defined in the proof of theorem 5.2.6 which assigns 
to each π G IIjv a ÎT' € UN defined by 
r'(j) = П- 7r(j) + 1. 
Then 
4 if E > EjeP(ir'.i) dj + di 
E
 - Ejepc^.o 4 i f о < ^ - Σ,-βΡ«») 4 ^ 4 
0 if £<EieiV.o4·· 
7η7(ΐ7) = 1 
With (6) it follows that <Pi(v) = RCi(E;d) and the proof is completed. • 
The CG-consistent rule assigns to a bankruptcy problem (E; d) the nucleo­
lus of the corresponding bankruptcy game. However, this can not be shown 
as directly as in the proof of theorem 5.3.8 and some preliminary lemma's 
are needed. 
5.3.9 Definition A division rule is called consistent if for any bankruptcy 
problem (E; d) the division offi(E\ d) + ƒ,(£; d) prescribed by the contested 
garment principle for claims di, dj is fi(E; d), fj(E; d) respectively. 
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5.3.10 Lemma The CG-consistent rule is the unique consistent division 
rule. 
Proof. That the CG-consistent rule is consistent has already been noted. 
Suppose there existed a division rule ƒ / CG-consistent rule such that ƒ 
is consistent. Then there exists a bankruptcy problem (E;d) for which 
it is possible to find claimants г and j with fi(E;d) > CGi(E\d) and 
fj(E;d) < CGj(E;d)Aî the total estate is fi(E;d)+fj(E;d) and just г and j 
are involved consistency of ƒ implies that the amount awarded to г is /{(E; d) 
and the amount awarded to j is fj(E;d). If the total estate is CGi(E;d)-\-
CGj(E; d) and just г and j are involved consistency of the CG-rule implies 
that the amount awarded to г is CGi{E\ d) and the amount awarded to j is 
CGj(E;d). UCGi(E;d) + CG,iE;d) > fi(E;d) + ƒ,·(£;d) then CGi(E\d) > 
fi(E·, d) because the CG-consistent rule is monotonie. However, this contra­
dicts ƒ;(£; d) > CGi(E; d). If CGi{E; d) + CG.,(£; d) < f^E; d) + ƒ.,·(£; d) 
then fj(E;d) > CGj(E;d) because any consistent rule is monotonie for the 
two-claimant case. This contradicts fj(E; d) < CGj(E; d). Thus, there can­
not exists another consistent division rule ƒ and the CG-consistent rule is 
the unique consistent division rule. Π 
5.3.11 Lemma Let χ be & solution of the bankruptcy problem (E; d) such 
that 0 < Xi < di. Let ν be the bankruptcy game corresponding to (E;d). 
Then for amy coalition S the reduced game of ν with respect to S and χ is 
the bankruptcy game corresponding to (x(S)·, ds). 
Proof. Let Vs be the reduced game of ν with respect to S and x. Recall 
that in 1.5.7 vs was defined as follows. 
c
m
 ί *(Γ) if Г = 5 о г Г = 0 
^
 )
 \ max{v(Q U T) - x(Q)\ QcN\S} if Τ С S, Τ φ 0, S 
Let îi) be the bankruptcy game corresponding to {x{S)\ds). Then ^ ( S ) = 
w{S) and г 5 (0) = и;(5). Let Τ С 5, Τ / 5,0 and let the maximum in the 
definition of ϋ 5 (Τ) be attained at Q. Then 











vs(T) > v(T U 0) - x(0) = v(T) = {E- d{N \ T) ) + > 0 (12) 
Formulas ( 11) and ( 12) yield 
i ; 5 ( T ) > ( * ( S ) ) - d ( S \ r ) ) + 
and together with ( 10) this yields 
vs(T) = (x(S)-d(<S\T))+ = w(T). 
It follows that vs = w and the proof is completed. D 
5.3.12 Lemma Let ν be the bankruptcy game corresponding to the bank­
ruptcy problem (E; d). Let χ be in the pre-kernel of the game ν and let 
S = {i,j} be a coalition with two players. Then xs — CG(xi + Xj;ds). 
Proof. From the definition it follows that 
CGi(xi + Xj\ ds) = Xi + Xj — dj + -(di + dj — ц - x¿) 
1 1 1 . 1 . 
=
 2Xi + 2Xj+2di~2dj 
and 
CGj(xi + XJ; ds) = XÍ + XJ - di + -(di + dj — Χχ- Xj) 
1 1 !_, !_, 
=
 2Xj+2Xi+2dj~2di· 
Let vs be the reduced game of ν with respect to S and x. From theorem 
5.3.11 it follows that 
v
s(S) = Xi + Xj, vs(i) = Xi + Xj — dj and vs(j) — Xi + Xj - di. 
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Because the pre-kernel satisfies the reduced game property it follows that 
15 is an element of the pre-kernel of vs. Therefore, 
VS(i) -Xi = VS(j) - Xj 
yielding 
which leads to 
Xi = Xj — dj + di and 
Xj = Xi — di -f- dj . 
Adding i ; to the first expression and Xj to the second gives 
2xj = Xj -\- Xi — dj + di 
2xj = Xi + Xj — di + dj . 
It follows that 
Xi = ^ 1 * + о1' + 2^ ' _ 2^·' = CGi{xi + ij·; ¿5) 
xi = 2 I j + 2Xi + 2 ^ - 2^* = CGi(Xi + XJ ; ^ 5 ) 
and the proof is completed. D 
5.3.13 T h e o r e m Let (E;d) be a bankruptcy problem and let ν be the 
corresponding bankruptcy game. Then CG{E\d) = ι/(υ) where v{v) is the 
nucleolus of the game v. 
Proof. Since υ is a convex game (theorem 5.3.2) it follows that ι>(υ) is the 
unique element of the pre-kernel of v. Cf. section 1.5. Because of theorem 
5.3.12 the restriction of v(v) to any two-person coalition S = {i,j} is equal 
to CG(i/i(v) + fjiv); ds). Lemma 5.3.10 now implies i/(r) = CG{E\ d). D 
5.3.14 T h e o r e m Let (E;d) be a bankruptcy problem and let υ be the 
corresponding bankruptcy game. Then AP(E·, d) — τ(ν) where τ(υ) is the 
T-value of the game v. 
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Proof. Because υ is a convex game τ(ν) = ν + Χ(Μ0 — ν) = v + \((ËAd) — v) 
where ν = (v(l),v(2), ...,υ(η)). (Cf. 1.6.5) Because тгц = v(i) for all г' G Ν 
it follows that AP(E;d) = ν + Ί((ά-υ)ΑΕ') where E' = E-YljeNv(j)a.iid 
(d — ν) Λ E' is the vector whose г-th coordinate is equal to (di — v(i)) A E'. 
It will be shown that (Ê Λ oí) - ν = (d - ν) Λ Ê'. 
Suppose di < E. Then E — di = v(N\{i} > £¿ej\r{t} v(j) where the inequal-
ity follows from the superadditivity of v. This yields E—Y^jçffv(j) > di—v(i) 
and hence (Ε Λ di) - (г) — (di — v(i)) A E'. 
Suppose di > E. Then E-di < 0 = 5Zj
e
jv\{i} v(j) leading to E-^JÇN V(J) < 
di — v(i) and hence (E A di) — v(i) = (di — v(i)) A E'. 
Thus, (Ê A d) — ν = (d — v) A E' and the efficiency of both the r-value and 
the AP-rule yields A = 7 and hence AP(E; d) = т( ) . Π 
Now the self-duality of the AP-rule will be proved as was announced in 
section 5.2. 
5.3.15 Theorem The AP-rule ¡s self-duài. 
Proof. Let (E; d) be a bankruptcy problem and ν the corresponding bank­
ruptcy game. It has to be shown that AP(E;d) = d - AP(D — E; d). This 
will be done by proving that т( ) = d — T(W) where w is the bankruptcy 
game corresponding to (D — E; d). By definition of the r-value and convexity 
of the games ν and w 
τ(υ) = V + \(ΜΌ - ν) and r(w) = w + η(Μν' - υή . 
It is easy to verify that w(S) = d(S) - E + v(N \ S) for all 5 e 2*. 
Therefore, w(i) = di — M? and M™ = с?,· — v(i) for each i ζ N and 
T(W) = d-Mv + j(Mv — v_). From the definition it follows that M" > v(i) for 
all i G І . Hence MV(N) = Σ,χζΝ^) implies v(i) = M? for all г G N and 
then it follows immediately that т( ) = d — T(W). In the following it is as­
sumed that M"(N) φ E i e * υ ( 0 · T h e n Еі€лгт-і(^) = ^-E¿eJvT-¿(«) y ^ d s 
7 = l - λ leading to d-τ(w) = Μυ-(ί-Χ)(Μυ-ν) = v+\(Mv-v) = τ(ν) 
and the proof is completed. Π 
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With the aid of the self-duality property an alternative way of comput-
ing the AP-rule can be provided. Let (£ ; d) be a bankruptcy problem with 
E < ¿D, then AP(E; d) = Xd* where λ is determined by efficiency and 
( di if di < E 
E if E<di<D-E 
di-D + 2E if di>D-E 
The self-duality property now makes it possible to compute AP(E;d) for 
problems with E > |Z) as well. 
Because bankruptcy games are convex games they have a non-empty core. 
The question arises under what conditions a division rule gives an outcome 
to a bankruptcy problem which will always lie in the core of the correspond­
ing bankruptcy game. 
5.3.16 Definition A division rule ƒ is said to be reasonable if fi(E;d) < di 
for every bankruptcy problem (E; d) and each claimant г in (E; d). 
Assigning more than his claim to claimant г seems highly unreasonable as 
there is not even enough to satisfy all the claims. 
5.3.17 Theorem Let f be a division rule for bankruptcy problems. Then 
/(E; d) G Ο^Ε,α) for all bankruptcy problems (E; d) and the corresponding 
bankruptcy games VEJ if and only i f f is reasonable. 
Proof. From theorem 5.3.5 it follows that С( Е;<І) = CC(vE;d) = 
{x 6 IRn | x(N) = v(N), m < χ < Ê Λ d} yielding the "only if" part. 
Further, efficiency and fi{E·, d) < di for all i £ N imply that fi(E; d) = 
E - T,jeN\{i} fÂE'i d)> E - d(N \ {г}) for each г 6 N. Individually ratio­
nality implies that fi(E;d) > 0 for all i £ Ν, hence fi(E;d) > ттц for all 
г 6 N and ƒ(£; d) e C(t>s;<f). • 
It follows that all the division rules mentioned in this chapter assign an 
outcomes to bankruptcy problem which is in the core of the corresponding 
game. 
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5.4 A n axiomat ic characterization of the ЛР-ги1е 
In this section where for sake of convenience the property ¿i < ¿2 < ... < dn 
is deleted, an axiomatic characterization of the AP-rule will be given. In 
order to do that three new properties for division rules will be introduced. 
The first one is the minimal right property which states that it does not 
matter whether a division rule is applied directly to a bankruptcy problem 
or the minimal rights are handed out first and the division rule is applied 
then. 
5.4.1 Definition A division rule ƒ satisfies the minimal right property 
iff(E; d) = m + f(E- m(JV); d - τη). 
From the way the AP-rule has been introduced it follows that it satisfies 
the minimal right property. In fact, this is the case for all game theoretic 
division rules that are invariant under strategic equivalence. 
5.4.2 Definition A division rule f is called symmetric if di = dj implies 
that fi(E; d) = ƒ , (£; d) for all bankruptcy problems (E; d). 
Symmetry is a weak form of the anonimity property which requires that 
ƒ is a symmetric function of di,...d
n
. (Cf. Moulin (1985)) From the defini­
tion it follows that the AP-rule satisfies the anonimity property and hence 
the symmetry property. 
The third property deals with a situation where one of the claimants dies 
leaving behind parts of his claim to different heirs. These heirs become new 
claimants, each one claiming the part of the original claim he received. To­
gether their claims sum up to the original claim. The third property states 
that if the bankruptcy problem is a zero-normalized simple claims problem 
then nothing changes for the other claimants. 
5.4.3 Definition A division rule f is said to satisfy the additivity of claims 
property if for every zero-normalized simple claims bankruptcy problem 
(E;d) = (E;(di,d2,...,dn)) which changes by splitting up the claim di in 
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smaller claims ά^ι,ά^, •••,^ ϊ,λ into a bankruptcy problem 
(E;d') = (E;(d1,...di-i,diil,di<2,...,diik,di+1,...,dn)) the following holds: 
/¿(E; d) = ƒ_,·(£; d') for each ; e Ν \ {i}. 
This property can also be found in O'Neill (1982) where it is defined for all 
simple claims problems and where it is called strategy-proofness. Together 
with four other axioms it is used there to characterize the proportional di­
vision rule. In the context of cost allocation it has also been defined and 
used by Banker (1981) to characterize the proportional cost allocation rule. 
One of the axioms O'Neill uses requires the continuity of the division rule 
in at least one point for all coordinates while Banker characterizes the rule 
in the case that it allocates cost in rational numbers only and remarks that 
an axiom requiring continuity is needed in order to relax this assumption. 
In the proof of the following theorem the proportional rule is characterized 
axiomatically by symmetry, additivity of claims, efficiency and individual 
rationality without the use of a continuity axiom. 
5.4.4 Theorem The AP-rule is the unique game theoretic division rule 
for bankruptcy problems that satisfies (i) the minimal right property, (ii) 
the symmetry property and (Hi) the additivity of claims property. 
Proof. It was already noted that the AP-rule is a game theoretic rule and 
that it satisfies (i) and (ii). That it also satisfies (iii) follows from the fact 
that for zero-normalized simple claims bankruptcy problems the AP-rule 
reduces to the proportional division rule. Let ƒ be a game theoretic division 
rule which satisfies these three properties. Let (E; d) be a zero-noromalized 
simple claims bankruptcy problem. In the following fj(E;d) is denoted by 
fj for all j € N. For an i e N with di > 0 let к G IN be such that 
-jL < dj whenever dj > 0. Consider the bankruptcy problem arising from 
(E; d) by replacing claimant i by к claimants, each one with claim equal to 
η£. By efficiency and properties (ii) and (iii) ƒ assigns to each one of these 
claimants the amount £-. Let j G N, consider the bankruptcy problem aris­
ing from the last problem by replacing claimant.;' by qk :— [-¿к] claimants 
with claim -£ and one claimant with claim т^ '·= dj — 9fc ^ · Here [x\ stands 
for the largest integer smaller than or equal to x. So -¿k — 1 < q^ < -4-k. 
Because of symmetry all the claimants with claim ^ receive £ . Let Jj^ 
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be the amount received by the claimant with claim r^k- By definition 
r¿fc < £ . This inequality, property (iii) and individual rationality imply 
that 0 < fjtk < £ · Property (iii) also yields /¿ = </*£ + fj,k and hence 
•¿ — j < ¥• < ^- + jf. Because it is possible to go through the above proce-
dure for every к which is big enough it follows that γ- = -¿-. Therefore the di-
vision rule ƒ is the same as the proportional division rule for zero-normali zed 
simple claims bankruptcy problems and hence ƒ is equal to the ЛР-ги1е 
for such problems. Let (E; d) be a general bankruptcy problem. Then 
ƒ(£ ; d) = m + f (E - m(JV); d - m) = m + f (E - m ( ^ ) ; È'A (d - m)) where 
Ê' is the vector in Ht" with all coordinates equal to E — τη(Ν) and where the 
first inequality follows from (i) and the second from the fact that ƒ is a game 
theoretic division rule. Now (E - m(iV); Ê' A (d - m)) is a zero-normalized 
simple claims bankruptcy problem and hence τη+/(Ε—τη(Ν)·, E'A(d—m)) = 
m + AP(E-m(N);Ê'A(d-m)) = m + AP(E-m(N);d-m) = AP(E;d). 
Here the second equality follows because the AP-rule is a game theoretic 
division rule and the third equality follows from the minimal right property. 
Thus, /(E; d) = AP(E; d) for all bankruptcy problems {E; d) and hence the 
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COÖPERATIEVE SPELTHEORIE EN TOEPASSINGEN 
Coöperatieve spelen werden voor het eerst systematisch bestudeerd in het 
boek "Theory of games and economie behaviour" door von Neumann en 
Morgenstern (1944). Coöperatieve spelen zijn bijzonder geschikt om situa-
ties waarbij een groep mensen samenwerkt te modelleren. In dit proefschrift 
worden coöperatieve spelen in karakteristieke funktievorm bestudeerd. Een 
coöperatief spel in karakteristieke funktievorm is een geordend paar be-
staande uit een eindige verzameling, de spelersverzameling en een funktie, de 
karakteristieke funktie die aan iedere deelverzameling van spelers een reëel 
getal toekent welke de waarde van zo'n deelverzameling in het spel voorstelt. 
In een situatie gemodelleerd door zo'n spel kunnen de spelers besluiten om 
alleen te werken of in deelgroepen genoemd coalities, of allemaal samen in 
de grote coalitie. De karakteristieke funktie beschrijft hun winst in al deze 
gevallen. Een vraag die veel aandacht heeft gekregen in de coöperatieve 
speltheorie is de volgende. Stel dat alle spelers besluiten samen te werken. 
Hoe moet de winst die hierdoor verkregen wordt onder hen verdeeld worden? 
In hoofdstuk 1 worden verscheidene bekende methoden uit de coöperatieve 
speltheorie om deze winst te verdelen behandeld. Als er een verdeelmethode 
bestaat die de stabiliteit van de grote coalitie garandeert dan heet het spel 
gebalanceerd. Verder worden er in dit inleidend hoofdstuk coöperatieve spe-
len gedefinieerd en worden er verscheidene eigenschappen van deze spelen 
behandeld. 
Hoofdstuk 2 is gewijd aan simpele spelen. Simpele spelen zijn coöperatieve 
spelen met de eigenschap dat de karakteristieke funktie alleen de waarden 
0 en 1 kan aannemen. Deze spelen zijn uitermate geschikt om comité con-
trole . Bij de bestudering van simpele spelen vervullen machtsindices een 
belangrijke rol. In hoofdstuk 2 worden verscheidene machtsindices uit de 
literatuur behandeld en een nieuwe machtsindex word geïntroduceerd en op 
twee manieren gekarakteriseerd. 
Hoofdstuk 3 is gewijd aan coöperatieve spelen met de waarde van een coa-
litie gelijk aan de waarde van een lineair programmerings probleem dat van 
de coalitie afhangt. Zulke spelen worden lineaire programmeringsspelen ge-
noemd. Deze spelen blijken gebalanceerd te zijn. Twee voorbeelden van 
lineaire programmeringsspelen, namelijk transportspeien en lineaire produk-
tiespelen worden behandeld. Comité controle in lineaire programmerings-
spelen wordt beschreven. De simpele spelen uit hoofdstuk 2 worden hiervoor 
gebruikt. Als alle simpele spelen die de comité controle beschrijven in een 
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lineair programmeringsspel gebalanceerd zijn, dan is het spel zelf ook ge-
balanceerd. Er wordt bewezen dat elk niet negatief gebalanceerd spel een 
lineair programmeringsspel met comité controle is. Voor niet gebalanceerde 
lineaire programmeringsspelen worden twee methoden om de winst te ver-
delen beschreven. Een variatie op lineaire programmeringsspelen waarbij 
claims een rol spelen wordt bestudeerd. De hiertoe ingevoerde claim spelen 
worden in hoofdstuk 5 grondig bestudeerd. 
Terwijl in hoofdstuk 3 een lineair programmeringsprobleem de waarde van 
een coalitie bepaalt gebeurt dit in hoofdstuk 4 door een combinatorisch pro-
grammeringsprobleem. Zo wordt een combinatorisch spel verkregen. In de 
paragrafen 4.2., 4.3, 4.4 en 4.5 worden koppel situaties en permutatie situ-
aties bestudeerd. In paragraaf 4.3 worden combinatorische spelen die uit 
deze situaties ontstaan behandeld. In het algemeen hoeven deze spelen niet 
gebalanceerd te zijn maar verscheidene deelklassen bestaande uit gebalan-
ceerde spelen worden gegeven. Paragraaf 4.4 behandeld economieën met 
ondeelbare goederen die uit permutatie situaties ontstaan. In paragraaf 4.5 
worden koppel situaties met ordinale preferenties behandeld. Paragraaf 4.6 
is gewijd aan een ander combinatorisch spel, het wachtrijspel. Dit spel blijkt 
mooie eigenschappen te bezitten. Eén daarvan is gebalanceerdheid. Voor 
twee verdeelregels uit de coöperatieve speltheorie, de Shapley-waarde en 
de r-waarde, kunnen simpele uitdrukkingen gevonden worden in het geval 
van wachtrijspelen. Een verdeelregel voor wachtrij situaties die gedefini-
eerd wordt zonder rekening te houden met speltheoretische overwegingen 
blijkt mooie eigenschappen te bezitten. Deze regel wordt axiomatisch ge-
karakteriseerd. In de paragrafen 4.7, 4.8, 4.9 worden combinatorische spelen 
behandeld die te maken heeben met kosten in plaats van winsten. Paragraaf 
4.7 behandelt handelsreizigersspelen. In het algemeen hoeven deze spelen 
niet gebalanceerd te zijn. Deelklassen bestaande uit gebalanceerde spelen 
worden gegeven. Een klasse van spelen die gerelateerd zijn aan handelsreizi-
gersspelen, namelijk routeringsspelen worden gedefinieerd. In tegenstelling 
tot handelreizigersspelen zijn routeringsspelen altijd gebalanceerd. Para-
graaf 4.8 behandelt minimum kosten opspannende boomspelen. Zowel deze 
spelen als de lokatiespelen die in paragraaf 4.9 behandeld worden zijn geba-
lanceerd. 
Hoofdstuk 5 behandelt bankroetspelen. Deze spelen onstaan uit bankroet 
situaties. Drie verdeelregels voor bankroetproblemen worden behandeld. Er 
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behorende bij het proefschrift 
"Cooperative game theory and applications" 
van 
I J . Curiel 
1. Laat de operator M op G ^ gedefinieerd zijn door: 
M(v)(S) := min Vmfi t?) voor alle υ G GN en aUe 5 G 2* . 
*
e I I wés 
Laat ν een symmetrisch spel zijn. Dan is M(v) een convex spel. 
2. De vaste punten van de operator M uit stelling 1 zijn precies de con­
vexe spelen in GN. 
3. Laat TT = < NìXiìX2,...,XniKTiK2,—,K^ > een n-persoonsspel 
in normale vorm zijn met Kj(x) = ~тгц{ц) — ТІ{С{Х)) voor alle 
г G N en alle χ G Χ = Χι Χ Хг Χ · • · -^η- Hier is mj een functie 
van Xi naar lil voor alle г G І en С is een functie van Л" naar IR met 
L := {z G X | C(z) = infxçA· C(a:)} φ 0. Laat Я(С) het bereik van С 
zijn. Een functie Τ van Л(С) naarlRn heet efficiënt als ЦіеЛ^Ду) = у 
voor alle y G R(C). Een functie Г van R(C) naar I I " heet geschikt 
als er een χ G L is die een Nash evenwicht is in Γ Γ . Het spel TT heet 
oplosbaar als Τ efficiënt en geschikt is. 
Als С injectief is dan bestaat er een Τ zo dat Г г oplosbaar is. 
Curiel, I.J. (1987). Cost allocation in a decentralized firm. 
Methods of Operations Research 57 465-475. 
4. Als de functie С in de definitie van Г г uit stelling 3 niet injectiefis dan 
bestaat er een Τ zo dat Г г oplosbaar is dan en slechts dan als er een 
x* G L bestaat met y = C(x-!.1,a;i) = С(х^_2^х2) — ··· = C(x*_n,xn) 
voor zekere Χχ G Xi, X2 € Χ2,···,χ
η
 G Xn impliceert y — C(x*) > 
12ieNÍ.Tni(xi)~mi(xi))· Hier is ( i l^Xj) de vector met j-de coördinaat 
gelijk aan χ* voor alle j φ i en met г-de coördinaat gelijk aan i j . 
5. Laat E een eindige verzameling zijn. Voor alle e G -E is een gewicht 
w(e) > 0 gegeven. Een coöperatief matroïdespel < Ν, ν > wordt als 
volgt gedefinieerd. Voor iedere S £ 2N \ {0} geldt 
v(S) := max У^ wie) 
waarin (E, Ms) een matroïde is. Stel dat 
(i) Ms Π MT = MsnT voor alle S,Te2N\ {0} en 
(ii) MsuT D {C \C = AüB, A E Ms, В G MT) voor alle 5, Τ G 
2"\{0} . 
Dan is ν gebalanceerd. 
6. Het Latijns-Amerikaanse ballroom dansen dat in Europa beoefend 
wordt heeft weinig te maken met het dansen in Latijns-Amerika. 
7. Pijnlijker dan de discriminatie zelf is het goedpraten ervan door men­
sen die men tot zijn vrienden rekent. 
8. Veel wrijving bevordert het gevoel van zelfvertrouwen. 


